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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to conduct a post-relational reading of the 
programme of relational art and its influence upon current aesthetics. 
‘Post’ is not used in the indicative sense here: it does not simply denote 
the passing of the high water mark of relational art’s critical reception. 
Rather, it seeks to identify what remains symptomatically unresolved in 
relational art through a reading of its texts together with its critique. 
Amongst these unresolved problems certain questions endure. The 
question of this art’s claim to autonomy and its problematic mode of 
appearance and materialism remain at large. Ironically it shares the same 
fate as the avant-garde it sought to distance itself from; the failure to 
unite art with the everyday. But it has nevertheless redefined the 
parameters of artistic production: this is its success. I argue that this is 
because relational art was internally riven from its outset by a 
contradiction between its micropolitical structures and the need to find a 
mode of representation that did not transgress its self-imposed taboo 
upon visual representation. I identify a number of strategies that 
relational art has used to address this problem: for example its transitive 
ethics and its separation of ‘the visual’ from formal representations of 
public space and of a liminal counter-public sphere. Above all, I argue 
that its principle of the productive mimesis and translation of social 
relations through art is the guarantor of this art’s autonomy. 
 
My thesis is premised upon the notion that one can learn much about new 
forms of critical art from the precepts and suppositions that informed 
relational aesthetics and its critical reception. Relational aesthetics, in 
fact, establishes the terms of engagement that inform new critical art. 
Above all, this is because the question of the ‘relation of non-relation’ is 
bigger than relational aesthetics. The ‘relation of non-relation’ does not 
denote the impossibility of relation between subjects. Rather, it is a 
category that identifies non-relation as the very source of productive 
relations. This can be applied to those liminal points of separation that 
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delineate the territory of critical art prior to relational aesthetics. For 
example, these instances of ‘non-relation’ appear in the separation of art 
from non-art; of representation from micropolitics and of the anti-
relational opposition of the philosophical categories of the general and 
the particular. Overall, I seek to reclaim Bourriaud as instrumental to the 
re-thinking of these categories and as essential to a reading of current 
critical art discourse. 
 
I identify a number of misreadings of relational aesthetics that result from 
a misrecognition or unwillingness to engage with Nicolas Bourriaud’s 
direct influences: Serge Daney, Michel de Certeau, Gilles Deleuze and 
Louis Althusser are often overlooked in this respect. I argue that 
Bourriaud’s critics tend to bring their own agendas to bear on his work, 
often seeking to remediate what is problematic. These critiques introduce 
existing aesthetic and political paradigms into his work in order to claim 
him as their own. So for example we encounter antagonistic relational 
aesthetics as the reinstatement of the avant-garde. Also, relational 
aesthetics as an immanent critique of the commodity form within a 
selective reading of Theodor Adorno. Also, we encounter dissensual 
relational aesthetics as ‘communities of sense’ that adopt site-specific 
methodologies whose mode of inhabitation of the socius is a reaction to 
relational aesthetics and is premised upon separatism. This diversification 
of relational art’s critique does not address, however, its fundamental 
problems of autonomy and representation. Rather, in different ways, they 
sidestep these issues and duplicate their non-relationality in the form of 
an impasse. 
 
My reading seeks to read the relational programme as a whole and to 
reclaim that which is symptomatically post-relational within it. I think 
that this is important because the critique of Bourriaud is presently 
unduly weighted towards the analysis of Relational Aesthetics1, thus 
important developments within Postproduction (2002) and The Radicant                                                         
1 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. by S. Pleasance and F. Woods, (Dijon: 
Les presses du réel, 2002) 
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(2009) have gone overlooked. Specifically, Bourriaud’s increased 
emphasis upon a topology of forms and an Althusserian ‘aleatory 
materialism’ demand that we ask whether relationality in art is 
ontological or epistemological in form. It also demands that we re-
consider its claims to materialism and critical realism on its own terms. 
 
Bourriaud’s later works are important not simply because they set out 
how relational art might inhabit networks of electronic communication 
but because they begin to develop a more coherent thinking of new 
modes of relational representation. Bourriaud begins to address the 
aporia of micropolitics and representation in his later works. His notion 
of representation becomes increasingly a matter of spatio-temporal 
relation and the representational act becomes increasingly identified with 
the motility of the relational act as a performative presentation. 
 
In the light of these developments, I argue that the thinking of relation 
that has thus far dictated the philosophical analysis of relationality and 
political aesthetics results in an acute anti-relationality or a ‘relational 
anarchism’. This is why the philosophy of Jacques Rancière and Alain 
Badiou respectively, are inadequate to the demands of current aesthetics. 
In fact they hinder its development. On this basis I turn to Rodolphe 
Gashé’s re-thinking of relation. His thinking grants relation a minimal 
ontology that in fact excludes it from philosophy, but at the same time, 
plays a key role in the construction of singularities as new 
epistemological categories. Gashé suggests a unique epistemological 
value for relations and recognizes what is evental within them. These 
singularities find their modes of appearance within various forms of the 
encounter. Gashé’s thought is helpful in that it identifies the non-
relational of relation with its event.  
 
Also, I argue that a theory of post-relational representation is necessary 
to address the ‘weak manifestations of relational art’, although not in a 
transgressive or messianistic form; also, that this thinking of 
representation, when combined with aleatory materialism, produces a 
 8 
broad constituency of representational forms with which to construct a 
more robust critical art. This includes the documentary form. In order to 
address the objections of micropolitics I therefore advance Philip 
Auslander’s notion of the performativity of the document as essential to 
relational aesthetics because it is an art form that in fact requires 
mediation by the visual. My argument is premised upon the 
ineliminability of representation from the aesthetic and moreover, that 
the artwork is constituted within a broad nexus of operations and acts of 
signification. This fragmentary construction is the source of the 
objectivity or critical realism of these practices. I argue that ‘visual’ 
documentation functions as a tool for presencing and connecting relations 
of exchange but is merely one of the forms of representation available to 
visual artists. 
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Introduction  
 
In the mid- 1990s, relational art emerged as a form of practice at the 
same time that the notion of relation was becoming a focus for 
philosophy and political aesthetics. As an art student, and then as a 
practitioner, I was aware of an undercurrent of relational practice that 
appeared to draw upon the cognates of 1960s art, specifically 
performance and collaboration mixed in with later post-conceptual forms 
such as installation art. This art appeared also, to be driven and courted 
by art institutions. An artform that appeared to be modeled upon a site-
specificity that had developed as a reaction to the gallery system in the 
60s appeared to have found a discursive home within galleries and 
museums. This indicated some sort of change in the nature of art 
institutions. Its willingness to host these works seemed to indicate that 
60s and 70s art had become legitimized. A concurrent trend for the re-
enactment of seminal works of performance art seemed to confirm this. 
 
All of this ultimately affected my own practice and in this I was very 
much influenced by Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics. The 
publication of this work in English drew an immediate and robust critical 
response, which appeared to have fizzled out by 2007. The critique 
largely ignored important aspects of the work that were better developed 
in Bourriaud’s other books, Postproduction and The Radicant, leaving 
important questions unanswered. Principally this left unanswered the 
relationship between relational art and the art of the 1960s and 1970s. In 
particular it did not address the documentary forms of relational art, 
which as a practitioner I had to think about practically in terms of 
presenting my own work to an audience. Much of the relational artwork I 
discovered came to me through documentation, but this documentation 
seemed often very matter of fact and understated. Relational art is 
affecting in that it requires some form of documentation but it accepts 
this only reluctantly. This is not so much because it essentialises 
performance, but rather, because it is based upon an anti-representational 
micropolitics. The critique of early relational art failed to recognize the 
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importance of this paradox and its wider implications for an ethics of a 
new critical art and the representative forms it might take. This has 
implications for our notion of the ‘realism’ of documentary forms. I later 
found that other aspects of Bourriaud’s thinking had been missed, for 
example his ideas on topology and the influence of aleatory materialism 
upon his aesthetics. These are themes that I explore in this thesis. 
 
Certain of the unanswered questions of relational aesthetics – its modes 
of representation and its presentation of spatio-temporal relations – have 
persisted within debates around current critical art. I therefore set out to 
read the programme of relational art and its critique together in order to 
see whether relational art continues to exercise an influence over artistic 
production. In the early millennium the concerns of relational art 
appeared to migrate to the internet raising interesting questions about its 
relationship to early network theory. This was a theory whose legitimacy 
was still questioned in the late 1990s. Moreover, it raised questions about 
the mimetic use of forms within relational art and this new art’s 
legitimacy as an autonomous artform. 
 
In the early part of this century then, the focus of critical art moved 
towards an examination of artistic communities and networks. Relational 
art, or rather its critical tools appeared to be swept along with this and 
also with a renewed debate upon the potential forms of a rethinking of 
communism, or communisation. The principles of sharing and creative 
commons at large within relational art therefore became attached to a 
wider debate about art’s sociable forms. And yet, the contradictions 
within relational modes of representation and autonomy have also 
migrated. These are questions that I will be examining within the rubric 
of post-relationality. If the lessons of relational aesthetics are fully 
embraced it may be that we can approach new forms of critical art upon a 
different footing and avoid the repetition of its arguments. 
 
Within political aesthetics the emergence of relational art coincided, as I 
have said, with a return to the question of relation. This was largely 
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explored through the notion of ‘event’ as a principle of social 
transformation. Thus the examination of relational art is co-extensive 
with a re-thinking of the event. Both relational art and philosophical 
aesthetics seemed to share an overriding concern with generally reified 
relations and their resistance to new ways of thinking and existing. In this 
respect my research questions emerge from a productive engagement 
between art and philosophy that characterized the milieu of late nineties 
and early twenty-first century thought. 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is not to present a defence of relational 
aesthetics but to explore its ideas as a working through of certain 
problems within political aesthetics. Bourriaud’s thought was a catalyst 
not so much for finding solutions to the problems of political aesthetics 
as for defining and clarifying them. In this respect it is worthy of our 
continued attention. I argue that even from its inception, relational 
aesthetics was already post-relational. This means that I view early 
relational aesthetics as expressing the conditions of its own impossibility 
within a culture stricken with generally reified relations. This is not to 
present it as a heroic failure. Its success, in fact, was to focus attention 
upon certain precepts or anti-relational norms that in fact threatened the 
success not only of relational art but its successors in communitarian, 
communist, protest and other forms of new critical art. These instances of 
non-relational norms can be seen in the thinking of artistic autonomy that 
relational art radically challenges. They can also be seen in the non-
relation between politics and art presented as a literal demand for art’s 
critical efficacy and the demand for antagonistic forms of art that hark 
back to the transgressive forms of the avant-garde. It can be seen in the 
aporetic demand that relational art appear in its singularity, a problem 
that emerges from the inadequacy of philosophy and in the injunction 
that relational art ‘show itself’ in contradiction to the micropolitical 
prohibition upon ‘speaking for the other’. The non-relation of 
representation and micropolitics cannot simply be swept away with the 
demise of relational practice. It both persists beyond and predates 
relational aesthetics.  
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These aporetic instances of non-relation are conditions for the critical 
realism of relational and subsequent practice. Later relational practice 
devises methodologies that re-define these precepts within productive 
terms and a range of formal strategies and principles of construction that 
produce relation at the heart of their non-relation. All of these strategies 
evince an objectivity upon which I set their credentials as critical realism. 
Within this, strategies of topological construction, translation and 
scripting are important in that they address the problem of artistic 
autonomy by setting out a mode of inhabitation and the use of social 
forms. In addition relational aesthetics makes clear that the object of its 
program is the production of sites of encounter. The discursive sites it 
proposes are ‘counter-public’ realms that operate ‘on the hoof’.  
 
Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism is also important to the realism of 
relational art. Its inductive methodology and anti-teleology are conducive 
to the production of singular constellations that ultimately require diverse 
modes of inscription in order to literally produce their reality. Overall, 
what I am proposing is that the sites of non-relation that are explored 
within relational aesthetics are capable of localization and articulation 
within the use of forms. As a consequence of this approach I identify 
Adorno’s thinking as of central importance to the formulation of a 
language of critical art within the dynamics of globalization. 
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Research Questions 
 
The Primary Research Question 
 
How are the concepts of relation and representation conjoined within 
relational and post-relational political aesthetics and how are these 
concepts evolving within the rubric of a new critical realism, or the 
‘documentary real’? 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine Bourriaud’s proposition that 
new forms of art can be produced through the linkage of social relations 
and by the manipulation of social forms. This may appear a 
straightforward proposition, one that ostensibly harks back to the 
conceptual art and performance art of the 1960s and 1970s. But the 
particular conjuncture within which this proposition arose in the mid 
1990s differs radically from its forebears. The discourse of relational 
aesthetics is played out against the backdrop of globalisation and the 
need to develop a language, form and methodology for artistic practice 
within network culture. The conjuncture in which relation re-appears as 
form, is marked by an accelerated commodification of social relations 
and an attendant anxiety about the seeming stranglehold of an 
identitarian culture over social relations. It is also a reaction to 
postmodernism. Bourriaud claims that his work is a reaction to a 
redundancy or malaise within postmodern thought that contests 
‘meaning’ all the way to its origin and yet he annexes postmodern 
thinking as a methodology for the production of new forms of artistic 
sociability. Thus the primary question might equally have been framed in 
the following terms: how might novel non-identical or singular forms of 
relation emerge and what is the mechanism for social transformation and 
artistic agency? It might be objected that this advances us no further than 
the sociable forms of art developed in the avant-garde. What is particular 
to the way relational practices set about this task is Bourriaud’s assertion 
of relational aesthetics’ materialism against its ‘meaning’; its anti-idealist 
stance and its inhabitation and translation of the forms of non-art. Above 
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all, relational aesthetics aspires to ‘represent’ a form of realism through 
largely non-visual methodologies. The practice of documentation 
increasingly gives way to forms of relational construction and topology 
and this principle of nomination calls into question the very notion of 
representation itself. It is the exploration of these consequences of the 
basic proposition of relational form that furnish my additional research 
questions.  
 
Why has the question of relation emerged as a problem for culture 
generally? Why does the discourse of relationality dominate political 
aesthetics and philosophy? 
 
I identify the discourse of relation with the contestation of realism and 
forms of social representation and in particular with pessimism around 
the possibility of social transformation within the hegemonic forms of 
advanced capitalism. Although not a thinker of relation as such, Mark 
Fisher, for example, claims that what is being contested in our current 
milieu, is the hegemony of ‘capitalist realism’. In his reflections upon 
‘capitalist realism’, Fisher notes the maxim, ‘it is easier to imagine the 
end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism’ which he 
attributes to both Slavoj Žižek and Fredric Jameson.2 In short, change 
appears impossible. I call this condition ‘relational hypostasis’. 
 
Relational hypostasis is not a concept, far from it. It is a term that 
identifies a symptom within our particular conjuncture of globalized 
capital that has persisted and mutated over time. It is by no means new. It 
can be seen in Georg Lukács writings on class-consciousness and 
reification. I take from Lukács the notion that whenever general 
consciousness is unaware of the reification of social relations within the 
form of capital, this produces the conditions for either despair or 
opportunism. On the latter point, without a critical mass of                                                         
2 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is there no Alternative? (Ropley, Hampshire: Zero 
Books, 2009), p.2. 
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consciousness, a minority of ‘politically engaged artists’ habitually resort 
to acts of idealism, committed art and literalism that betray the 
complexity of art’s sociable forms of praxis. We might say that the 
critique of consciousness and reification are ‘at large’ within the critique 
of relational aesthetics fidelity to political goals, ethical efficacy and 
forms of representation. 
 
The symptom of relational hypostasis can also be traced to Adorno’s 
Critique of Enlightenment. Adorno’s critique of identitarian thinking, and 
of thinking both with and against the concept is indicative of the paradox 
of relational hypostasis: that the negation of the concept entails not its 
disavowal but rather its critical suspension: this is the argument of ‘The 
baby with the bathwater’.3 Hypostatic relations are the hosts of critical 
thinking but theory can no longer be regarded as parasitic or directly 
critical. Critical thinking is seamless in its inhabitation of its host; it is a 
social morphology. This demands then that the critique of relational 
hypostasis be immanent in its methodology and inhabit the very forms 
that are its object.  
 
The overall problem of relational hypostasis can be diagnosed in Alain 
Badiou’s theoretical writing. Badiou’s classicism, his tendency towards 
‘monumental constructions’ in thought, produces a binary articulation of 
relational hypostasis as the absolute relation of non-relation between the 
particular and the singular. The nomenclature is not specific to Badiou. 
He echoes a general philosophical concern with the relationship between 
the universal and the particular, which produces anti-relational thought. 
What I take from Badiou in my understanding of relational hypostasis is 
this: firstly, any rethinking of the ontology of relation is impossible 
within a system that separates multiplicity from the finite. Such a system 
produces its own crisis of representation through its adherence to an 
ontological division between what is ‘present’ and that which ‘appears’. 
Secondly I take from Badiou, and this is my understanding, that the                                                         
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. by 
E.F.N. Jephcott (London and New York: Verso, 2005), p.43. 
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question of relation only becomes important for thought when a crisis of 
established relations occurs. This is to say that the question of relation 
comes to the fore only at the point that it is already post-relational. From 
my perspective, Badiou’s logic and meta-ontology in Being and Event 
are symptomatic of the need to re-think relation within new terms: these 
terms are post-relational in the sense that they can no longer be thought 
within the rubric of the universal and the particular. 
 
Jacques Rancière’s thinking of relation is yet another component within 
my thinking of relational hypostasis. Rancière embraces relational 
encounter as a principle of social action, but his refusal of established 
institutions and social structures seems to endorse an opportunistic and 
committed art that fails to connect with the socius. What I take from 
Rancière is the crucial insight that the interrogation of relational 
hypostasis entails a re-thinking of representation that encompasses the 
forms of non-art and the systems of distribution and exchange that dictate 
appearance: thus the ‘operations of the image’ can be read within 
Bourriaud’s ‘operative realism’. 
 
Why have relational and post-relational practices returned to the 
ontology of the event? 
 
In The Radicant, Bourriaud claims that: ‘the modern favors the event 
over monumental order, the ephemeral over an eternity writ in stone; it is 
a defense of fluidity against omnipresent reification.’4 He is speaking 
here of a rejuvenated modernism or ‘altermodernism’ in which concrete 
material relations might be constructed by artists rather than any 
idealistic programme for social change that he associates with 
modernism’s previous incarnation. 
 
The importance of the ‘event’ in relational and post-relational art practice 
is linked to a desire to overcome ‘omnipresent reification’ or, relationally                                                         
4 Nicolas Bourriaud, The Radicant (New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2002), p. 16. 
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hypostatic terms. Its emergence is linked to the need to imagine the 
possibility of social transformation. The ‘event’ thus becomes a conduit 
for the emergence of hitherto unimagined relational forms. 
 
It must be emphasized that there are many ways in which the event is 
currently being thought. My thesis reflects this diversity and seeks to 
highlight some of the difficulties involved in reconciling them. For 
example, Bourriaud’s thinking of the event is influenced by Althusser’s 
aleatory materialism. I believe that Bourriaud takes up Althusser’s 
principle of the ‘necessity of contingency’ – that is, a belief that 
established facts are always contingent and can be made otherwise. This 
is fundamental to relational aesthetics’ programme of social change. In 
Bourriaud’s hands, this becomes the basis of a principle of artistic-social 
agency. What this entails, then, is a belief that events can be both 
anticipated and engineered. In this respect, his outlook is similar to 
Rancière. Rancière acknowledges that events are rare but grants artistic 
agency a similarly privileged position. However, this position is 
contestable on the basis that it is not a true reading of the event. 
 
For Badiou, the appearance of events is posited as the (im)possible 
appearance of the singular within the particular. In addition, for the most 
part his writing has ruled out the possibility of producing events. This 
makes sense within Badiou’s overall system on the basis that a true 
singularity is by definition unthinkable. Notwithstanding his 
pronouncements upon sites of torsion and susceptibility as places of 
subjectivisation, it is fair to say that Badiou places agency within post-
evental fidelity. That is, the event never appears as such but can be 
viewed post hoc in the fidelity demonstrated by its subjects. Badiou’s 
notion of the event is therefore implicative. A major part of my 
philosophical reflection will therefore be concerned with this problematic 
relationship between event and subjective agent. This paradox in fact 
demands the rethinking of relation as itself an evental movement, 
addressed through a reading of Gashé’s work in Chapter 4. 
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What is the relationship between relational and post-relational practice 
and the historical and neo-avant-gardes? How have the cognates of 
sociability within previous forms of ‘socially engaged practice’ 
translated into the rubric of relationality? 
 
Bourriaud rejects the reading of relational aesthetics under the rubric of 
the avant-garde to the extent that he seeks to avoid placing his polemics 
within the teleology and idealism of modernism. Notwithstanding that he 
outlines a programme for a new modernism this is less a 
recommencement of modernism than it is a reaction against what he sees 
as the sterility of postmodernity. Rather he seeks to break with any 
historical or teleological reading of his project in order to assert its 
materialism against any idealistic reading. This is entirely consistent with 
his incorporation of Althusser’s ‘aleatory materialism’ as a methodology 
for relational, postproductive and radicant practices. I suspect also that 
Bourriaud’s disengagement with the avant-garde is a rhetorical device 
that allows him to underscore what is radically different within the 
conjuncture of relationality, namely the imperative for artists to inhabit 
and manipulate forms within globalised culture under what I term 
symptomatic conditions of ‘relational hypostasis’. Bourriaud does 
acknowledge the importance of the avant-garde as a specific conjuncture 
within art and also the translation and re-enactment of its concepts and 
methodologies within contemporary practice. But his critical position is 
that of a re-invention of modernity as a utilitarian and materialist 
practice. I do not seek to go against the grain of Bourriaud’s position by 
placing relational practice within the teleology of the historical or neo 
avant-gardes. However I feel that an overview of relational practice 
warrants some examination of the avant-garde in order to shed light on 
the importance of these inherited forms and methodologies. I am thinking 
in particular of the cognates of sociability: performance, participation and 
collaboration; and also, avant-garde methodologies of constructed forms: 
inorganicity, collage and montage, translated in the relational idiom to 
principles of the immediacy of social activism. In terms of the critical 
reception of relational aesthetics it is important to recognise that 
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misunderstandings have arisen because Bourriaud’s interlocutors have 
adopted positions informed by theories of the avant-garde. This is crucial 
for example to understanding the dispute concerning the autonomy of 
relational art.  
 
What are the consequences for the theory of artistic autonomy of 
relational and post-relational artistic practice? Can the theory of 
autonomy be maintained in the light of these practices? In other words, 
what gives these practices their distinctive character as art? 
 
The broad critical response to the publication of Relational Aesthetics 
derives largely from a defence of artistic autonomy against Bourriaud’s 
seemingly promiscuous adoption of the forms of non-art to relational 
practice. Whilst it is generally accepted amongst Bourriaud’s 
interlocutors that there must be some form of connection between 
autonomous art and that which is heteronomous to it, the charge is that 
Bourriaud subsumes artistic autonomy beneath artistic heteronomy. 
Generally then, the criticism is that Bourriaud goes ‘too far’. This thesis 
addresses the prepositions upon which this claim is founded. In particular 
it will be concerned with the nature of the point of separation between art 
and non-art and seek to re-define artistic autonomy within the rubric of 
relational art. This entails an exploration of the following question: 
 
In what sense are relational and post-relational artists as ‘tenants of 
culture’ employing the use of forms mimetically?  
 
Is it fair to say that ‘mimetic’ practices merely duplicate or parody the 
social forms they seek to inhabit? If this is correct, then the charge that 
relational practices are subsumed under forms that are heteronomous to 
art, (that relational art is no longer identifiable as ‘art’), would appear to 
be justified. If, on the other hand, we look to Bourriaud’s precise 
methodology of formal mimesis, that is, as acts of translation, re-
temporalisation, scripting and topological nomination, the fear of artistic 
 20 
heteronomy appears to be exaggerated. From this perspective what is 
produced in the act of mimesis is decidedly not ‘the same’. 
 
From an Adornian perspective one might argue that the model of 
mimesis used in the critique of relational aesthetics, (the parodic or 
reductive imitation of forms) is tainted with identitarian rational thought. 
For Adorno, mimesis is the means by which we adapt to an environment. 
It occupies the realm of pre-rational knowing in the sense that it is an 
instinctive act that is overlooked and devalued by the abstraction and 
rationalism of enlightenment thought. My analysis will seek to construct 
a model of mimesis that is adequate to a faithful reading of Bourriaud 
and which I think will shed a different light on the nature of relational 
art’s claims to autonomy. 
 
What is the nature of relational art’s engagement with archival practices 
and informational networks of expanded authorship within contemporary 
art practice? 
 
This question arises in the context of the postproductive and radicant 
practices advanced in Bourriaud’s extension of relational art into the 
sphere of internet art. Bourriaud considers that electronic communication 
and its networks of exchange can be appropriated to the objectives of 
relational art. In other words, these forms can be re-used in the 
construction of novel topologies of relation. The legitimacy of internet 
art’s emancipatory potential has been questioned from its inception on 
the basis that it aligns itself too closely with the instrumental reason of 
advanced capital and its processes of de- and re-territorialising 
subjectivity and community. Bourriaud’s postproductive and radicant 
forms of relational art, thus place themselves within an acute 
reformulation and anxiety surrounding the continued status of artistic 
autonomy. 
 
Relational artworks can take many forms including gallery-based works, 
online networks of expanded authorship and experimental communities. 
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Can we yet discern a new artistic form of post-relationality? What is the 
difference between relational and post-relational artistic practice? 
 
My thesis posits an emergent form of post-relationality. This is not to 
suggest that we can or should ascribe to this the status of a concept, nor 
should it add another ‘ism’ to the canon of art history. ‘Post-relationality’ 
is used in this thesis as a term for a number of symptoms, often retrogade 
movements, in the thinking of relationality in art and philosophy. As 
such, I regard it as a dynamic principle that informs everything that 
follows. In order to demonstrate this I will set out the facets of post-
relational thinking that inform the research question. I will set this out by 
way of a constellation. 
 
If I were concerned to conceptualise the ‘post-relational’ I could find a 
convenient point of demarcation between Bourriaud’s account of early 
gallery and institutionally based relational art practice and its subsequent 
inhabitation of informational networks and communities of sense. 
However, relational art develops unevenly and I wish to avoid 
historicizing its development. It is fair to say that post-relationality 
entails an extension of the use of forms, specifically as a means of 
employing forms as non-visual representation. It is the broadening of the 
search for non-visual communicative forms that marks the post-relational 
within the theories of post-representation.  
 
Post-relationality can also be viewed as the symptomatic re-thinking of 
relation as aformal and intricate against the binarisms of classical thought 
that generally ascribe no quality to relation. On this basis, one could say 
that post-relationality entails the use of anti-philosophy in its opposition 
to the exclusion of relation from classical ontology. More broadly, we 
could say that post-relationality marks a moment in which heterological 
thinking enters aesthetics as a principle of construction for new 
knowledge, rather than its deconstruction and in which the specificity of 
relation is rescued and divorced from its ontological determination. 
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The financial crisis in 2008 precipitated the reinvention of relational 
aesthetics as a strain of communist-enclave thinking. The effect of this 
crisis upon consciousness was to impress upon us the extent to which 
relational hypostasis has taken hold. The crisis appears to have no 
solution and therefore the demand for ‘better ways of living’ now has a 
more populist appeal. Post-relationality is then the full appearance to 
consciousness of reified relations as relationally hypostatic. Relational art 
appears only because the hypostasis of relation has already passed its 
zenith. It is only when something begins to disappear that its concept 
becomes apparent. 
 
Relational art was post-relational from its inception. I think that the post-
relational attitude to relational art is to view it as a framing mechanism. It 
presented itself initially as an (im)possible programme for art in the light 
of generally reified relations. 
 
Post-relationality is the formulation of modes of representation for 
micropolitics against its anti-visual paradigm. It relies upon a new 
conjuncture of aesthetics with topological presentation.  
 
Post-relationality is a critique of finitude and of ‘nature’. Once the 
aleatory materialist content of relational art is fully recognized it 
becomes aligned with the thinking of the necessity of contingency. This 
mode of thought reverses the ‘capitalist realist’ perspective in which 
change is seen as impossible or unlikely. It emphasizes the historical 
contingency of existing relations. 
 
Given that relational aesthetics is founded upon a micropolitics that is 
inimical to representation and in particular, to ‘visual representation’, 
what would be an adequate model of the forms of representation 
proposed by relational and post-relational artistic practices? What are 
the various forms of representation implicated within relational art and 
what might a relational ‘topology’ offer in terms of beginning to speak of 
new forms of representation such as ‘relational shapes’ and matrices? 
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Relational aesthetics emerges from a distinctly anti-representational 
milieu. This can be traced back in part, although not exclusively, to Felix 
Guattari’s micropolitics. Guattari proposes a micropolitics that works 
against representation and in particular its repressive and ideological 
function in the production of meaning.5 All of this begs the question: 
what are artists to do in the face of this de facto prohibition of images? 
Moreover, what tools are available for political art in bringing a critique 
of capitalist forms of subjectivity into consciousness? A potential artistic 
reinvestment in representation does not simply entail an about turn: a 
rejection of micropolitics in favour of the political expediency of a 
‘committed art’. Rather the question entails a wholesale reconfiguration 
of representation within the conjunction of globalized artistic discourse 
identified by Bourriaud in Postproduction and The Radicant. What are 
the forms of representation adequate to a changed reality? It is fair to say 
that Bourriaud embraces the notion of representation as an act and that 
this is, in some part, because he understands the finitude and historically 
contingent nature of ideology. 
 
The overall project of relational art is as a critique of ‘the visual’, a term 
that Bourriaud derives from Serge Daney’s analysis. However, this is not 
to say that relational aesthetics does not advocate a form of 
representation of its own. Nor is representation considered a ‘necessary 
evil’, a recurrent tendency in accounts of the ontology of ‘live art’.  On 
my reading, what Bourriaud proposes is an expedient use of the various 
forms of representation at large within the socius which, through 
processes of translation, relocation and linkage constitute liminal 
matrices or constellations that might be read as singular representational 
forms. This singularity is, though, based upon a principle of 
multiplication rather than negation. 
 
                                                        
5 Felix Guattari, Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics (New York: Peregrine, 
1984) 
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This notion of multiplication in Bourriaud’s work requires some 
explication: I will begin by setting out some of the forms of 
representation that we find within relational art practice. Relational art is 
often read as hostile to the production of artistic objects of contemplation 
that might fit under the rubric of viewership we might apply to the plastic 
arts. (It is more accurate to say that these objects are regarded as 
particular forms rather than as ideological presentations.) Any critique of 
relational art that operates from a reading of its disavowal of the object is 
therefore prone to asserting that relational art produces nothing that one 
might term art and therefore demands of relational art that it demonstrate 
its utilitarian or ethical credentials. Bourriaud’s critique of ‘the visual’ is 
certainly a cornerstone of relational aesthetics, but is simply one facet of 
his programme. I believe it is important to read Bourriaud with 
Rancière’s critique of ‘the future of the image’ as an expansion of the 
image into the currency of its networks of circulation. In addition, to read 
Bourriaud with Auslander’s critique of ‘liveness’ which both addresses 
the image as a mediator of the event but also re-temporalises and re-
spatialises the operations of the image into an expanded field of 
viewership. However, a full reading of the representation of relation 
requires a consideration of numerous other representational forms: how 
then do relational artworks translate and re-territorialise the 
representative forms of democracy? In particular, how does the liminal 
site relate to the forms of the public and counter-public spheres? This 
requires some reading of relational aesthetics within the rubric of Jürgen 
Habermas’ and Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge’s writings. It requires 
in fact a critique of the forms of the ‘misrepresentation’ of the public 
realm. In addition, what are the representative forms of subjectivity 
proposed by relational aesthetics? How do these relate to the notion of 
subjective configurations and to the performative aspects of labour and 
general social technique within the informationalised sphere of 
production?  
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Where is the work? What is the ontology and function of the artistic 
document within the social system of relational art? 
 
As I have indicated, the complexity of relational forms of representation 
has steered the critique of relational aesthetics towards an enquiry into 
the nature of its object(s). Relational and post-relational artworks 
commonly rely upon methodologies of performance or ‘live art’. Thus 
like their predecessors they find an audience through the circulation and 
dissemination of documentary material. The tendency of relational works 
in particular to disappear invites the reactivation of debates around the 
ontology of performance art, which traditionally privileges the 
‘unmarked’ nature of performance over its secondary documentation. 
Within the critique of relational aesthetics, the ontology of 
documentation takes on a renewed significance. The essentialist ontology 
of the unmarked performance has a political import in that unlike the still 
or moving image document, it lays claim to resisting commodification. 
Bourriaud regards the dissolution of such an ontological divide as 
‘established fact’: the question ‘where is the work’ is subsumed by 
broader considerations about the nature of postproductive artistic 
technique and the nature of representation within globalised networks of 
exchange. The question, ‘where is the work?’ is, therefore, a corollary of 
the question of how relational forms should be represented, or rather 
articulated, within a matrix of relation. The question requires 
modification from an ontological enquiry towards an analysis of the 
function of documentation as an operation of ‘critical realism’. 
 
What might a model of the documentary real or more broadly critical 
realism look like? Can relational practice make a claim to critical 
realism? In particular, what can Bourriaud’s notion of operational 
realism contribute to the renewed debate around realism within 
representation? 
 
Relational art is generally available to its audience through its visual 
documentation, but it is an anti-visual aesthetics. Thus, there is a paradox 
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at the heart of relational aesthetics. If one simply ignores this, and some 
relational artists do, by embracing photographic documentation, then 
what is essential to relational aesthetics, its micropolitics, cannot be 
maintained. What is required is therefore some re-thinking of the 
ontology of artistic documentation as no longer a secondary material. 
That is, it might be thought of as performative in its own right. It both 
presences the work and is productive of arts sociable forms. My question 
is whether a notion of the documentary real as a singular presentation (in 
Adorno’s terms, objective) can form the basis of a new critical realism. 
What are the strategies and operations within relational art’s 
methodologies and forms that might constitute it as a form of critical 
realism? This requires not a thinking of realism in terms of the power of 
representations, but in terms of a matrix of relational forms that are made 
to represent. 
 
Political aesthetics has been dominated in the early twenty-first century 
by the relational philosophy of Jacques Rancière and the anti-relational 
philosophy of Alain Badiou. Are their philosophical positions adequate 
to the analysis of relational and post-relational art? 
 
In the past decade, the discourse of political aesthetics has been 
dominated by the theoretical positions of Badiou and Rancière. 
Rancière’s work in particular has been well received by theorists and 
practitioners of relationality and post-relationality for two principal 
reasons. Firstly, Rancière embraces the notion of montage as a principle 
of social action and secondly, his stance on artistic autonomy, which 
entails a willingness to embrace hybrid forms of art and the relationship 
of imbrication between art and non-art, is homologous to the 
interdisciplinary forms of relational practice.  Whilst Rancière is willing 
to accept that there is nothing ‘proper to art’, his unwillingness to 
entertain a version of relationality capable of inhabiting existing social 
structures and institutions is problematic. This is because one cannot be 
certain when and where new relations might ‘take hold’. In other words, 
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his analysis lacks a materialist focus or topology for any lasting 
instantiation of new relations.  
 
The strength of Badiou’s analysis on the other hand is his emphasis upon 
topology as the site of subjective determination within a given 
configuration. In addition, his logic of appearing provides a compelling 
analysis of the persistence of structures of domination that preclude the 
appearance of singular or novel relations. Badiou’s Maoist principle of 
cellular political organisation has found a sympathetic reception amongst 
post-relational practitioners in that it appears to provide a model for 
micropolitical structures of artistic collaboration. In addition, one might 
have expected Badiou’s insistence that an artwork operates as a linking 
principle within a chain of other works, a model of configuration, to have 
struck a chord. On the whole there has been little take-up of Badiou’s 
approach within the discussion of relational practice. Why is this? Firstly, 
Badiou’s position is abstract and anti-relational to the core. He offers no 
example of the emergence of new relations through the sensible other 
than through the miraculous appearance of events. Whilst he is able to 
supply a brilliant logical analysis of the problem of relational hypostasis, 
he offers little by way of encouragement to artists who might look to him 
for a principle of social agency. Secondly, Badiou’s insistence upon the 
separation of art from politics and his unwillingness to accept hybrid 
forms of art has also alienated him from the constituency of relational art. 
 
The problem that this particular research question addresses is then a 
persistent binarism between a non-materialist relationality in Rancière 
and a materialist anti-relationality in Badiou. These approaches 
themselves constitute a relation of non-relation at the heart of political 
aesthetics. The deeper import of the question is whether a political 
aesthetics driven by the strictures of philosophy and its objects is in fact 
hindering a proper discussion of relationality. 
 
The question then becomes whether relation can be re-thought in ways 
that might free its conceptualization from the constraints of the singular 
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and the sovereign: namely its presentation within the tropes of the 
particular and the universal through which philosophy conceptualizes its 
objects. 
 
Can relational and post-relational art substantiate its claim to be a 
materialist aesthetics and if so, in what sense? 
 
Bourriaud’s ‘random materialism’ is essential to a faithful reading of 
relational art. A materialist aesthetics is for Bourriaud axiomatic to his 
thinking. He draws upon Althusser’s philosophy of the encounter and 
notion of aleatory materialism. Althusser claims that a hidden strain or 
‘undercurrent’ of materialist philosophy can be traced back to Epicurus. 
This is not in any way an idealist philosophy. Its basic tenet is that 
materialism, i.e. what appears as ‘established fact’, arises from random 
encounters and deviations within the Epicurian ‘rain’ of multiplicity or 
the purely heterogeneous. Thus within Althusser’s materialism the 
appearance of things does not rely upon any a priori of the concept. 
Rather it is the product of a deviation and encounter within the rain of 
multiplicity that produces a pile up of atoms. This may sound fanciful 
and I will be examining aleatory materialism in detail in my first chapter. 
For present purposes this question arises from my conviction that what is 
incontestable is that Bourriaud’s adoption of random materialism 
produces manifold consequences for any reading of his methodology and 
for an understanding of his approach to the question of sociability. In 
terms of methodology, Bourriaud’s materialism entails a working against 
conceptualization and favours a principle of construction that always 
proceeds inductively from the fragment towards a network or matrix of 
forms. In this respect, he falls within a genealogy that can be traced back 
to Walter Benjamin. Bourriaud’s cognates of sociability (collaboration, 
participation, encounter and event) can only be faithfully read within the 
rubric of his materialism. The importance of Althusser’s influence upon 
Bourriaud’s materialism is missed in much of the critical response to 
relational aesthetics. This is a central argument for this thesis. Moreover, 
if one fully appreciates the implications of Bourriaud’s materialism the 
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discourse of material and immaterial labour can be seen as having 
exercised a disproportionate influence over the reception of relational art.  
 
To return to the question: in what sense can Bourriaud’s work lay claim 
to a materialist aesthetics? Bourriaud’s materialism is crucial to my 
reading of relational and post-relational representation as a matrix of 
forms. This reading entails a development of Bourriaud’s position 
through an exploration of the philosophy of relation itself. In particular, I 
will read the ‘undercurrent’ of aleatory materialism along side Gashé’s 
re-thinking of relation. Gashé’s analysis of the indeterminacy of 
relational ontology identifies relation as a minimal form of being or ens 
minimum. As both an influence upon thought but not a thing as such, 
relation occupies an acute relation of non-relation to the history of 
classical philosophy. The ontology of relation is therefore something of 
an undercurrent in its own right. My thinking of post-relational forms of 
representation reads aleatory materialism as contiguous with Gashé’s 
notion of ‘relational shape’. In addition, it seeks to place Bourriaud’s 
thought within what I identify symptomatically as a heterological 
thinking of materialism that has emerged from the intellectual burnout of 
deconstructive thought. 
 
Original Contributions to Knowledge  
 
My thesis provides an original contribution to knowledge in that it 
examines systematically the reason for art’s current subsumption beneath 
the rubric of relationality. It presents a review not only of the key 
polemics of relational art but a reading of its critical reception and 
developments that have occurred in the wake of this.  Thus I investigate 
the conditions of post-relational art and in particular its emerging 
theories of representation and materialism. 
 
The model of post-relational representation I propose is unique in that it 
links the recent defence of representation to symptomatic movements in 
Bourriaud’s thought going back to Relational Aesthetics. Thus it 
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identifies the kernel of the current arguments within aporias that arise in 
the use of micropolitics within relational art that were present from the 
start. 
 
My thesis’ claim to originality also lies in addressing the anti-relational 
philosophy of Alain Badiou and the relational thought of Jacques 
Rancière not as the conclusion to the analysis of philosophical relation, 
as has previously been the case, but as a premise for a re-thinking of 
relation. This combines the philosophy of Gashé with the aleatory 
materialism of Althusser and Bourriaud. It combines the thinking of 
aformal relational shape advanced by Gashé with the modelling of 
formal matrices advanced by Bourriaud in order to arrive at a first 
statement of post-relational aesthetics. 
 
In addition, I propose an original interpretation of the event in art. Rather 
than externalising the event as a providential or absent third term 
between the singular and the particular, it places the event at the heart of 
the ‘minimal relation’. Gashé has proposed this on the basis that it 
represents a lost thinking of relation. Where I advance upon Gashé’s 
position is that I place the event at the heart of Bourriaud’s transitive 
ethics of encounter. 
 
My methodology is original in that it productively combines what is 
homologous in Adorno and Bourriaud’s methodologies without ignoring 
their differences. It is a methodology constructed out of the principles of 
their inductive thought and use of the fragment against conceptualisation, 
history or teleology. Bourriaud’s critics have paid his methodology scant 
attention. Throughout this thesis, I point out where this produces a 
misreading of the programme of relational art. 
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Methodology 
 
On Bourriaud’s and Adorno’s Homologous Methodologies 
 
Adorno’s ‘The Essay as Form’6 is, I think, a legitimate point of entry into 
Bourriaud’s methodology in Relational Aesthetics. Adorno states, ‘the 
effort of the essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without 
scruple, on what others have already done.’7 This seems to me 
homologous to the credo of Postproduction as the appropriation and use 
of pre-existing forms. It also reflects the tenor of Bourriaud’s polemical 
methodology. 
 
If Adorno is at all ‘at large’ in Bourriaud’s aesthetics then his direct 
influence is acknowledged only obliquely or negatively. There is a 
reference to the ‘completely administered world’ within Relational 
Aesthetics8, more or less a clarion call of Adorno’s critique of identitarian 
thinking, but this is countered by another remark that Frankfurt School 
philosophy is a ‘magnificent but ineffectual toy’.9  
 
Bourriaud’s rejection of the Frankfurt School is based upon his 
scepticism about its ‘directly critical’ approach and his preference for 
‘micro-utopian’ strategies. He says, for example, that: 
 
Social utopias and revolutionary hopes have given way to everyday micro-
utopias and imitative strategies, any stance that is ‘directly’ critical of society is 
futile, if based on the illusion of a marginality that is nowadays impossible, not 
to say regressive.10 
 
This is, in fact, a reductive reading of Adorno’s aesthetics because in 
essence, Adorno is anything but a political opportunist and in my view it                                                         
6 Theodor W. Adorno ‘The Essay as Form’, in B. O’Connor The Adorno Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) 
7 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, pp. 91-111. 
8 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.76. 
9 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.31. 
10 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.31. 
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is in fact the indirectness of his criticality and his engagement with the 
concept through multiple and partial readings of the object that 
characterise his thought. The distinction between them perhaps lies in the 
fact that whereas Adorno presents aesthetics negatively as an index falsi 
of the world Bourriaud appears to present relational forms on an 
affirmative footing. However, even Adorno recognises what is positive in 
the negative dialectical method on the basis that it ‘respects its object’. 11 
 
Any attempt to construct a genealogy of relational aesthetics can at times 
be a difficult task, much to the frustration of Bourriaud’s critics. The 
caveat here is of course that Bourriaud’s critics generally seek to force 
relational aesthetics into a genealogy that suits their own intellectual 
proclivities, rather than his. Any attempt to place Bourriaud’s work 
within a linear teleology would be a disavowal of his materialist 
aesthetics. Rather than placing Bourriaud against Bourriaud, within the 
direct lineage of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, I intend to examine the 
homologies between these thinkers, to read them syncretically. In fidelity 
to the principles of relational thought I will place them within a 
diachronic relation. One of the essential features of Bourriaud’s thought 
is his idea that new spatio-temporal relations produce new conditions for 
knowledge. On this basis I will be ‘producing’ a relation between Adorno 
and Bourriaud across time that strictly speaking is not there. I do this in 
order to arrive at a methodology that is adequate to a faithful reading of 
both thinkers. 
 
What I propose to do then is to read Bourriaud through Adorno and vice 
versa. Specifically, there is a mutual commitment by both theorists to an 
inductive methodology, one that entails the arrangement of fragments 
into constellations, networks or matrices of meaning that proceed from an 
anti-teleological premise.  This similarity in approach to the use of the 
‘fragment’ gives to their writing a similar complexion. Both 
                                                        
11 T W Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970)  
pp. 144-146. 
 33 
acknowledge, in fact, the influence upon their inductive methodologies of 
Walter Benjamin’s thought.  
 
I will be reading Adorno – who is the exemplary thinker and anticipator 
of post-modern method through the notion of Darstellung (a presentation 
that does not define its concept) and the essay as the praxis of writing-
form – with Bourriaud, who rejects postmodernism in favour of an 
aleatory-materialist modernity. Fredric Jameson makes the case for a 
reading of Adorno as a thinker of the postmodern on the basis that his 
‘prophecies of the “total system”’ finally came true, in wholly 
unexpected forms.’12 He says that although Adorno’s dialectics may have 
seemed unfashionable in the 1970’s: 
 
there is some chance that he may turn out to have been the analyst of our own 
period, which he did not live to see, and in which late capitalism has all but 
succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes of nature and of the Unconscious, 
of subversion and the aesthetic, of individual and collective praxis alike, and, 
with a final fillip, in eliminating any memory trace of what thereby no longer 
existed in the henceforth postmodern landscape.13 
 
If Adorno anticipates this state of affairs, variously in, for example, his 
reflections upon the poverty of philosophy, his critique of positivism and 
enlightenment rationalism and his better-known analysis, with 
Horkheimer, of the culture industry, then he anticipates also that the 
future will require a new formal working methodology. His response 
comes in his thinking on the form of the essay and its principle of 
fragmentary construction as constellation.  
 
For his part, Bourriaud not only uses this kind of methodology in his own 
polemics, but extends the principle of the fragment into a form of social 
action: the construction of liminal sites of relation, and the post-
production of forms. One of the best examples of Bourriaud’s                                                         
12 Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, ThePersistence of the Dialectic (London 
and New York: Verso, 1996), p.5. 
13 Jameson, Late Marxism, p.5. 
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methodology and I hope, for that matter, a vindication of my own 
syncretic methodology in reading him with Adorno, comes in a section of 
Postproduction: ‘Deejaying and Contemporary Art: Similar 
Configurations’.14 Bourriaud begins with the following description: 
‘When the crossfader of the mixing board is set in the middle, two 
samples are played simultaneously…’ Bourriaud then seeks to 
contextualise the metaphor of mixing within the blurring of the 
distinction between consumption and production. He claims that, ‘The 
ecstatic consumer of the eighties is fading out in favour of an intelligent 
and potentially subversive consumer: the user of forms’.15 This, he says, 
will extend ‘DIY’ to all levels of cultural production. Significantly for 
me, he points out that: 
 
DJ culture denies the binary oppositions between the proposal of the 
transmitter and the participation of the receiver at the heart of many debates on 
modern art. The work of the DJ consists in conceiving linkages through which 
the works flow into each other, representing at once a product, a tool, and a 
medium. The producer is only a transmitter for the following producer, and 
each artist from now on evolves in a network of contiguous forms that dovetail 
endlessly.16 
 
If indeed this model extends to all areas of cultural production then it 
would be disingenuous of me to ignore this within my own methodology. 
Therefore my syncretic reading and my structure reflect this. On the 
latter point, I do not analyse individual works of art or seek to place them 
within any taxonomy. Rather, I seek to read relational practice across 
questions of their social imbrication, technological determination, 
philosophical-aesthetic implications and representative capacities. This 
approach dictates the structure of this thesis. It is important to read post-
relational aesthetics symptomatically and I emhasise that this cannot 
amount to a definitive account.                                                         
14 Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprogrammes 
the World (New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2002), p.39. 
15 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.39. 
16 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.40. 
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Reification and Relational Hypostasis 
 
To return to Bourriaud’s oblique references to Adorno: Bourriaud accepts 
the problem of the reified and ‘completely administered world’ as the 
premise for a thinking of a corrective relational aesthetics. He says, ‘The 
space of current relations is…the space most affected by general 
reification.’17 And yet Bourriaud’s project appears to embrace and 
appropriate these reified relational forms appears, on the face of it, at 
odds with Adorno’s model of art’s ‘relative’ autonomy. Thus, Adorno’s 
thinking of political aesthetics would appear too rigid to accommodate 
the fluidity of Bourriaud’s thinking of the relationship between art and 
non-art. In other words, Bourriaud appears to take greater risks with 
artistic autonomy than does Adorno. However, I do not think this 
problem is insurmountable. Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory contains many 
expositions of artistic autonomy and it would, I think, be hasty and 
reductive to ‘nail down’ a definitive statement of his position without 
taking into consideration both Adorno’s overall methodology and the 
nature of the book itself: it is an aggregate of fragments and demands 
itself to be read as a constellation. I will deal with this problem in greater 
detail in my first chapter. For present purposes I will simply propose that 
my methodology accepts, with Bourriaud and Adorno, some level of 
imbrication between artistic autonomy and that which is heteronomous to 
it as essential to political art and aesthetics. Whether one regards this in 
terms of a new materialist aesthetics of use or of a negative dialectical 
presentation of ‘truth’ is a separate question. 
 
Adorno and Bourriaud’s anti-teleological method can be viewed as a 
commonality that is more fundamental than their differences of 
articulation. Just as Adorno addresses the relationally identitarian 
thinking that is the legacy of rationalism, Bourriaud’s materialist 
relationality rejects positivist thinking or any preconception of the order                                                         
17 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.1. 
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of things. Both Adorno and Bourriaud share a commitment to praxis: in 
both cases praxis involves a principle of construction premised upon the 
construction of relational forms. For Bourriaud this entails the 
recognition of a novel conjuncture (a situation, typically dictated by 
technology and globalization) that demands a response through the 
appropriation of forms: the production of liminal spaces of ‘counter-
subjectivity’. In Adorno’s work, the nomenclature is that of 
‘constellation’: the melding of fragments and multiple perspectives that 
allow the interrogation of the concept by the object. In both cases what is 
at stake is the inductive construction of relational matrices that take on 
the power of representations without thereby submitting to statements of 
ideology. 
 
This anti-teleological commitment in both authors is complemented by 
their shared anti-Cartesianism. I think that this trait is essential in 
defining both as relational thinkers. Adorno identifies the Cartesian 
subject as one of the central problems of philosophy. In Bourriaud’s 
thought the individual is taken as socially determined. He says, ‘There is 
nothing less natural than subjectivity.’18 In thinking, subjectivity as 
socially determined Bourriaud’s methodological response introduces 
what he calls a thinking of trans-individuality. This notion recognises the 
materialism of ‘the bonds’ that link people together in ‘social formations’ 
as the ‘essence of humankind’.19 He recognises these bonds as historical 
facts, but the promise of trans-individual thought is that he views such 
bonds as nevertheless historically contingent. The issue here is the 
method of linkage, of conjunctures that comprise material relations as 
primary and the subject as merely its effect: This is not simply a critique 
of Cartesian subjectivity, but is the basis of a methodology of social 
transformation. 
 
As I have said, both authors begin with the premise of the problem of 
general reification. This is why I link them through the term relational                                                         
18 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.88. 
19 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.18. 
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hypostasis.  For Adorno it is the separation of art that implores him to 
argue that in spite of the separation of art and science this opposition 
should not be hypostatised. For Adorno, reification is a by-product of 
rationalism and ultimately to the totalising ratio of the enlightenment and 
the principle of exchange within the commodity form. Significantly he 
regards this separation as historically contingent but no less ‘real’ for 
that. Thus Adorno accepts the factity of hypostasis as the object that 
produces his negative dialectical method axiomatically. This is the 
method by which one frames truth within untruth. For Bourriaud, the 
roots of hypostasis are also categorised within our milieu of capital and 
exchange. Thus I think that in Bourriaud’s thinking there is a specific re-
enactment of this critique of rationalism albeit within a radically different 
conjuncture: that of globalization and the network society.  Again 
Bourriaud treats hypostasis as historically contingent but nevertheless as 
something that has acquired the status of fact. The impetus for 
Bourriaud’s thinking is not dialectical, however, but aleatory materialist. 
Thus the impetus for Bourriaud is not to frame hypostasis but to propose 
different conjunctures in which the artwork becomes the demonstration 
of better forms of living. What they undoubtedly share I suggest is the 
desire to produce counter-subjects to capital.  
 
Writing as a form of praxis: the ‘enthusiastic fragment’ 
 
Both Adorno and Bourriaud view their writing as a form of praxis that 
seeks to overcome the limitations of rational discursive models. For 
Adorno, this is directed against the preponderance of the concept as the 
measure of its object that thereby distances the latter. Both Bourriaud and 
Adorno challenge the subject-object relation as imprinted in thought by 
the totalising impetus of what is ‘rationally’ conditioned by the 
commodity form of exchange, by hegemonic relation. What this means is 
that they share an approach in which the principle of a relation of non-
relation, thus the appearance of reality as fragmented and aporetic, 
demands an appropriate methodological response. They develop similar 
approaches to writing in which fragments are constructively linked 
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according to the principle of a nexus or matrix. Adorno’s methodology is 
that of the constellation;20  Bourriaud’s is that of the conjuncture and 
topology. In both cases they use the fragmentary nature of their writing to 
their own advantage. For Adorno the essay is ‘weak’ and for Bourriaud it 
is ‘precarious’. They share a commitment towards acquiring the universal 
in a concrete but non-totalising sense. They explore the acute relation of 
non-relation between the universal and the particular that conditions 
‘reality’ through multiple and partial readings. This is to say that they do 
not seek to ‘determine’ their object (reality) through the imposition of 
pre-existing concepts or categories: rather they construct a reality through 
multiple lattices of encounter. They arrive at their object through the 
accumulation of multiple perspectives whose motility is derived from the 
particularity of lived experience and in the case of Adorno, the monadic 
logic of a particular artwork. Thus:  
 
In the essay, concepts do not build a continuum of operations, thought does not 
advance in a single direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as 
in a carpet. The fruitfulness of the thoughts depends on the density of this 
texture.21 
 
What appears meandering and fragmentary in the essays and polemics of 
these theorists is in fact the demonstration of a methodology that is open 
and based upon a heterological perspective that is essential to a re-
thinking of relationality. We might call it a methodology that is allergic 
to methodology. Thus Adorno says that: ‘The essay simultaneously 
suspends the traditional concept of method.’22 And also that, 
 
The usual reproach against the essay, that it is fragmentary and random, itself 
assumes the givenness of totality and thereby the identity of subject and object, 
and suggests that man is in control of totality. But the desire of the essay is not                                                         
20 ‘In the essay discreetly separated elements enter into a readable context; it erects no 
scaffolding, no edifice. Through their own movement the elements crystallize into a 
configuration. It is a force field, just as under the essay’s glance every intellectual 
artefact must transform itself into a force field.’ Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, p.102. 
21 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, p.101. 
22 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, p.99. 
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to seek and filter the eternal out of the transitory; it wants, rather, to make the 
transitory eternal. Its weakness testifies to the non-identity that it has to 
express, as well as to that excess of intention over its object, and thereby it 
points to that utopia which is blocked out by the classification of the world into 
the eternal and the transitory. In the emphatic essay, thought gets rid of the 
traditional idea of truth.23 
 
‘Art history’ as the history of production 
 
Both Adorno and Bourriaud share the conviction that ‘art history’ can 
only be written from the perspective of production rather than 
exclusively as a mode of reception. Bourriaud proposes that ‘art history’ 
is only notionally possible for him if it could be re-written as the history 
of the relations of artistic production. Thus he says that: 
 
the ‘Art’ network is porous, and it is the relations of this network with all the 
areas of production that determines its development. It would be possible, 
furthermore, to write a history of art that is the history of this production of 
relations with the world, by naively raising the issue of the nature of the 
external relations ‘invented’ by artworks.24 
 
Again, their corresponding outlooks on this point convinces me of the 
possibility of a cross reading. 
 
Artistic Subjectivity and Objectivity 
 
Adorno seeks a form of objectivity in which objective reality is 
‘paradoxically’ a form of extreme subjectivisation that precludes the free 
play necessary for the development of true, that is, subjective objectivity. 
Bourriaud looks for this within the production of liminal sites of non-
alienated relational exchange. Both Bourriaud and Adorno reverse the 
subject-object relation in order to render the singularity of the artwork 
truly objective against a backdrop of objectively reified relations. For                                                         
23 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’ p.99. 
24 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.27. 
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Adorno this is a negative presentation or a non-synthetic dialectic 
articulation of a ‘wrong world’. For Bourriaud this takes the form of a 
concrete, however fleeting demonstration of a ‘better’ one. 
 
Artistic Forms 
 
Within both Bourriaud and Adorno’s thinking, the notion of form is 
central to their methodological approaches. What is compelling within 
both is the necessity of viewing artistic form as its content.  
Adorno states: ‘The positivist tendency to set up every possible 
examinable object in rigid opposition to the knowing subject remains – in 
this as in every other instance – caught up with the rigid separation of 
form and content…’25 Equally Bourriaud posits Relational Aesthetics not 
as a theory as such but as a methodology in which the use, appropriation 
and mimetic translation of social and artistic forms is the very subject of 
relational art itself. 
 
Mimesis is not strictly speaking a methodology used by these thinkers 
but it is one of the objects of their enquiries. Both place a premium upon 
the use of mimetic procedures in art. Mimesis will be discussed at length 
in my first chapter but I raise it here, again, in order again to explain my 
decision to read these thinkers syncretically and also to point out an 
essential difference that might impact on my reading of the mimetic. 
 
Dialectics as an Epistemological Category 
 
There is a fundamental difference between Adorno and Bourriaud that 
cannot be dismissed lightly. This is the contrast between Bourriaud’s use 
of aleatory materialism, which lacks ontological foundation and 
Adorno’s reading of ‘nature’, which valorises the latter as an a priori 
category of the non-identical to be contrasted with the administered 
world. This is deeply problematic for my reading and generally my                                                         
25 Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, p.94. 
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endorsement of Bourriaud’s materialism. Steven Vogel has addressed 
this question, contrasting Lukács’ appraisal of nature as a social category 
with Adorno and Horkheimer’s conception of essential nature in 
opposition to its ‘humanness’.26 Adorno posits a ‘wrong world’ within 
his negative dialectic as the alienation of nature. Were I to follow his lead 
this would not only affect my reading of materialism but also the notion 
of mimesis, which I choose to read in non-essentialist terms. I read 
mimesis not as any structuralist-anthropological category but as a 
materialist endeavour based upon the investigation and inscription of 
forms. 
 
The broader consequences of this decision are that this thesis treats the 
dialectic as an epistemological method rather than as an ontological 
enquiry. This theme is repeated throughout the work. Ontology in this 
thesis is treated as a category of normative relation: it is something 
imputed as a supplement to relational configurations and is generally 
treated as a form of illusion that serves the purpose of making that which 
is contingent appear necessary. On this basis I would say that my cross 
reading of Adorno and Bourriaud aims at a fully materialist dialectic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
26 Steven Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1996), p.69. 
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Chapter Outlines 
 
Chapter 1: Relational Art as a Form of Sociability 
 
My first chapter sets out the programme of relational aesthetics including 
elements of Bourriaud’s thought that appear in Postproduction and The 
Radicant. Given the emphasis of previous discussions of Bourriaud’s 
work upon his first book, Relational Aesthetics, I think that this is 
necessary to a proper overview. This has the benefit of emphasizing 
important elements of Bourriaud’s thinking that have been missed. For 
example, the influence of Althusser’s aleatory materialism and of 
relational art’s propositions as to topological forms and matrices. The 
major theme of the first chapter is the problematic question of the 
autonomy of relational art. This arises from its ‘mimetic use’ of form and 
its micropolitical disavowal of the forms of visual representation. The 
terms of critical engagement of early relational art are premised upon the 
following charges: that it lacks aesthetic, utilitarian or critical efficacy, 
and that it merely reproduces reified relation rather than proposing a 
programme for their immanent critique. It is therefore criticised as an 
‘immaterial’ artform rather than in terms of a concrete materialist 
aesthetics espoused by Bourriaud. The development of relational 
aesthetics’ propositions as to the nature of ‘liminal’ spaces is also 
examined, in terms of their relation to theories of the counter-public 
sphere. In this chapter I consider the nature of utilitarianism in relational 
art. I argue that there is a strain of non-productive utilitarianism in 
relational art, which in fact frees it from a notion of utilitarian art that 
might be instrumentally rationalized. I also consider the paradoxical 
nature of relational art on the basis that it appears caught between the 
injunction to represent and to not represent. Relational art, like much 
critical art since the 1960s, is caught between the need to appear and the 
ethical injunction that prohibits ‘speaking for the other’. I examine this 
from the perspective of the creative responses that such an aporia 
produces within relational art. Specifically, I address its invention of 
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nacent non-visual forms of representation as material constructions of 
time and space. 
 
Overall, what I propose in this chapter is that there have been significant 
misreadings of Bourriaud’s work and that in fact it evinces a theory of 
productive mimesis that establishes it as an autonomous artform.  
 
Chapter 2: New Forms of Sociability: Archive and Network 
 
In this chapter, I extend the readings of Postproduction and The Radicant 
in order to consider a shift in the emphasis of relational art towards 
modes of electronic informational production and communication. I place 
the narrative tendency in this form of relational art within an overall 
testamentary turn of the ‘archival impulse’ identified by Hal Foster. The 
questions of reductive mimesis and artistic autonomy persist within this 
form of relational art but they take on a different inflection. In this 
chapter, they are explored in terms of the relationship between the forms 
of artistic and non-artistic labour and the role of performativity in the 
production of informational value. In order to do this I examine the 
different facets of informational labour and the nature of informational 
‘value’ in order to consider relational art as a form of silent production or 
‘non-productive’ labour. Non-productive labour is not used in a classical 
Marxist sense of labour that does not produce ‘value’ but as a category of 
the appropriation of pre-existing forms to a creative commons. What 
emerges is something like the argument of chapter one around counter-
publics, this time in the guise of differential networks. The 
autonomy/mimesis argument appears also in the form of a notion of the 
informational readymade: specifically whether the theory of the classical 
readymade can be used as a principle of translation and metamorphosis 
within informational networks. An important element of this chapter is to 
define informational materiality in performative terms, that is, as existing 
vicariously in the social relations that informational labour engenders. 
This is important in that it seeks to overcome the reductive distinction 
between material and immaterial forms of art that persists within the 
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discourses of critical art. What I propose is to open up the space of 
relation to the notion of topological inscription through performance – a 
sort of performative ontology. Whilst I reject ontology in its non-
relational forms I argue that as a concept that is premised upon 
nomination. From an aleatory materialist perspective therefore, 
ontologies are produced inductively and are not necessarily a priori 
concepts that should inhibit relational performativity. We thereby create 
the possibility that new relations might be inscribed as a materially 
aleatory mode of the ‘taking hold’ of relations. 
 
I consider the archaeological and the heterological models of the archive 
as models of particularity and singularity respectively. Thus, I begin to 
introduce the notion that post-relational thinking requires some 
heterology of thought in order to escape the positivistic strictures of 
difference and alterity. This is because, overall, informational networks 
are identified as sites of subjectivisation whose principles are fed 
precisely by positivistic logic. Within this totalizing system I examine the 
role of performative notions of labour in order to examine the potential 
spaces for artistic autonomy. What I find is that the transgressive model 
of performance that we would normally associate with the activities of 
the avant-garde has been subject to recuperation and that different 
models of performative efficacy require combination within art’s 
mimetic presentation. The overarching theme of this chapter is that this 
resistance is in fact a defence of subjectivity that calls for the 
micropolitical strategies of relational art as the staging of events of 
relational and topological construction that are of a promissory and 
speculative nature. It recognizes this territory as a place of creative 
experimentation. 
 
Chapter 3: The limits to art as a form of sociability within the political 
aesthetics of Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou   
 
In Chapter 3, I consider the dominant philosophical discourses of 
philosophical aesthetics: the anti-relational thought of Badiou and the 
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relationally anarchistic thought of Rancière. I consider in particular their 
conceptualization of community and the ways in which their thought has 
been either used or rejected within recent commentaries upon the 
sociable forms of art. What emerges is that the thinking of relationality is 
problematic within classical philosophy because the latter adheres to the 
binarisms of the general and the particular. I propose that this is why the 
thinking of event is important to these thinkers. That it acts as a 
supplement to this mode of thought and that consequently it tends to be 
thought of as both rare and as a mode of non-appearance. If the event 
operates as an absent third term within the structure of the general and 
particular, I argue that the philosophy of relation in its current form 
hinders the emergence of new relations. This examination of the anti-
relationality of philosophy asks whether it might be possible to found a 
separate, intuitionist logic of relation adequate to the appearance of the 
singularity of relational constellations. This is important in that a new 
language of relational discourse can be potentially founded upon this. 
The development of such a language appears imperative in the light of 
the need to arrive at a language of representation and realism adequate to 
contemporary critical art. This chapter paves the way for a re-thinking of 
relation and its critical modes of representation and documentary realism 
in chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4: Relational Form as Representation 
 
In Chapter 4, my aim is to link new thinking around the defence of 
representation in critical art to the re-thinking of the philosophy of 
relation. They appear to me in fact to be different aspects of the same 
question: that is, the non-appearance of relational form. In order to do 
this I begin with an overview of the types of representational forms that 
are currently being debated. In addition to visual representation, these 
also include the forms or illusions of representative democracy protest 
and direct action. What unites this thinking is the notion that 
representation is an action by and upon consciousness. This serves as a 
new benchmark for a theory of representation that displaces a 
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semiological approach and, in particular, the reductive rejection of forms 
of visual representation as ideological categories of meaning rather than 
relational tools. In this respect I think we can see the ongoing influence 
of relational art. I propose that Gashé’s thinking of the informal intricacy 
of relations in terms of relational shapes and the nuances of encounter, 
might provide a mode of thought adequate to the defence of 
representation. Moreover, drawing upon thinking about the matrices of 
art that arises around installation art, I propose that relation appears 
philosophically as a simple complex of relations. These relational 
constructions may evince only minimal being but they begin, through 
their presentation of the specificities of encounter, to grant us a formal 
lexicon with which to evaluate relational forms and appearances. I then 
return to the question of representation in relational art that seeks to 
establish the performative use of documentary images in conjunction 
with other non-visual forms of representation within formal matrices of 
exchange. I argue that this mediation is essential to the efficacy of 
relational art in establishing its credentials as a materialist aesthetics. 
This is because aleatory materialism is not simply a form that arises from 
a heterology as a combination of elements but also a form that requires 
some mode of inscription. 
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Chapter 1: Relational Art as a Form of Sociability 
 
Introduction 
 
The first part of this chapter will set out what I consider a faithful 
overview of Nicholas Bourriaud’s programme of relational aesthetics. It 
will present a commentary upon Bourriaud’s thought that seeks to re-
define the terms of engagement for the critique of relational art practice. I 
believe that that there is an urgent requirement for such an exposition 
because the interlocutors of relational art have been tendentially drawn 
towards Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics at the expense of his later 
works on relational aesthetics: Postproduction and The Radicant. The 
programme of relational art requires a cross reading of these texts. The 
artist Liam Gillick, is the only commentator on relational art practice 
who recognised the radical import of Bourriaud’s work in the mid- 
nineties: that is, the identification of relational art within the dynamic of 
globalization and the fact that what is inherently radical in this art is that 
it proceeds from its social determination within this dynamic. He has 
commented that the magnitude and the ferocity of critical reception to 
Relational Aesthetics (broadly this covers the period 2005-2007) was out 
of all proportion to the modesty of its intention: it was simply a polemic 
written in defence of 1990s artworks in which art’s sociability assumed 
the performative mantle of artistic form.  
 
Relational Aethetics was savaged by its critics and no doubt, Bourriaud’s 
inflated rhetoric invited this. Bourriaud is promiscuous in his use of 
existing aesthetic terms and ideas. However, this is part of his 
methodology. In the United States, Grant Kester’s dialogical aesthetics 
also proposed an art of concrete sociable formations but it did not draw 
the fervour of criticism that we associate with Bourriaud in Europe. In 
both Bourriaud and Kester’s work, there was a rejection of savvy 
spectacular art and an explicit rejection of the avant-garde. So, why 
would an anti-avant-gardist, materialist aesthetics receive critical acclaim 
in North America but not so in Europe? This comes down, I think, to two 
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factors.  The purported utility and efficacy of dialogical art was clearer 
than that expounded by relational aesthetics and this chimed with the 
demands placed upon fine art by its chief funding body in the United 
States, the National Endowment for the Arts. Secondly, Bourriaud’s 
book, full of seemingly paradoxical disavowals and appropriations, was a 
provocation to a largely disenchanted European left, bound by 
entrenched positions and interests. His audience was, to paraphrase 
Bourriaud, too caught up in ‘yesterday’s concerns’ to an extent that was 
less prevalent in North America.27 
 
It is easy to forget that in the early-nineties the notion of art as a form of 
sociability had all but disappeared within the mainstream and the extent 
to which relational art went against the grain. Having said this, relational 
art was no innocent outsider: by the mid-nineties, it benefitted greatly 
from the proliferation of biennials, of publicly funded international 
residencies and cheap air travel. Moreover, it ‘cashed in’ on its avant-
garde credentials whilst simultaneously distancing itself from any 
‘theory’ or ‘teleology’ of the avant-garde, an assumption about the avant-
garde, which it accepted as unproblematic. In its early stages relational 
aesthetics exploited its memorial credentials and the whole history of 
1960s and 1970s ‘socially engaged art’ in order to get itself seen. As a 
highly mobile and adaptable art form it morphed remarkably well into the 
nomadic forms of 90s site-specific practice. 
 
I came to relational aesthetics through an interest in site-specific practice 
and an interest in ‘social sculpture’ and its expanded field.28 Relational 
Aesthetics, though, posed more pressing questions about art as a sociable 
form and the possibilities of a new artistic language of relation. As I have 
said, much of this was missed in its ‘definitive’ reading before the global                                                         
27 ‘Too often, people are happy drawing up an inventory of yesterday’s concerns, the 
better to lament the fact of not getting any answers. But the very first question, as far 
as these new approaches are concerned, obviously has to do with the material forms 
of these works. How are these apparently elusive works to be decoded, be they 
process-related or behavioural by ceasing to take shelter behind the sixties art 
history?’ Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.7. 
28 Roaslind Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’, October, 8 (1979), pp. 30-44. 
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economic crisis (2008). I believe that it must be re-read in the light of 
recent events, not least because since the ‘crash’ it has tended to be read 
as a strain within a broader communitarian paradigm and in particular the 
re-thinking of ‘the idea of communism’. In other words, the radical 
conjuncture that Bourriaud premised in relational aesthetics has become 
self-evident in the ‘event’ of economic meltdown. Specifically, network 
culture and global circuits of exchange are more widely understood to 
have been a catalyst for the rapidity of the viral nature of this crisis. This 
forms part of the post-relational conjuncture. 
 
There are many elements to the notion of post-relationality. I do not 
propose it as a concept. However, the events of 2008 changed the 
meaning of relational practice almost overnight. What persisted from the 
early critique of relational art within the post-relational milieu has been 
the question of this art’s ability to mount a serious critique of capital as 
opposed to its being an instance of capital’s mimetic duplication. In order 
to avoid the repetition of this line of argument I wish to examine the 
precepts that produce this contradiction. I wish to propose a reading of 
Bourriaud in which the importance of productive mimesis, random 
materialism and the nature of Bourriaud’s notion of the ‘public realm’ are 
better developed and given greater emphasis.  
 
I talk about the ‘programme’ of relational art in order to include within 
my exposition some of the important aspects of Bourriaud’s thought that 
appear within Postproduction and The Radicant.  A more detailed 
reading of those aspects of theses texts concerned with informational 
networks will follow in Chapter two but for present purposes I will read 
some of the fundamental tenets of relational aesthetics across his three 
major texts on the subject. Bourriaud has said that he believes there is a 
misunderstanding about the relationship between his books. He says that 
the common denominator is that the books and the works he examines 
‘deal with the ‘interhuman sphere’, ‘relationships between people, 
communities, individuals, groups, social networks, interactivity, and so 
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on.’29 Thus, Relational Aesthetics is merely one aspect of a more 
expansive programme of relational art. 
 
What is Relational Art?  
 
Relational aesthetics’ main feature ‘is to consider interhuman exchange 
an aesthetic object in and of itself.’30 
 
Essentially, Bourriaud proposes that the encounters engendered by 
relational art are productive of new relations, which are in themselves 
aesthetic forms.  Bourriaud states that relational aesthetics is not a theory 
of art but a theory of form.31 For Bourriaud these forms emerge within 
socially interstitial configurations; they are micro-models of new forms 
of sociability.32 
 
Relational aesthetics is primarily a proposition about social and artistic 
forms or formations. It is not a theory of art. Bourriaud is emphatic on 
the latter point. He adopts an anti-teleological position in order to free 
relational aesthetics from the charge of idealism and thus the implication 
that his aesthetics might be statements of ‘origin or destination’. 
Bourriaud regards an artwork as merely one form within a subset in an 
overall series of existing forms. A form, he says, demonstrates the typical 
features of a world. We can see from this perspective how Bourriaud 
immediately raises questions about the relationship between the forms of 
art and non-art. At the same time we can see in his notion of form as 
demonstrative of the typical features of a world an example of his 
methodology of the fragment: forms in this sense relay the facets of a 
world, but not that world in its entirety. There are similarities here with 
Adorno’s monadological reading of the artwork and the sense that it 
enacts an immanent logic, which is necessarily interior. These are 
questions I will return to when I consider the autonomy of relational art.                                                         
29 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.7. 
30 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.33. 
31 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.19. 
32 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.45. 
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Bourriaud insists upon the ‘instability and diversity of the concept of 
“form”’.33 He views form as an extenuated notion that bears little relation 
to its use in the plastic arts. The notion of form must therefore be 
considered in relation to an increasing complexity of visual experience. 
The extenuation of artistic form means, he says, that the relations that 
‘glue’ these forms together are less obvious and more diverse. He cites, 
for example, meetings, encounters, events and collaborations as 
relational-artistic forms. Bourriaud claims that these forms instantiate 
‘forms of sociability’ and that these forms can be lasting: thus, form is a 
‘lasting encounter’. This form of materialism in Bourriaud’s work is 
generally contested on the basis that in reality these forms fail to appear 
in concrete form. This lack of concretion is generally paired with the 
‘utilitarian’ credentials of relational art, in order to criticise its efficacy. 
What then does Bourriaud propose about the use of forms? 
 
Bourriaud derives his principle of the use of forms from Serge Daney. 
This principle of use contains the sense of ‘making use’ as an adaptation 
of form to our own needs. This is the underlying principle of 
Postproduction. Bourriaud proposes the after-use of pre-existing forms 
and artworks within communal matrices. He finds the internet an ideal 
vehicle for this sort of exchange. What he proposes then is a form of 
montage, which he claims is productive of new forms of sociability and 
offers a true critique of the contemporary forms of social life. This is the 
purported efficacy of relational art. However, it is easy to see why such a 
proposition can be read as a model, which subsumes art beneath the 
principle of de- and re-territorialisation that we associate with advanced, 
informationalised forms of capital. I will be addressing the 
informationalised form of relational aesthetics within the second chapter. 
What I emphasis here is that the critique of relational art’s efficacy is 
repeated within every formal arena in which Bourriaud articulates his 
programme.                                                         
33 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p. 20. 
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The conjuncture of globalization and network culture 
 
As I said in my methodology, Bourriaud recognizes the problem of 
reification and the impossibility of any outside to the ‘completely 
administered world’. He views globalization as our ‘barbarism’, against 
which it is the task of the artist to develop a truly worldwide culture that 
evinces its own logic. 
 
It would be unfair to say that ‘the conjuncture of globalization’ is only 
developed in Bourriaud’s later works in which its technological 
conditions are explored. Bourriaud is clear from the outset that this 
conjuncture forms the backdrop for early relational art, even those gallery 
based works that combine elements of installation and performance. This 
appears in Relational Aesthetics’ call for a new language and the 
identification of a globalised artworld. However, his exposition of this 
conjuncture is more emphatic in the later works. He calls for an art of the 
use of forms in response to an increased annexation of artistic and social 
forms within the ‘chaos’ of global culture. In addition, he claims that the 
blurring of the distinction between the use and production of these forms 
produces ‘new cartographies of knowledge’. I think this is a significant 
element of new relational thinking: it does not so much advocate the 
surrender of artistic autonomy to non-art as is generally assumed. Rather 
it identifies a shift in the precepts upon which a notion of artistic 
autonomy was founded within modernism.  
 
What is compelling in Bourriaud’s exposition of the globalised 
conjuncture of present day art is its identification of the new spatio-
temporal relations that shape its aesthetics and artistic procedures. Firstly, 
Bourriaud emphasizes that: ‘the modern favors the event over 
monumental order, the ephemeral over an eternity writ in stone; it is a 
defense of fluidity against omnipresent reification.’34 As I indicated in                                                         
34 Bourriaud, The Radicant, p.16. 
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my research questions the thinking of the event as a response to the 
hypostasis of relation seems to have gained currency not only within 
aesthetics but also within philosophy and politics. This thinking of the 
event has taken multiform incarnations. Certain accounts of the event 
rely upon the notion of its absolute singularity: that is the sense in which 
its appearance erupts within our midst. Within this (Badiouian) model, it 
is impossible to predict or engineer the appearance of events. They rarely 
occur. This provides no a priori role for political-aesthetic agency. 
Rather it is the event itself that subjectivises the agent a posteriori. 
 
Bourriaud’s thinking of the event is less a matter of ontological 
speculation than the thinking of event in its motility within the act of the 
trans-ethical use of forms. He recognizes within our conjuncture a new 
relation between, or entwinement of space and time. He says that: ‘The 
major aesthetic phenomenon of our time is surely the intertwining of the 
properties of space and time, which turns the latter into a territory…’35 
and that ‘today’s art seems to negotiate the creation of new types of space 
by resorting to the geometry of translation: topology.’36 He says that 
topology ‘refers to movement, to the dynamism of forms, and 
characterizes reality as a conglomeration of transitory surfaces and forms 
that are potentially movable. In this sense it goes hand in hand with 
translation as well as with precariousness.’37 
 
Granted, many other books will tell you the same thing but what is 
significant in Bourriaud’s thought is, I think, that he fully integrates this 
in his thinking on materialism. In other words, this spatio-temporal 
model not only underwrites the territory of artistic praxis as an 
established fact; it also challenges the finitude of existing aesthetic and 
philosophical methodologies of relational construction. Specifically, this 
temporal relation opens hitherto non-relational binarisms between the 
singular and the particular; artistic autonomy and heteronomy;                                                         
35 Bourriaud, The Radicant, p.79. 
36 Bourriaud, The Radicant, p.79. 
37 Bourriaud, The Radicant, p.79. 
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production and consumption; repetition and mimesis; the public and 
private. All of these categories appear to me to be ‘out of joint’ with 
Bourriaud’s spatio-temporal conjuncture. 
 
On this basis, it is unsurprising that Bourriaud rejects existing modernist 
aesthetics, preferring to make a clean break with previous theories of art. 
 
Bourriaud’s Altermodernity 
 
Bourriaud rejects teleological theories of art in order to escape the 
temptations of idealism. However, he maintains that modernism is not 
dead, merely its ideological-teleological version. It has a role to play still 
within the modeling of the future, specifically in ‘modeling possible 
universes’. To Bourriaud’s critics this rhetoric appears suspiciously 
idealistic. Bourriaud’s claim is that the aim of a new modernism is to 
‘learn to inhabit the world in a better way’ rather than trying to conceive 
of the world in terms of social evolution. He proposes against the 
construction of utopias ‘models of living’ within existing reality. What he 
proposes then is the resuscitation of the artwork as a sociable form within 
a concrete and materialist paradigm. What then is the nature of 
Bourriaud’s claim for relational art as a materialist aesthetics? 
 
Bourriaud’s Chance or ‘Aleatory’ Materialism 
 
Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics clearly identifies the goal of relational 
art as the construction of ‘concrete spaces’. In a rare admission of the 
genealogy of relational art, he identifies it with a ‘materialistic tradition’ 
and the importance of the ‘undercurrent’ of materialism in Louis 
Althusser’s later writing. In particular, he cites Althusser’s ‘materialism 
of the encounter’ as seminal for relational aesthetics. Althusser takes 
contingency as the necessary basis of all social formations and identifies 
a process by which the undifferentiated ‘rain’ of social relations might 
coagulate into concrete forms. This is based upon the production of such 
forms through aleatory or chance encounters that cause relations to pile 
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up. It is the recognition of such forms from precarious origins and their 
agglomeration into social formations as ‘established facts’ that informs 
Bourriaud’s advancement of relational aesthetics as a materialist 
aesthetics. The concretization of these forms as facts is what for both 
thinkers gives rise to history. However, this materialism does not take 
history as its starting point and neither does it predetermine idealistically 
any historical direction for these forms. I should note here that in 
accepting Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism I have to reject within my 
own dialectical methodology any place for an essentialist or prelapsarian 
reading of nature, after Adorno. To do otherwise would be to place an 
origin at the heart of this materialism. 
 
There is an overriding sense in Bourriaud’s work that culture and social 
formations are encountered ‘on the hoof’. His aleatory materialism 
perhaps gives his thought this complexion. Moreover, this materialism is 
founded upon a principle of trans-individuality. That is, it is relations 
between people that are material and dictate subjective forms. Thus, 
Bourriaud adopts what is materialist in Marx, namely his ‘inversion’ of 
the subject-object relation. 
 
In his adoption of precarity and contingency as the basis of social agency, 
he claims that communities are ‘organised and materialised’. This strain 
of materialist thought allows Bourriaud, at least notionally, to address the 
problem of reification on the basis that a ‘completely administered 
world’ is merely contingent. In this way, Bourriaud carves out a space for 
artistic-social agency that appears impossible from the pessimistic 
perspective of ‘capitalist realism’, that is the totalisation of all relations 
beneath the mantle of identity. Bourriaud it seems offers a potential way 
out of relational hypostasis. I will argue in my fourth chapter on relation 
and representation that this strain of thought is gaining currency within a 
re-thinking of the philosophy of relation in which it is the principle of 
linkage rather than the objects thereby linked that is emerging as a tool 
for the thinking of the appearance of singular relation. What I think is 
also evident here is an awareness on Bourriaud’s thought of the need to 
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adopt or perhaps translate the heterology of postmodern thought, and in 
particular Derrida’s thought, not as an examination / deconstruction of 
origin but in Derrida’s sense of ‘the wager’. Although Bourriaud 
condemns deconstructive thought’s tendency to legitimize models of 
‘pure alterity’ he is also highly receptive to the intertextual use of forms. 
What is also evident in Bourriaud’s materialism is that these sites of 
encounter found, for him, a principle of the realism of relational art. 
Realism is the product of this encounter; it is a product of negotiation 
between reality and fiction. Bourriaud also refers to ‘operative realism’: 
that is a negotiation of the artwork between the demands of 
contemplation and use. Again, I will address this question later in this 
thesis. For the purposes of this chapter, the question for Bourriaud’s 
realism as it appears in the critique of relational aesthetics is whether this 
is sufficient to demonstrate some form of the efficacy of relational art 
without its having a theory of representation. It is the purported ‘failure’ 
of the avant-garde to demonstrate its efficacy that haunts (and of course 
utterly vindicates) the historical and neo-avant-gardes. How does 
Bourriaud view the avant-garde? 
 
Relational Aesthetics and the Avant-Garde 
 
Bourriaud claims that present-day art takes up the legacy of the avant-
garde without being doctrinaire: that is without repeating its teleological 
or ideological premises. 
 
Bourriaud distances relational art from the historical avant-garde on the 
basis, as I have said, that he distinguishes the concrete and material 
nature of the objectives of relational aesthetics from the idealism and 
teleology of modernism. Bourriaud is, however, sympathetic to the 
avant-garde and he regularly cites examples of avant-garde practice that 
have influenced his work. Particularly those formal cognates that have 
been translated into present-day-art (for example, performance, 
collaboration and site-specificity). In particular the principles of montage 
and collage appear to have influenced his understanding of the principle 
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of constructivism that underlies the postproduction of forms and the 
creation of relational matrices. In Bourriaud’s hands the recombinant 
forms of the avant-garde, become principles of social action. Relational 
aesthetics is a theory of forms and one might readily identify 
comparisons here with Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde.38 One 
might add to this a favourable comparison with Bürger’s methodology of 
the avant-garde. This is based upon the dialectical principle that an 
artistic enquiry is without origin but is, rather, the principle by which one 
arrives at or defines one’s object through the exploration of artistic 
forms. This resonates with Bourriaud’s methodology as ‘without any 
origin nor destination’.  
 
If the reader is getting the sense here that I am tempted to place relational 
aesthetics within the broader rubric of a recommencement of the avant-
garde, they would be right. What is holding me back is based upon my 
observation of relational aesthetics’ critical reception. In particular, I 
believe that if one shoehorns relational aesthetics back into art history in 
this way we thereby risk underestimating the radically different 
conjunction within which relational aesthetics arises. Moreover, we risk 
occluding Bourriaud’s crucial (and rather Adornian) remarks that a 
history of art might legitimately be re-written as the history of the 
conditions of artistic production. Bürger and Adorno of course address 
their political aesthetics to this very question but the fact is, again, that 
within our present conjuncture we need a theory of artistic production 
adequate to global models of exchange and to the unprecedented blurring 
of consumption and production, art and culture. Moreover, who can 
blame Bourriaud for distancing himself from the avant-garde? It is an 
institution whose messengers are routinely shot. The paradox of the 
avant-garde is of course that its failure is the measure of its success. That 
is, its failure to unite art and the everyday is predestined in its very 
appearance. It is a reflection of the separation of art from other types of 
                                                        
38 Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde, trans. By M Shaw, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 
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discourse and in fact, it is the very embodiment of the oxymoronic 
category of ‘socially engaged art’.  
 
I will, however, allow myself to express my disappointment that 
Bourriaud does not refer to the neo-avant-garde, or to Hal Foster’s 
influential essay on this.39 What it seems to me Foster has to offer 
Bourriaud, is a theory of the avant-garde that is based upon a principle of 
experimentation. It may offer some indication as to the relationship 
between the interstitial artwork and its symbolic/real pairing and most 
importantly a diachronic analysis that offers the historical avant-garde as 
a series of tools to be rediscovered and reactivated. This bears 
comparison with Bourriaud’s worldview: a stockpile of forms and 
gestures inviting re-use and recombination. It also echoes a major theme 
of relational aesthetics: its unique conception of the temporality of the 
artwork.  
 
Bourriaud says himself that artistic praxis offers ‘a rich loam for social 
experimentation’.40 This would not look out of place in Foster’s account. 
In spite of this, I will remain faithful to Bourriaud on the basis that he 
also seems to regard the end of the avant-garde as a necessary precursor 
for new modes of thinking. Specifically this thinking rejects what is 
transgressive and heroic in the (historical) avant-garde in favour of the 
positivization and remaking of uses. 
 
Artistic autonomy and Social Mimesis 
 
A crucial feature of relational aesthetics is its blurring of the distinction 
between the forms of art and non-art to a supposedly unprecedented 
extent. The historical avant-garde can offer ample evidence that this is 
incorrect. However, I link mimesis and autonomy in Bourriaud as 
categories that should be read together in order to understand the nature 
of artistic praxis he proposes. Bourriaud draws upon Michel de Certeau’s                                                         
39 Hal Foster, ‘An Archival Impulse’, October, 110 (2004), pp. 3-22. 
40 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.9. 
 59 
proposition that life can be lived as a ‘tenant of culture’. What this entails 
is that art finds its place within hegemonic social and technological 
structures. Its criticality lies in its mission to turn these forms to its own 
ends. Relational art has been criticized on the basis of its apparently 
reductive mimesis of social forms, that it risks the notion of art itself 
through its willingness to engage with forms that are heteronomous to 
art. Relational Aesthetics caused a furor over the meaning and status of 
the principle of artistic autonomy. I agree with those who think this ‘fear 
of heteronomy’ has been overstated. I would add that it is misplaced 
because it fails to heed Bourriaud’s analysis of the culture of 
globalization. What Bourriaud makes clear is that the possibility of 
existing outside of the structures and forms of globalization has all but 
disappeared.  What I think his project proposes is then a new concept of 
artistic autonomy that must be embraced within the very particular 
conjuncture in which we find ourselves. 
 
Prior to Relational Aesthetics, the notion of artistic autonomy within 
progressive art has generally been regarded as sitting somewhere along 
an axis of art and non-art. To varying degrees art is regarded as 
conditioned by the social and its means of production but also asocial to 
the extent that it sets itself apart. Bourriaud’s position is as follows: 
 
All these artistic practices although formally heterogeneous, have in common 
the recourse to already produced forms. They testify to a willingness to inscribe 
the work of art within a network of signs and significations, instead of 
considering it an autonomous or original form.41 
 
Adorno on the other hand states that: ‘Art is the social antithesis of 
society, not directly deducible from it. The constitution of art’s sphere 
corresponds to the constitution of an inward space of men as the space of 
their representation.’42 
                                                         
41 Bourriaud, Postproduction, pp.15-16. 
42 Theodor W Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. and ed. by G. Adorno and R. Tiedemann 
(London: Athlone Press, 1997), p.8. 
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I do not find the statements irreconcilable provided one pays heed to the 
very specific form of inscription that Bourriaud proposes. Inscription 
here carries the sense of a translation of form that we see within Daney’s 
notion of ‘use’, which I believe preserves the sense of interiority that 
Adorno suggests. The fear of artistic subsumption rests, I believe, upon a 
misreading of Bourriaud’s meaning in his use and translation of 
heteronomous forms within art. Much has been made of the argument 
that relational art is ‘merely mimetic’ of heteronomous structures and 
forms and that it is at best only ‘parodic’. This brings me to my next 
point. Relational art employs a notion of social mimesis that is more 
nuanced than its critics have been willing to accept. Bourriaud’s notion 
of the use of social forms is consistent in its notion that the forms are 
appropriated and translated within artistic praxis. Furthermore, these 
forms are re-situated within different topologies and in relation to other 
forms. The form of mimesis advocated by Bourriaud bears comparison 
with Adorno’s notion of the term. It exhibits a shamanistic quality, or in 
Bourriaud’s terms, ‘make-believe’. Bourriaud’s use of the notion of 
‘screenplay’ and ‘scripted forms’ is seldom remarked upon but I believe 
that it is key to understanding just how an artist is to inhabit the pre-
existing (or co-exist) within the social forms she inherits. For Bourriaud 
mimesis as ‘make-believe’ is in fact contiguous with his project of 
realism. 
 
Relational Aesthetics as Critical Realism 
 
Relational aesthetics posits itself as a category of critical realism. 
Bourriaud describes the methodology of this critical realism as ‘operative 
realism’. Operative realism is for him a kind of flirtation with the notion 
of artistic autonomy. I think that what my analysis of the categories of 
artistic autonomy, mimesis and critical realism demonstrates is that they 
are cognate terms. The following statement from Bourriaud, I think 
supports this connection: 
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To denounce or ‘critique’ the world? One can denounce nothing from the 
outside; one must first inhabit the form of what one wants to criticize. Imitation 
is subversive, much more so than discourses of frontal opposition that make 
only formal gestures of subversion.43 
 
Again, Bourriaud’s methodology is clear and surprisingly Adornian. He 
rejects what is directly critical in favour of productive mimesis. This 
produces his critical model on the basis that he appropriates and 
translates aspects of a world. In spite of Bourriaud’s rhetoric, I don’t 
think that relational artworks abandon the principle of aesthetic 
autonomy. Rather, they re-define it through procedures that are precisely 
necessitated by the shrinking space of art’s autonomous social relation. 
 
Within Bourriaud’s thought, the rejection of ‘directly critical forms’ is 
also symptomatic of his use of micropolitics. This gives rise to questions 
about the representative capacities of relational artworks. The search for 
a critical realism of relational art therefore entails propositions as to non-
visual forms of representation. Broadly this entails the use of forms as a 
representative act.  
 
The Influence of Micropolitics upon Relational Art 
 
Relational aesthetics relies upon the concept of micropolitics as a 
methodology for resisting reified relations and dominant forms of 
signification. For Felix Guattari, whose ‘micropolitics of desire’ is a 
constituent of the genealogy of relational aesthetics, the micropolitical is 
expressly theorized against the identitarian nature of representation.44 
Guattari reasons the relation between micropolitics and signification as 
follows: 
 
All contents, before being structured by language or ‘like a language’, are 
structured at a multitude of micro-political levels. It is precisely this fact, which                                                         
43 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.74. 
44 Guattari, Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics.  
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justifies the fact that a micro-political revolutionary action makes it possible to 
relativize the ‘dominant significations’ and to neutralize the forms of indication 
and regulation put forward by the structuralists. Denying the function of power 
in representation implies a refusal to make a micro-political commitment 
wherever it may be needed, in other words, wherever there is a signification.45 
 
For Guattari, the movement of desire is ‘sterilized’ by a relationship of 
representation. He urges us to abandon the distinction between content 
and form and ‘to try to find connecting points, points of micro-political 
antagonism at every level.’46 Between ‘content and form’ there is a 
relationship of ‘stabilization and deterritorialization’ – this forms ‘the 
system of figures of expression and acts like the state in ordering and 
hierarchizing.’47 For him, this constitutes an over-encoding of 
signification that can only be undone by the micropolitical.48 
Paradoxically, then, it is a challenge to the normative forms of relation 
that structure representation, its form/content structure as the embodiment 
of its power that founds relational aesthetics upon a micropolitics of anti-
visual representation.  
 
It is not necessary to disregard Bourriaud’s micropolitics in order to find 
modes of representation adequate to relational art. Bourriaud recognises 
the need for a re-thinking of representational forms and, to this end, he 
makes a clear distinction between ‘the visual’ and other forms of 
representation. He recognises that one cannot universally identify all 
forms of signification as instances of ‘over-encoding’. If all signification 
resulted in over-encoding then this would sever the link between the a 
priori of micropolitical structures to linguistic or representational forms, 
that Guattari sets out as a relation between (non-relational) micropolitics 
and forms of (relational) signification. In other words it would sever the 
relation of non-relation between the two. It would surrender micropolitics 
to irreducible singularity.                                                         
45 Guattari, p. 83. 
46 Guattari, p. 83. 
47 Guattari, p. 83. 
48 Guattari, p. 84. 
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There is no denying the value of micropolitics as a mode of the critique of 
the dominant forms of signification under the commodity form, and 
particularly the commodity form of subjectivity. Guattari aims to move 
out of the dominant forms of signification and ‘get beyond the system of 
representation as such – since that system separates desiring production 
from production for exchange, and alienates it as prevailing production 
relations demand.’49 The question is, then, for an immanent critique of the 
commodity form, and thus a fully-fledged politics of relational aesthetics, 
whether desiring production and production-for-exchange can find a form 
of representation adequate to their micropolitical/significatory antagonism 
that elides any immediate recuperation. The question remains as to what 
form of representation micropolitics assumes. This anticipates my 
analysis in chapter 4 where I will look at different forms of representation 
that might inform a critical realism in relational art. The critique of 
relational aesthetics rests in part upon the non-appearance of its objects. 
To this end I will set out Bourriaud’s distinction between forms of visual 
and non-visual representational forms of encounter. 
 
Representation and the ‘visual’ 
 
Bourriaud addresses the problem in terms of the ‘restoration of mediums 
of experience’, thus he says that: 
 
When entire sections of our existence spiral into abstraction as a result of 
economic globalization, when the basic functions of our daily lives are slowly 
transformed into products of consumption (including human relations, which 
are becoming a full-fledged industrial concern), it seems highly logical that 
artists might seek to rematerialize these functions and processes, to give shape 
to what is disappearing before our eyes. Not as objects, which would be to fall 
into the trap of reification, but as mediums of experience: by striving to shatter 
the logic of the spectacle, art restores the world to as an experience to be lived. 
Since the economic system gradually deprives us of this experience, modes of                                                         
49 Guattari, p. 100. 
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representation must be invented for a reality that is becoming more abstract 
each day.50 
 
More generally, Bourriaud makes clear the necessary task of constructing 
new modes of representation within the space formerly reserved by art 
for visual representation. He employs Serge Daney’s pejorative notion of 
‘the visual’ in order to separate it from other forms of relational 
representation.51 Whilst the production of an image is the mere 
representation of desire, relational forms, in their reciprocity, can become 
their enactment. Thus according to Bourriaud, Daney,  
 
maintains that form, in an image, is nothing other than the representation of 
desire. Producing a form is to invent possible encounters; receiving a form is to 
create the conditions for an exchange, the way you return a service in a game of 
tennis. If we nudge Daney’s reasoning a bit further, form is the representative 
of desire in the image. It is the horizon based on which the image may have a 
meaning, by pointing to a desired world, which the beholder thus becomes 
capable of discussing, and based on which his own desire can rebound.52 
 
The use of forms against visual representation is tied to Bourriaud’s 
notion of representational forms as the material linkages that produce 
subjectivity. What distinguishes this rethinking of relation is its clear 
connection to Bourriaud’s transitive ethics: this is an ethical principle of 
the encounter that invites dialogue. Bourriaud states that:‘when an artist 
shows us something he uses a transitive ethic which places his work 
between the ‘look-at-me’ and the ‘look-at-that’.53 
 
The production of relations between individuals and groups, between 
artist and the world, and, by way of transitivity, between the beholder and 
the world is specifically aimed at a non-authoritarian form of 
representation. In this respect he proposes something like a form of 
                                                        
50 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.32. 
51 Serge Daney, cited in Relational Aesthetics, p.24. No reference appears. 
52 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.23. 
53 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p. 24. 
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counter-publicity. Bourriaud says that whereas the pairing of 
‘Promote/receive’ (Daney’s definition of ‘the Visual’) is authoritarian, in 
Daney’s thinking, ‘all form is a face looking at me’, in the sense that it is 
summoning me to a dialogue with it. There is an intertextual inflection to 
this transitive ethic: in fact it points towards the ‘unfinished 
discursiveness’ that seeks to avoid the over-encoding tendencies of visual 
representation. 
 
As we will see in the critique of relational aesthetics, the crucial question 
here is whether Bourriaud proposes a model of encounter that posits 
relations of encounter outside of reified relations in a mode of refusal or 
whether they are capable of posing an immanent critique of reified 
relations. This tends to focus upon Bourriaud’s appropriation of the 
‘liminal interstice’, defined as a place of exception within Marxist theory. 
I do not think that Bourriaud’s transitive ethic of encounter can be simply 
reduced to a proposition about the interior or exterior of reified relations. 
To recall, Bourriaud’s methodology rejects the ‘directly critical’ stance 
that such binarisms tend to engender. Rather, I regard Bourriaud’s 
programme of ‘non-visual’ representation through encounter as a form of 
performative inscription. This in turn raises the question of whether 
relational aesthetics is a theatrical artform based upon the 
dematerialisation of the art object and a ‘fetishisation of the encounter’. I 
will contest these charges in the latter part of this chapter. 
 
The democratic tendency within Relational Aesthetics 
 
Bourriaud’s articulation of the democratic impulse within relational art is 
perhaps one of the most perplexing aspects of his writing. Although I 
have set out to provide an overview of the project of relational aesthetics, 
I think that there is an identifiable shift in Bourriaud’s conception of 
‘democracy’ and the ‘public realm’ between Relational Aesthetics and 
his subsequent writing.  Within Relational Aesthetics, Bourriaud employs 
the rhetoric of consensus and specifically the ‘reparation of social bonds’. 
This invites criticism. His early ‘convivial’ model of public discourse 
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precipitates a debate around the critical credentials of Relational 
Aesthetics and provides the impetus for a sub-categorisation of relational 
art into antagonistic relational aesthetics. The rudimentary nature of 
Bourriaud’s early conception of a model of consensus is informed by his 
notion of materialism as something like a critical mass of agreement. But 
it delivers Bourriaud’s texts into the hands of commentators who favour a 
‘directly critical’ approach of reified relations that Bourriaud never 
intended and a reinterpretation of his thought in which antagonism 
becomes a benchmark for relational art’s critical efficacy. 
 
Bourriaud is rather vague in his use of the term ‘democracy’: it is not 
always clear whether he is talking about models of representative 
democracy or whether in fact he is speaking about a ‘democracy of 
forms’ and their utilitarian value within the principle of sharing and 
postproductive practice. So, for example, Bourriaud states that:  
 
What strikes us in the work of this generation is, first and foremost, the 
democratic concern that informs it. For art does not transcend everyday 
preoccupations, it confronts us with reality by way of the remarkable nature of 
any relationship to the world, through make-believe.’54 
 
This refers to the sense in which the use of forms is a democratic 
methodology based on its appropriation and mimesis of existing social 
forms. However Bourriaud’s claim that the alienation of individuals 
within a postmodern environment has broken the social bonds between 
them and that relational art’s ‘new models of sociability’ might perform a 
reparative task goes beyond the question of a consensual/dissensual 
model of political aesthetics. This rhetoric opens questions about the 
nature of the ‘public’ that Bourriaud proposes and the role of the 
institution of art in the production of relational artworks. 
 
 
                                                         
54 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.57. 
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The Public Realm and Interstitial Space 
 
It is very important to identify the nature of ‘publicness’ that Bourriaud 
proposes. I suspect that the spatio-temporal configuration that Bourraud 
identifies along with the identification of modes of consumption and 
production dissolves the categories of public and private tout court. 
However, Bourriaud’s early rhetoric of reparation has appeared 
inflammatory within the context of earlier theoretical accounts of the 
public sphere. I am referring here to the work of Jürgen Habermas and its 
critical evaluation in the work of Negt and Kluge. The problem is that 
any proposition as to the existence or potential of ‘interstitial’ public-
discursive spaces inevitably becomes entangled within pre-existing 
discourses, in particular Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public 
sphere and Negt and Kluge’s proposition of the forms of the proletarian 
counter-public sphere. Essentially the problem is that an aesthetics whose 
goal is the critique of the reified relations of a completely administered 
world cannot unproblematically propose a counter-public discursive 
community as a remedial measure. The notion of the ‘public sphere’ as a 
democratically independent discursive space is contested by Negt and 
Kluge as an idealistic and ideological construct: it both occludes and 
legitimates the production of hegemonic relations within the logic of the 
commodity form of exchange. Equally, the possibility of a counter-public 
is contentious in the sense that it may merely reproduce the idealistic 
premises of the bourgeois public sphere within an oppositional stance. I 
will deal with this argument in full when I consider the critique of 
relational aesthetics. For present purposes I will set out what I think is 
Bourriaud’s notion of the ‘public’ nature of relational art. 
 
Bourriaud’s methodology is to identify artistic form with its content. As 
an advocate of micro-communitarian practices the aim of relational art is 
thereby to simultaneously produce new relations and their discursive 
spaces as their content. In its early incarnations, the production of 
discursive spaces was reliant upon the gallery space and the ‘new 
institutionalism’ of publicly funded art institutions as ‘readymade’ sites 
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for relationally discursive artistic practice. This model of ‘new 
institutionalism’ was itself premised upon the acceptance of an idealised 
notion of the public realm as a model for the independent, publicly 
funded arts organizations of the 1990s.  It was financially driven by the 
injunctions of inclusivity and pedagogy that guaranteed the public 
gallery’s charitable status. In the early stages this facilitated the visibility 
relational art practice. However, relational practice has increasingly 
identified itself with the production of its own discursive space and the 
ethics of community in the early part of this century. Thus within the 
notion of post-relationality one can identify a break with the institutions 
of art. This is not a clear break and it by no means identifies or defines 
post-relationality. Relational art develops unevenly but there remains the 
sense that relational art is ‘done’ within the gallery system and that it 
articulates its own space now within a more diffuse topology. 
 
Bourriaud’s topologies no longer fit within any strict delineation of the 
public or private. He says, in fact, that: ‘Any artwork might thus be 
defined as a relational object, like the geometric place of a negotiation 
with countless correspondents and recipients.’55 
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The Critique of Relational Aesthetics 
 
The Critical Reception of Relational Aesthetics 
 
In order to evaluate the radical claims of Relational Aesthetics I will set 
out the principle arguments that appeared in the wake of its critical 
reception following its first publication in English in 2002. The early 
critique of relational aesthetics focuses upon questions of relational art’s 
efficacy, its ‘non-representational’ forms and mimetic character. Its 
primary concerns are, then, with the ‘aesthetic autonomy’ of relational art 
and its relationship to extra-artistic social forms. How can relational art 
legitimate itself as art? This analysis increasingly focuses upon relational 
art’s efficacy as a critique of the commodity form of exchange. It 
questions also the nature of the public sphere that relational art proposes 
and seeks to ‘concretise’. 
 
On the whole the early critique of relational aesthetics concentrates upon 
Bourriaud’s analysis of those gallery-based works, installations and 
performances that appear in Relational Aesthetics.  In subsequent 
chapters I will chart the development of what is symptomatic in the first 
wave of critique into an emergent analysis of post-relational practice: that 
is, of the increasingly complex and technologised forms of relational art 
that are less grounded within art institutions. The discussion of post-
relationality also turns increasingly towards a discussion of ‘community’ 
and ‘networks of expanded authorship’. Post-relational critique is 
characterised by a more tolerant approach to the question of relational 
art’s autonomy. I will argue that post-relational analysis has already 
digested the earlier critique to the extent that it recognises and accepts 
that the importance of Relational Aesthetics was its instrumental role in 
re-defining the artistic autonomy of artistic-social forms within the milieu 
of globalization. 
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I have said that this chapter will set out the relational programme of 
Bourriaud that includes elements of Postproduction and The Radicant. 
This is not only because Bourriaud intended them to be read together but 
also because a narrow focus upon Relational Aesthetics produces a rather 
lop-sided early critique.  
 
Anthony Downey’s ‘Towards a Politics of (Relational) Aesthetics’ 
presents an exemplary synopsis of the discourse of Relational Aesthetics 
and the works it discusses immediately after its publication in English, 
between 2002 and 2007. I will be drawing upon his analysis in particular 
because Downey anticipates the questions that establish the terms of 
engagement for later post-relational critique. He offers us a measured 
presentation of a debate that has otherwise tended to polarise opinion and 
has drawn responses from entrenched positions. To his credit, Downey’s 
analysis is mindful of the polemical nature of Relational Aesthetics, that 
is, he accepts its fragmentary nature. He also renders a reading that is 
based upon some of those figures Bourriaud expressly acknowledges as 
having influenced his text: Serge Daney, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel de 
Certeau, and Gilles Deleuze. These are names that emerge infrequently, 
if at all, in the contributions of the respondents to the first critique. Those 
who have come to Bourriaud’s defence are principally artists, but their 
defence has been generally emotive, and has given insufficient weight to 
the influence of these thinkers upon his project. Equally, Bourriaud’s 
‘random materialism’, based upon Althusser’s ‘aleatory materialism’ is 
omitted from the first critique. This omission produces a distorted 
reading of Bourriaud, which persists in the second critique. This is a 
misreading I will seek to address. 
 
The ‘overarching’ purpose of Downey’s article is to ‘clarify the ground 
for a substantive discussion of the politics of aesthetics in the context of 
contemporary art practices and art criticism.’56 His assertion is that the 
first wave of criticism boils down to a reconsideration of artistic                                                         
56 Anthony Downey, ‘Towards a Politics of (Relational) Aesthetics’, Third Text, 21.3 
(2007), (267-275), p. 268. 
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autonomy within the relational model, and therefore how one might 
distinguish relational art forms from other forms of commodified social 
relations. He puts it as follows:  
 
If relational art practices are indeed reflecting, or utilizing, channels of inter-
subjective relations, then there is a need to enquire into whether or not they are 
applying the already invasive practices of neo-liberalist commodification to 
both the so-called private realm and, subsequently, to the institutional relational 
space between art institutions and their public. The question that needs 
addressing, in fine, is relatively straightforward: do these works expose 
tensions within social relations or just epitomize them?57  
 
Downey’s article then identifies the charge of mimesis that informs the 
first wave of criticism, with a consideration of the commodity form, 
which initiates the second. He also identifies the problematic question of 
artistic quality as being coextensive with that of autonomy. In other 
words, what qualities do the works demonstrate in order to justify their 
recognition as artworks? 
 
What are the Provocations of Relational Aesthetics?  
 
Downey states that: 
 
In a broad sense, relational art, for Bourriaud, engages in a form of practicable 
social interactiveness that co-opts collaboration, participation, intervention, 
research-led activities and community-based projects into both the form and 
content of the work. The emergence of these new formal strategies implies, in 
turn, that the ‘criteria of aesthetic judgement’ be yet again re-articulated.58 
 
Downey is right, in my view, to identify the overarching question of 
aesthetic judgement as the point of departure for the critique of relational 
aesthetics. This is because the question ‘what constitutes a good 
relational artwork’ is inevitably asked in the absence of any recognisable                                                         
57 Downey, p. 271. 
58 Downey, p. 267. 
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production of artistic objects or any immediate demonstration of the 
political efficacy of novel relational forms. Thus, the demand for some 
‘aesthetic criteria’ manifests itself as the search for some artistically 
autonomous quality of relation. However, Bourriaud is quite clear that 
the nature of the relational encounter moves beyond the relation of 
object-viewer: rather, the works facilitate ‘an invitation to participate in 
better forms of living within the existing real’.59 
 
Critique of Transitive Ethics 
 
As I have said, Downey examines Bourriaud’s work in the context of 
those he cites as influences, particularly Serge Daney and Emmanuel 
Levinas. Principally this is to identify the nature of Bourriaud’s transitive 
ethics, which posits relational aesthetics as an exercise in showing and an 
invitation to exchange. He says that: ‘Conceptualized as a reciprocal, if 
not strictly speaking interrogative gesture, the form of relational art – and 
the formative structures it engenders – effectively ‘invent[s] possible 
encounters’ and ‘the conditions for an exchange’’.60  
 
Bourriaud’s use of Daney’s notion that ‘all form is a face looking at me’ 
and Bourriaud’s focus upon relations of ‘exchange, social interplay and 
inter-subjective communication’61 constitute, according to Downey, 
nodal points for reflection upon their potentially social transitivity.62 He 
adds that: 
 
This, for Bourriaud, is a political activity insofar as relational art practices not 
only focus on the ‘sphere of inter-human relations’, a realm that is an 
endemically political sphere to begin with, but also give rise to the conditions 
within which unprecedented inter-human relations can be articulated. [My 
emphasis]63 
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Downey correctly identifies that the politics of relational aesthetics 
concerns not its political content so much as the politics of social 
formations. But what the quotation foregrounds, is the concern that 
relational aesthetics’ focus upon a purely ethical notion of the conditions 
of exchange, appears to impose limitations from the outset upon the 
extent to which it can pose a politically resistant critique of reified 
commodity relations. Downey suggests that the transitive ethic fails to 
address inter-human relations as themselves conditioned by, and 
experienced as, manifestations of exchange value, as expressions of a 
pervasive commodity form. For Downey it is in this sense that inter-
human relations are endemically political for us? Whilst I agree with 
Downey in principle, I think that his criticism ignores crucial features of 
relational aesthetics – not least, Bourriaud’s understanding that relations 
between people are dictated by forms of exchange. 
 
The implication of this criticism is an extreme scepticism around 
Bourriaud’s claim that unprecedented or (I will call them) radically 
singular relations are even possible and doubts about the mode of 
appearing of relational artworks. Bourriaud claims that relational art 
transcends the ambit of art and creates novel and concrete relations 
within the socio-political sphere, and it is on this claim that he needs to 
be judged. Downey is primarily concerned with the aesthetic criteria and 
efficacy of relational art. But he states that the ‘open-endedness’ of 
Bourriaud’s thesis, and this art’s inability to present its symbolic value 
leaves it open to numerous criticisms.64 Downey attributes this in part to 
Bourriaud’s reliance upon a rhizomatic conceptualization of the social, 
which he takes from Deleuze.  Downey’s says that his interest is in ‘the 
practicalities’ of relational art’s position. He asks: 
 
to what extent, for example, do relational art practices really operate ‘beside or 
beneath beneath a real economic system’ and thus avoid (and radically 
reconstitute) the service economy that underwrites our neo-liberal world order                                                         
64 Downey, pp. 270-271. 
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and the relationships formed within it? This is critical that we considered the 
degree to which relational art is proposed as a remediative to the socially de-
personalising effects of the neo-liberal, post-industrial and increasingly 
globalised demands of the so-called Western world. 65 
 
For Bourriaud relational aesthetics has ‘no prior example in art history’.66 
In Downey’s terms: ‘Bourriaud simply tends to disregard his own 
reliance on a degree of idealism that was largely associated with 
modernism’.67 Significantly Downey connects this notion of 
unprecedented relational form to what is reified in relational aesthetics – 
this is an ethical abstraction predicated as though it had a relation to, or 
were in fact, a concrete political existence.68 He is not dismissive of such 
art, but maintains that Bourriaud’s claim that relational practices produce 
‘unprecedented’ inter-human relations that advance us beyond the 
compromised relations of the neo-liberal world need substantiating.69 
 
What is more, Downey’s assessment is that the artist’s purpose in such a 
realm [of transitive ethics] is to perform the role of ‘social worker’, 
tasked with gluing together breaches within contemporary social 
interrelations. 70 This model of relational aesthetics as ‘social palliation’ 
also appears in the work of other critics. Leaving aside for the moment 
the separate question of the nature of the relational public realm, this sort 
of criticism is based upon a reductive and binary reading of artistic 
autonomy and heteronomy. In particular it is symptomatic of paranoia 
about the disappearance of what is particular to art. This stems from a 
misunderstanding of the mimetic character of relational practice. 
 
In particular the question of ‘cultural tenancy’ merits further 
consideration. I read ‘cultural tenancy’ as identifiable with the mimetic 
tendency in relational art. To recount, relational aesthetics is often                                                         
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70 Downey, p. 270. 
Comment [S8]: mimesis 
Comment [S9]: cultural tenancy and mimesis 
 75 
criticized on the basis that it merely mimics existing social relations, or 
that it surrenders the artwork to its heteronomy tout court. If one reads 
‘cultural tenancy’ as reductively mimetic of existing social relations then 
it is easy to see why it threatens the autonomy of art. But relational 
aesthetics has a more nuanced articulation when read in de Certeau’s 
terms as ‘cultural tenancy’, that is, as a form of productive mimesis. 
Downey does not talk about alternative models of mimesis but he does 
observe that Bourriaud’s thesis contains a ‘crucial causative inflection’ in 
the sense that relational art practices may replicate without necessarily 
mirroring the conditions of their production. Downey says that: ‘this 
point is further complemented by the notion of a co-existence criterion: 
the idea that all works of art produce a model of sociability’; however, 
relational practices, significantly produce new models of sociability’. [my 
emphasis]71 The idea here is then that what Bourriaud proposes in 
‘cultural tenancy’ is a principle of the co-existence of artistic forms. 
Moreover I would add that this co-existence does not necessarily entail 
subsumption beneath, or the reductive mimesis of, dominant social 
forms. 
 
Downey’s reading of Bourriaud through de Certeau, reveals the true 
nature of Bourriaud’s sense of the social interstice. It should be read as a 
tactical space capable of inhabiting however fleetingly, the strategically 
determined and alienated socius. In this light, the accusation of glorified 
social work is grossly unfair. It ignores the very particular model of 
artistic autonomy, which Bourriaud adopts, based on de Certeau’s model 
of tactical interventions and Althusser’s aleatory materialism. My reading 
then tends to credit Bourriaud with a greater critical import than one can 
derive from an isolated analysis of his transitive ethic. Bourriaud is 
certainly a thinker of relational hypostasis but his response is not to seek 
artistic autonomy in the gestures of avant-gardism or transgressive 
opportunism. Rather he is a constructor of forms of encounter within 
productive mimesis                                                         
71 Downey, p. 270. 
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Productive Mimesis in post-relational art 
 
If relational art is to overcome the charge that it is ‘merely mimetic’ of 
reified social relations then it must establish the legitimacy of its forms of 
productive mimesis. If it can do this, the charge that it lacks artistic 
autonomy would seem equally to be ill founded. In order to establish this 
I turn, here, to Adorno. Given the importance of this question I will quote 
from Adorno at length: 
 
The spirit of artworks is their objectivated mimetic comportment: It is opposed 
to mimesis and at the same time, the form that mimesis takes in art. 
 
As an aesthetic category, imitation cannot simply be accepted any more than it 
can simply be rejected. Art objectivates the mimetic impulse, holding it fast at 
the same time that it disposes of its immediacy and negates it. From this 
dialectic, the imitation of reality draws the fatal consequence. Objectivated 
reality is the correlative of objectivated mimesis. The reaction to what is not-I 
becomes the imitation of the not-I. Mimesis itself conforms to objectivation, 
vainly hoping to close the rupture between objectivated consciousness and the 
object. By wanting to make itself like the objectivated other, the artwork 
becomes unlike that other. But it is only by way of its self-alienation through 
imitation that the subject so strengthens itself that it is able to shake off the 
spell of imitation. That in which artworks over millennia knew themselves to 
be images of something reveals itself in the course of history, their critic, as 
being inessential to them. There would have been no Joyce without Proust, nor 
Proust without Flaubert, on whom Proust looked down. It was by way of 
imitation, not by avoiding it, that art achieved its autonomy; in it art acquired 
the means to its freedom. 
 
Art is not a replica any more than it is knowledge of an object; if it were it 
would be dragged down to the level of being a mere duplication, of which 
Husserl delivered such a stringent critique in the sphere of discursive 
knowledge. On the contrary, art reaches towards reality, only to recoil at the 
actual touch of it. The characters of its script are monuments to this movement. 
Their constellation in the artwork is a cryptogram of the historical essence of 
Comment [S11]: All stuff on mimesis here 
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reality, not its copy. Such comportment is related to mimetic comportment. 
Even artworks that announce themselves as replicas are such only peripherally; 
by reacting to reality they become a second-order reality, subjective reflection, 
regardless whether the artists have reflected or not.72  
 
In these terms, the reading of relational art has hitherto failed to 
recognise the dialectical nature of mimesis: that is, even at its most 
imitative, art becomes qualitatively other. None of Bourriaud’s 
interlocutors read the mimesis of relational art as its productive self-
alienation. Seen from this perspective it is the very mimetic nature of 
relational art that is the guarantee of its autonomy and legitimates its 
claim to be a critical-realist artform. What persists even with a corrective 
reading of mimesis is the sense that relational art continues to manifest 
itself only weakly as a form of representation and that it fails to identify 
its place of concrete appearance. 
 
Relationality and the Public realm: New Institutionalism  
 
Concerns about relational aesthetics reliance upon a vanguardism of 
curatorial practice and upon ‘new institutionalism’ are related, on the 
basis that they are symptomatic and productive of the conflation of the 
public and private realms. The charge is that relational aesthetics reflects 
the institution of art back upon itself, and as a result loses critical 
distance. Models of artistic autonomy and heteronomy cannot be read 
simpliciter when the operations of the culture industry redouble the 
question of artistic autonomy through the rapid assimilation of ideas and 
new relations into capital. Downey poses the question in the following 
terms: 
 
If relational art practices are indeed reflecting, or utilizing, channels of inter-
subjective relations, then there is the need to enquire whether or not they are 
applying the already invasive practices of neo-liberalist commodification to 
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both the so-called private realm and, subsequently, to the interstitial relational 
space between institutions and their public. 73 
 
Downey’s concern is that contemporary curatorial practices are 
developed within the context and mandate of market-led, publicly funded 
institutional priorities. Increasingly he views the institutional context of 
relational aesthetics as being in fact, the de-institutionalization of the art 
institution, and the migration of the public sphere into this institution as a 
forum for ‘public’ debate. He cites Catherine David who claims that ‘the 
strategies that attempt to contrast institutional space with an ‘outside’ 
appear naïve or ridiculous [ignoring the transformation of the 
Habermasian model of public space, and] new modes of imaginary and 
symbolic investment of places by contemporary subjects’.74 For Downey, 
relational aesthetics capitalise upon this migration to such an extent that 
it is unclear whether relational works can produce critical statements. He 
talks of an institutional context then, which absorbs ‘the transitive power 
of critical statements’.75 This presentation, I would suggest, is a 
reflection of a growing disillusionment in the 1990’s with the promises of 
self-organising networks as potentially productive of new forms of 
democracy, and a realization that they in fact constitute no more than a 
morphology of the organisation of capital.76  How can relational 
aesthetics respond to such a charge? In the following sections I will 
examine the ‘public-ness’ of relational art in detail, culminating in the 
question of whether relational practice might constitute a counter-public 
sphere and, moreover whether this is either possible or desirable. 
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The Publicness of Relational Art 
 
The Critique of ‘Consensual’ Relational Aesthetics and the Public Sphere 
 
How do we account for the charge that relational aesthetics forms mimic 
the forms of neo-liberal democracy? The problem as it is generally 
presented, is that relational aesthetics lends itself to consensual models of 
sociability and is therefore neo-Kantian. The charge is that it sets out a 
model of public sphere that is founded upon consensus. I will set out 
Toni Ross’s contribution to this question here.77  
 
Ross attributes great significance to the assertion of ‘a minimal 
difference between hegemonic culture and the aesthetic sphere, 
describing art as a ‘social interstice’, or gap within a larger relational 
system’.78 She identifies this thinking of the interstitial, with the notion 
of excess. Whilst artistic practice is generally ‘enmeshed’ within 
networks of global capitalism, art creates free spaces of social 
experimentation that are ‘partially protected’. Ross concludes that there is 
for Bourriaud, a transcendental dimension to art that ‘exerts its pressure 
from within the very fabric of what currently passes for everyday life’. 79  
She contends that the notion of the aesthetic as a vehicle for resistance to 
the given realities of capitalist culture has been around for at least two 
hundred years, echoing Rancière’s view of the aesthetic regime of art as 
the decoupling of meaning and referent. Bourriaud’s asserts the 
unprecedented nature of relational aesthetics, but his use of ‘interstitial’ 
reasoning carries Marxist remnants into the discourse of relational                                                         
77 Toni Ross, ‘Aesthetic Autonomy and Interdisciplinarity: a Response to Nicolas 
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aesthetics, in a way that for Ross is ironically dictated by the form of the 
transcendental synthetic philosophy of Kant. Ross identifies Bourriaud’s 
ancestral relation to Kant as an assertion of aesthetic freedom that elides 
instrumental rationality and stimulates the free play of the mental 
faculties.80 Bourriaud’s remarks that a work of art, ‘has no a priori useful 
function without being socially useless’.81 
 
Ross contends that the democratic-consensual impetus of relational 
aesthetics is neo-Kantian. She claims that: ‘a prominent feature of 
relational aesthetics is its cancellation of the avant-gardist value of 
dissent.’ 82 She bases this upon Bourriaud’s claim that whilst ‘the 
imaginary of modernism was based on conflict, the imaginary of our day 
and age is concerned with negotiations, bonds and co-existences.’83  She 
maintains that this ethical demand for harmonious cohabitation between 
people is ‘perfectly in tune with the long-standing liberal conception of 
democracy’.84 
 
In particular, she says that: 
 
According to political theorist John Rawls’ influential thesis, liberal theories of 
democratic equality are based on the fraternal assumption of the ‘symmetry of 
everyone’s relation to each other’. 85 Relational aesthetics is articulated in 
precisely this way: artists and members of the public, or art and a plurality of 
disciplinary parts, come together on an equal footing to form a whole. More 
specifically, relational aesthetics echoes the central values of liberal consensus 
politics. Seeking to ameliorate social or political dissent, consensus politics 
assumes that every sector of society, along with their specific differences, can 
be incorporated and adjusted to the given political order. 86 
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This assessment of Bourriaud’s reparative and consensual model within 
Relational Aesthetics appears valid. Bourriaud appears to valorize a 
bourgeois public sphere. I think that Bourriaud’s construction of the 
public realm is less developed in his early work than it is in either 
Postproduction or The Radicant. In the later work, the spaces of 
relational art are more clearly linked to the production of topologies and 
matrices of form. This is an area that needs further enquiry. The rhetoric 
of consensus disappears in this later work. 
 
The Relational Public Sphere 
 
Relational art poses a number of questions about the nature of the public 
sphere and the forms of ‘publicness’ of the encounter. I will consider the 
developments in Bourriaud’s thinking of relational space and ask what 
form, if at all, should the notion of the public sphere now take?  
 
Relational art purports to be reparative of the social bond but also to 
produce its own spaces of operation through its appropriation of social 
forms and its principle of co-existence. Yet the very existence of a public 
sphere is contentious. Even if it did exist, many would consider it an 
ideological construction. What is more, the blurring of the distinction 
between consumption and production makes the identification of a public 
realm problematic based on a lack of clear division between public and 
private interests. It accelerates what Habermas identifies as the origin of 
the public sphere’s dissolution. What would a philosophy of art look like 
on the assumption that there is no way of distinguishing between the 
private and public realms? How could one define artistic autonomy under 
those conditions? Even de Certeau’s distinction between strategic and 
tactical behaviours depends upon some distinction between the public 
and the private sphere as a necessary precondition for the emergence of a 
strategic-tactical site of torsion. 
 
In Postproduction and The Radicant, I believe that there are significant 
developments in Bourriaud’s thinking of the ‘public sphere’ towards a 
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formation of networked relations that calls the producer/recipient into a 
dialogic encounter. I have said that Bourriaud’s notion of publicness is 
initially ill defined and at times contradicts his later account. In what 
follows I will set out the ‘terms of engagement’ for a reading of the 
public sphere that I believe has conditioned Bourriaud’s critical reception 
on this point. Broadly speaking, Bourriaud can be read in Relational 
Aesthetics as proposing a reparative programme that brings his thought 
within the critique of Habermas’s view of the public sphere as an 
idealised realm. There are elements within Relational Aesthetics’ 
proposal as to the modeling of possible universes within interstitial 
spaces that become more clearly articulated in the language of topology 
in the later writing. This brings Bourriaud’s thought within the critique of 
the public sphere from the perspective of a counter-public that appears to 
suggest a micropolitical-communitarian model. 
 
Habermas’s Public Sphere 
 
We have already encountered the argument that Bourriaud’s notion of 
consensual relations is neo-Kantian. Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere 
is similarly based upon a consensual Kantian model in which the public 
sphere presents a space of critical discourse in which private persons may 
openly discuss and bring practical reason to bear upon public affairs. 
Habermas’s account of The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (1962)87 gives an account of its demise based upon internal 
tensions caused by its vastly expanded constituency; this popularization 
is at odds with the question of the ‘quality’ of its discourse. Yet, 
Habermas seeks to redeem what is ‘valuable’; that is its emancipatory 
potential. What is problematic in this has been for Habermas’s critics a 
seemingly blind faith in the efficacy of formal democracy and its 
attendant idealistic-rational legitimation of the inequalities perpetrated by 
the state. Moreover, it can appear an unrealistic theory given the lack of a                                                         
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clear distinction between the public and private realms. As more private 
organizations assume public power and as the state increases its 
involvement in private affairs it can appear outdated and ineffectual. 
What is more, Habermas really provides no solution to the problem of 
exclusion from, and marginalization in relation to, any dominant 
bourgeois public sphere, relying instead upon a notion of 
‘communicative action’ or communicative ethics as adequate to the 
demand for representative democracy. This ethical model of 
communicative action does look suspiciously similar to Bourriaud’s 
transitive ethic. Crucially Habermas is criticized for failing to advance 
any counter public that might contest a bourgeois public realm that in 
fact tends towards elitism and exclusion. If Bourriaud perhaps 
unwittingly strays into this territory in Relational Aesthetics then he has 
paid a heavy price. Specifically I think that the persistent charge of 
reductive social mimesis must be read in the light of this. The discussion 
of convivial or consensual relations has tended to draw attention away 
from his counter-public and micropolitical articulations of the relational 
programme. 
 
Reading Relational Art’s Programme as a Counter-Public Sphere: Negt 
& Kluge’s Public Sphere and Experience88 
 
Negt and Kluge’s analysis of the public sphere examines the mechanisms 
by which the horizon of social experience is constituted from a Marxian 
perspective. Thus, they challenge any essentialist or ahistorical notion of 
the public sphere. Their analysis differs from that of Habermas in 
important respects. Thus the decline of the public sphere is not the result 
of emergent contradictions. These contradictions inhere in its very 
structure from its inception. They regard the public sphere as premised 
upon an abstract notion of generality that excludes the particular. They                                                         
88 Oliver Negt and Alexander Kluge, Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis 
of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere, Foreword By M. Hansen, trans. by P. 
Labanyi, J.O.Daniel and A. Oksilort (London and Minneapolois: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993) 
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regard any call for its re-institution as a value free and independent realm 
as dangerously misguided. Significantly, they examine the public sphere 
within the context of globalization of the media and as an aggregation of 
phenomena that present themselves in disparate and contradictory 
locations. Thus the global unification of the public sphere within 
electronic media and transnational networks of consumption and 
production entails a double movement between the diversification of 
constituencies and particularities, identified by Habermas as the source of 
the public sphere’s dissolution, with an ever more direct hold upon the 
‘raw experience’ of subjectivity. Bourriaud’s thinking of the matrices and 
topologies of relation seems a good match for Negt and Kluge’s attention 
to the changing spatial, temporal and geopolitical parameters of the 
experiential horizon. Negt and Kluge anticipate the ambivalent forms of 
the global and local that Bourriaud identifies in The Radicant. In other 
words, Negt and Kluge seem to share a notion of the ‘territory’ of 
relation that is attuned to the spatio-temporal changes that mark the 
‘radical conjunction’ of relational aesthetics. They also share some of 
Bourriaud’s optimism about the potential uses of the forms of 
globalization for the creation of particular counter-publics 
notwithstanding what they perceive to be a fetishisation of the global as a 
‘pseudo public sphere’. Key to Negt and Kluge’s conception of a 
counter-public is the notion of the ‘context of lived experience’, that is 
Erfharung. This notion of ‘experience’ carries less of an empirical 
flavour than it does in English. It contains within it the notion of journey, 
from the German verb fahren and therefore temporalises experience in 
the sense of a wandering exploration that might bear comparison with the 
figure of Bourriaud’s semionaut. There is then an emphatic notion of 
experience at work that includes memory, relation and the imagination 
that is at odds with a purely rational or empirical model that we find in 
Habermas. Erfharung is then a site for the mediation of experience, and 
might then be seen as a matrix within which consciousness and social 
horizons are explored. Again, comparisons with Bourriaud’s thinking 
might be made on the basis that his topologies and matrices of 
appropriated forms are sites of translation and inhabitation aimed at 
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producing a consciousness of better ways of living or, we might advance, 
‘counter-subjects to capital’. Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism, that 
emerges from the experience of the object without any predetermined 
origin or destination for thought might also acquire a sense of emerging 
‘publicness’ when read with Erfharung as the primacy of lived 
experience. What I am proposing on this reading is that the ‘public 
sphere’ of relational aesthetics might be viewed not only as the site of 
multiple counter-publics but that it be viewed less as a site than as a 
process. Just as Bourriaud insists upon the instability and diversity of the 
concept of form, we might equally say that within Negt and Kluge’s 
thinking of the unstable makeup of the public sphere, we arrive at a 
notion of the production of a counter-public sphere of relational art as a 
precarious and perilous task. 
 
Utility or Contemplation? The Critique of Relational Aesthetics’ 
Utilitarianism 
 
In the search for a form of measure of the qualities of relational art Claire 
Bishop analyses its utilitarian credentials. She asks whether there is 
anything ‘proper’ to this art, qua art, within the traditional categories of 
aesthetic judgement, or, failing this, what is the quality of these relational 
forms that might make them aesthetic forms.89 It is a familiar question, 
which arises within different configurations of the historical and neo-
avant-gardes.90 Bourriaud digests the problem of relational quality. His 
programme advances the utilization of social forms as a methodology for 
the concrete realization of social artworks. 
 
Bishop’s approach is premised upon the ‘uselessness’ of art as a 
guarantor of its autonomy, of its contemplative value against its 
utilitarianism. Art’s uselessness is its badge of honour. But what exactly                                                         
89 Claire Bishop, ‘Antagonism & Relational Aesthetics’, October, 110 (2004), pp. 51-80. 
90 Rosalind Krauss makes a similar connection between the question of what constitutes 
a sculpture and a loss of place, resulting in the monument as a presentation of pure 
negativity producing a crisis in the teleology and historicism of artistic qualities. 
Rosalind Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’, October, 8. (1979), pp. 30-44. 
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does ‘useless’ mean and what is forgotten in this valorisation of 
uselessness? I suggest that what is forgotten is that within the logic of the 
commodity form it is productivity as exchange value that legitimises 
certain social practices and marginalises others. Relational Aesthetics and 
Postproduction frame this as a question of the legitimacy of artistic 
labour, that is of ‘useless’ or ostensively ‘non-productive’ labour which 
in fact acquires its use value and therefore its utility through processes of 
non-commodifiable exchange. 
 
This calls for a fuller diagnostic that reframes relational aesthetics within 
the question of utilitarianism. Historically, utilitarianism reflects a 
tension between individual and collective rights within the paradigms of 
liberalism. John Stuart Mill’s basic thesis is that relations are organised 
in order to maximise happiness for the greatest number. The striking 
difference between Mill’s formulation of utilitarianism and Bourriaud’s 
is that Mill works within a clearly defined distinction between the public 
and the private realms, whereas Bourriaud works within a notion of their 
conflation. 
 
Classical utilitarianism, then, understood as the maximization of 
happiness for the greatest number, underwrites liberalism, but it is 
acutely distorted within our neo-liberal, experiential economy in which 
the public/private distinction has either collapsed or the abstraction of its 
illusion has become self-evident. Downey’s assessment of neo-liberalism 
is that it is,  
 
an order that is facilitated and maintained by the consumerist-driven 
commodification of both private and public sphere; the commercialization of 
the substance and form of social communications; and the privatization of 
inter-personal and professional relations. 91 
 
Downey accuses Relational Aesthetics of complicity with classical 
utilitarianism, in that Bourriaud states that it aims ‘to invent possible                                                         
91 Downey, p. 272. 
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relations with our neighbours in the present and to bet on happier 
tomorrows’.92 Downey likens this to ‘a disconcerting corporate-speak’.93  
 
Claire Bishop calls for some means of measuring or comparing the 
relations produced by a work of art when she claims that: ‘The quality of 
the relationships in ‘relational aesthetics’ are never examined or called 
into question… If relational art produces human relations, then the next 
logical question to ask is what types of relations are being produced, for 
whom, and why?’94 
 
Whilst Downey claims that relational art attempts to balance public with 
private interests, Bishop takes up the utilitarian argument on the basis 
that relational aesthetics privileges inter-subjective relations over art’s 
production of objects of contemplation. She says that relational art 
ascribes a direct and self-evident democratic value to its model of 
participation. This masks the absence of any demonstration of the quality 
of relations in terms of either their political efficacy or content. In other 
words she advocates a productive relational utilitarianism. This is an 
empirical approach to relation. What then are the assumptions of 
productive utilitarianism, and how might I counter this with a model of 
relational aesthetics as non-productive utilitarianism? 
 
The non-productive ‘Utility’ of Relational Art 
 
What is Utilitarianism? 
 
A reading of utilitarianism in which utility as usefulness enters into a 
binary opposition with the presumed uselessness of art, identifying the 
latter with objects of contemplation, is simply erroneous. It is worth 
reminding ourselves of how John Stuart Mill defines the concept. In the 
                                                        
92 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p. 45. 
93 Downey, p. 272. 
94 Bishop, ‘Antagonism & Relational Aesthetics’, p. 65. 
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second chapter of his Utilitarianism, titled ‘What Utilitarianism Is’, he 
opens with the following statement: 
 
A passing remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing 
that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong use the term in 
that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to 
pleasure.95 
 
Mill expresses his frustration with those who denounce his theory ‘as 
impracticably dry when the word ‘utility’ precedes the word ‘pleasure’, 
and as too practicably voluptuous when the word ‘pleasure’ precedes the 
word ‘utility’.’96 He adds that: ‘Having caught up the word ‘utilitarian’, 
while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually 
express by it the rejection or the neglect of pleasure in some of its forms: 
of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement.’97 Mill is clearly concerned 
that the sense and use of the word utilitarianism in his time is acquiring a 
distorted meaning, and goes on at some length to establish two essential 
tenets of utilitarianism which appear apposite in the light of the first 
critique of relational aesthetics. Mill asserts that utilitarianism is not 
simply a hedonistic pursuit, the maximisation of happiness but is 
concerned with the question of quality. He says that: 
 
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact that some 
kind of pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be 
absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity 
alone.98 
 
In the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill asks the question, ‘of what 
sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible’? He gives the                                                         
95 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism and the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment, ed. by 
George Sher, 2nd edn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis, 2001), 
p. 6. 
96 Mill, p. 6. 
97 Mill, p. 6. 
98 Mill, p. 8. 
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following answer: ‘The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, 
and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only 
desirable as means to that end.’99 And then continues: 
 
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people 
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it; and 
so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole 
evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do 
actually desire it… No reason can be given why the general happiness is 
desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, 
desires his own happiness.100 
 
My point is this. The critique of relational aesthetics’ utilitarianism is 
based upon unexamined and misleading precepts. First amongst these is 
the notion that utility is opposed to pleasure. This critique therefore 
unsurprisingly demands of relational utilitarianism that it demonstrate the 
quality of its relational encounters, in terms of quantitative outcome. This 
reversal is not only attributable to a misunderstanding of utilitarianism, 
but demonstrates I think the logic of commodification itself. Mill is at 
great pains to point out that even a relatively small quantity of utility may 
produce greater happiness than a greater quantity, if the quality of the 
former is superior to the latter. It is quite consistent with Mill’s 
utilitarianism, that Bourriaud's interstitial and fleeting moments of non-
alienated relation may produce greater satisfaction than commodified 
relations of an inexorably greater quantity. The evental nature of the 
relations that Bourriaud attests to, may well entail their disappearance, 
but that does not preclude our understanding, or indeed our speculating, 
that those relations were of a superior quality to those we habitually 
encounter. 
 
A related point is this: the critique of relational aesthetics also demands 
that utilitarian relations demonstrate the proof of their utility. I have                                                         
99 Mill, p. 35. 
100 Mill, p. 35. 
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demonstrated that this is an absurd question in the light of what Mill has 
to say on the question of the proof of happiness. However, reading the 
critique through Mill does shed light on the demands of political efficacy 
placed upon art. According to the critique of relational art’s utility, 
relational artworks appear to present us with a clear choice: we can either 
invalidate them on the basis that they fail to represent or evidence their 
efficacy, or we can validate them as expressions of desire for, and 
testamentary presentations of, non-alienated relations in their promissory 
form. In other words, the restitution of ‘utility’ to its proper meaning also 
entails an expansion of the notion of ‘ethical efficacy’, beyond a model 
of productive utilitarianism or communicative transparency within 
‘instrumentalised relation’. 
 
If not utilitarian efficacy, then ‘critical’ efficacy 
 
Bishop is critical of relational aesthetics’ convivial model of democracy 
as at times indistinguishable from the neoliberal milieu itself.  I have 
already examined this claim. However unlike Ross’s argument for 
‘disagreement’ as constitutive of a public sphere, Bishop takes 
disagreement as the basis of a measure of the aesthetic criteria of 
relational art based upon its critical efficacy. To this end she 
distinguishes and endorses a strain of antagonistic relational aesthetics 
based upon her analysis of the works of Santiago Sierra and Thomas 
Hirschhorn.101   
 
Bishop’s presentation of antagonistic relational aesthetics as a more 
convincing subcategory of relational artwork is premised upon its 
demonstration of a tangible degree of ethical efficacy. It therefore 
assumes that relational aesthetics stands and falls upon its ethical efficacy 
that can be measured. If it produces no object of contemplation (and is 
therefore non-utilitarian in Bishop’s terms) then it ought to demonstrate a 
quantifiable or legible capacity for its ability to signifyits resistant                                                         
101 Downey, pp. 274-275. 
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capacities. I view such a formulation of antagonistic relational aesthetics 
as an otiose category, which can be explained away through a detailed 
reading of utilitarianism, which permits the articulation of relational 
desire as both synonymous with utility, and commensurate with 
dissent.102 
 
What is problematic in Claire Bishop’s article ‘Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics’ is the very particular way in which she formulates 
the notion of antagonism.103 An argument ensued in October magazine 
between Bishop and Liam Gillick, over what he claims to have been 
Bishop’s misuse of the concept. He claims that Bishop misrepresents 
Laclau and Mouffe's exposition within Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy.104 I wish to assert, here, the negative dialectical model of 
antagonism that informs this research, against Bishop’s formulation, and 
also to shift the focus of Bishop’s argument on to what is its overriding 
concern, that of the efficacy of the representational forms of relational 
and post-relational art practice. 
 
Bishop’s argument proceeds as follows: firstly, in an argument we have 
already encountered, Bishop points out that relational aesthetics lacks 
any object of contemplation, or even a proxy, in the form of a souvenir, 
what might be termed ‘reliquary’ documentation. For Bishop this 
problem calls for a formulation of a measure of its aesthetic value.105 
Having set this precept for her argument, Bishop then proposes a form of                                                         
 102 In fact, Sierra's works certainly do not fit with the model of relational aesthetics put 
forward by Bourriaud, in the sense that they tend to shut the public out and do not 
elicit a relational encounter. I view them as already post-relational on the basis of 
their thwarted theatricality. This model maintains the distance between actors and 
audience, in a way that maintains its identity as theatre, rather than for example, the 
experimental theatre of Paolo Freire, which in fact relies upon abandoning this 
distance, and in fact its identity as theatre tout court. It is the enframing of the 
impossibility of encounter that renders them post-relational. 
103 Bishop, ‘Antagonism & Relational Aesthetics’, pp. 51-80. 
104 Liam Gillick, ‘Contingent Factors: A Response to Claire Bishop’s Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics’, October, 115  (2006), pp. 95-107. 
105 ‘rather than the interpretations of a work of art being open to continual reassessment, 
the work of art itself is argued to be in perpetual flux. There are many problems with 
this idea, not least of which is the difficulty of discerning a work whose identity is 
willfully unstable.’ Bishop, ‘Antagonism & Relational Aesthetics’, p. 52.  
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aesthetic judgement adequate to the relational artwork, posited as an 
examination of the tangible quality of relations demonstrated in the work. 
In the third strand of Bishop’s argument, she addresses this quality of 
relation as cognate with its antagonistic nature. In order to do this, she 
conflates Laclau and Mouffe’s arguments concerning subjectivity as a 
form of self-differentiation of the subject within hegemonic forms of 
capitalism with a dissensual model, which relies upon Rancière's 
formulation. Finally, Bishop appears in my view, to meld this 
formulation of qualitative antagonism to a model of ethical immediacy 
and political efficacy, which is both consistent with her reading of 
Relational Aesthetics as productive utilitarianism, and adopts Rancière's 
critique of political efficacy and ethical immediacy within his analysis of 
the failures of critical art.106 This fourth step in her analysis is crucially 
given much less attention than her analysis of antagonism: 
 
today, political, moral, and ethical judgements have come to fill the vacuum of 
aesthetic judgement in a way that was unthinkable forty years ago. This is 
partly because postmodernism has attacked the very notion of aesthetic 
judgment, and partly because contemporary art solicits the viewer’s literal 
interaction in ever more elaborate ways. Yet the ‘birth of the viewer’ (and the 
ecstatic promises of emancipation that accompany it) has not halted appeals to 
higher criteria, which have simply returned in other guises.107 
 
My difficulty with this final stage in Bishop's argument, is not only its 
reductive reading of art’s ethics and politics as utilitarian, but also that it 
is fundamentally at odds with my reading of antagonism within negative 
dialectics as an index falsi of reality. This final stage of Bishop’s 
argument is a hasty and opportunistic movement from antagonism as the 
source of the power of negation, into a fruitless search for democratic 
tendencies within relational aesthetics premised upon an ideological 
notion of antagonistic quality. In other words, it attempts to introduce                                                         
106 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and its Discontents (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009) 
107 Bishop, ‘Antagonism & Relational Aesthetics’, pp. 77-78. 
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some reconciling element.108 I am in agreement with Liam Gillick's 
response here therefore in his rejoinder to Bishop’s argument, that this 
approach simply reproduces a reductive binary relationship between 
hegemony and resistance. Gillick’s assessment is as follows; 
 
Things get truly interesting when art goes beyond a reflection of the rejected 
choices of the dominant culture and attempts to address the actual processes 
that shape our contemporary environment. This is the true nature of Mouffe's 
plea for a more sophisticated understanding of the paradox of liberal 
democracy, which concerns the recognition of the antagonism suppressed 
within consensus-based models of social democracy, not merely a simple two-
way relationship between the existing sociopolitical model and an enlightened 
demonstration of its failings.109 
 
If antagonism and contradiction are categories of reflection produced not 
by the concept but by its object, then the presentation of antagonism is 
already immanent to relational and post-relational artworks all the way 
down. Therefore, the term ‘antagonistic relational aesthetics’ is 
tautologous. To recall, the relationship between negative dialectics and 
antagonism reflects necessarily, the irrationality of its object; 
 
For its part, negative dialectics aspires to display a fidelity to this antagonistic 
character of capitalist society: it is a dialectic modality of thought because 
society is antagonistic; negative because this antagonism cannot be overcome                                                         
108 Against the totalizing tendency it is rather more important to present what is 
unreconciled, so, ‘The nonidentity of the antagonistic, a nonidentity it runs up against 
and laboriously pulls together, is the nonidentity of a whole that is not the true but the 
untrue, the absolute opposite of justice. But in reality this very nonidentity has the 
form of identity, an all-inclusiveness that is not governed by any third, reconciling 
element. This kind of deluded identity is the essence of ideology, of socially 
necessary illusion. Only through the process whereby the contradiction becomes 
absolute, and not through the contradiction becoming alleviated in the absolute, could 
it disintegrate and perhaps find its way to that reconciliation which must have misled 
Hegel because its real possibility was still concealed from him.’ Theodor W. Adorno, 
Hegel: Three Studies, (Cambridge: MA: MIT Press 1993) cited in A. R. Bonnet, 
‘Antagonism and Difference: Negative Dialectics and Post-structuralism in view of 
the Critique of Modern Capitalism’, in Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and 
Political Activism (eds.) (London: Pluto Press, 2009), pp.41-78 (p. 45.) 
109 Gillick, p. 100. 
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through thought; and certainly utopian, because it continues to hope for a 
reconciled reality. However, the abstract character of negative dialectics also 
points towards a determination of society, because its abstraction is not a 
subjective abstraction which belongs to the realm of thought, but an abstraction 
which is rooted in its object: society.110 
 
In her appeal to political efficacy and ethical immediacy, Bishop dilutes 
the negative power of contradiction as the reflective thinking of a 
contradictory society into a search for 'genuine democracy'. To this 
extent, she is in agreement with Rancière’s identification of aesthetics 
with politics. What is interesting to me in Bishop's argument is that in her 
skepticism about the open artwork, for example, or the democratic 
pretensions of the encounter, she ignores the power of negation within 
relational art as a site of immanent non-identity. What she does highlight 
is a separate issue, which is that of the weak representational 
manifestation of this negativity within certain relational art practices. In 
other words there is a distinction to be made between the presence of 
antagonism as an element within every artwork (because artworks are 
socially determined) and the degree to which that antagonism may appear 
or become manifest as negation. It is for this reason that relational art 
requires a re-thinking of its forms and methods of representation in 
terms, as Bourriaud has said, of the ‘non-visual’. This is why Bishop 
bases her argument upon the work of Sierra and Hirschhorn. Both of their 
practices rely extensively upon photographic documentation as an 
explicit manifestation of their practices. Indeed Sierra goes so far as to 
admit that the objective in staging his works is to arrive at an exemplary 
photographic representation of it. Both Sierra and Hirschhorn have a 
strong iconography associated with their work.  
 
                                                        
110 A. R. Bonnet, ‘Antagonism and Difference: Negative Dialectics and Post-
Structuralism in View of the Critique of Modern Capitalism’, in Negativity and 
Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism, ed. by John Holloway, Fernando 
Metamoros and Sergio Tischler (London: Pluto Press, 2009) pp. 41-78 (p. 45). 
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Overall, then, my reading of Bishop’s antagonistic model is that it 
contains a legitimate call for some thinking of the representational forms 
of relational and post-relational practice adequate to the formal 
presentation of the relational encounter.111 But this does not call for 
literal demonstrations of the failings of social democracy. I will discuss 
some of the developments in thinking around post-relational 
representation my final chapter. I do not suggest that we should abandon 
the notion of artistic efficacy: rather, that we view it within the form of ‘a 
restless movement of negation that does not lead necessarily to a happy 
ending.’112 In Bishop’s latest work, Artificial Hells, she expressly 
distances herself from her missives on relational art and focuses upon 
participatory art practices. She appears, now, to accept the need for non-
visual forms of representation but this is couched in terms of the 
separation of the forms of artistic and ‘actual’ forms of democracy, 
whatever they might be. She remains beholden to the separation of the 
artistic and social critiques of capitalism as categorically different and 
proposes their productive reading within a principle of suspensive 
contradiction. Moreover, she continues to demand that art demonstrate its 
efficacy albeit in non-visual form. Ultimately the model of artistic 
autonomy in Artificial Hells remains unchanged and therefore out of step 
with the configuration of relational art practice. We can see in the 
following statement how Bourriaud suggests we evaluate a work of 
relational art: 
 
The first question we should ask when looking at a work of art is: - Does it give 
me a chance to exist in front of it, or, on the contrary, does it deny me as a 
subject, refusing to consider the Other in its structure? Does the space-time 
factor suggested or described by this work, together with the laws governing it, 
tally with my aspirations in real life? Does it criticise what is deemed 
                                                        
111 In spite of this Bourriaud does acknowledge that, ‘Today there is a quarrel over 
representation that sets art and the official image of reality against each other.’ N 
Bourriaud, Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprogrammes the 
World (New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2002), p. 93. 
112 Bonnett, p. 45. 
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criticisable? Could I live in a space-time structure corresponding to it in 
reality?113 
 
However, Bishop’s objection that relational art is weak in its modes of 
appearance is justified. Indeed, this is where relational art needs to 
develop its own theory of representation. However, Bishop misses the 
political nature of relational art in the mode of its self-alienation as in fact 
a diagnosis of relational hypostasis. Therefore, for example we might 
read its disappearance in Adornian terms: 
 
Today it is conceivable and perhaps requisite that artworks immolate 
themselves through their temporal nucleus, devote their own life to the instant 
of the appearance of truth, and tracelessly vanish without thereby delimiting 
themselves in the slightest. The nobility of such comportment would not be 
unworthy of art now that its loftiness has decayed to attitude and ideology.114 
 
Relational Aesthetics as an Incomplete Critique of the Commodity Form 
of Exchange 
 
Downey’s summary of the first wave of the critique of relational 
aesthetics is useful in that it brings to the boil the conflicting views of 
relational aesthetics as either productive of new artistic forms of 
sociability, or, as merely mimetic of existing reified forms of social 
relation. This forms the basis of an attempt to address the contradictions 
of relational aesthetics through a Marxist reading in which Bourriaud’s 
programme is viewed as an incomplete but nevertheless legitimate 
attempt to produce an immanent critique of the commodity form of 
exchange. 
 
The critique of relational aesthetics from the left is driven by a certain 
frustration with Bourriaud, not based on those he cites as influences, but 
                                                        
113 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.57. 
114 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.177. 
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on the basis of those he disavows or seemingly ignores.115 Relational 
aesthetics has the flavour of a leftist critique, but it seems disingenuous at 
times in its refusal to reveal its ancestry. For example, Bourriaud’s use of 
the ‘social interstice’ is derived from Marx; he acknowledges this but 
does not carry it forward, as one might expect into a full-blown Marxist 
critique of the objectification of relations. Perhaps this is because 
Bourriaud emerges from a distinctive Marxist tradition; Althusserianism. 
Bourriaud speaks of the problems of reification and the ‘completely 
administered world’, yet he distances himself from the Frankfurt School. 
He alludes to the gift economy in relation to Rikrit Tiravanija’s work but 
makes no mention of Marcel Mauss. Put simply, the magnitude of the 
critical response to relational aesthetics seems to me to result inevitably 
from its provocations. Bourriaud’s promiscuity with leftist thought elicits 
vehement responses but is generally not interpreted within his own 
aleatory materialist methodology; that is as a critique of entrenched 
orthodox historical materialism. In what follows I will set out the Marxist 
critique of relational aesthetics: that it namely represents a theatrical 
fetishisation of social relations. This is a partial Adornian critique of 
Bourriaud that I wish to counter with a more expansive reading of 
Adorno. 
 
In Stewart Martin’s ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’ he proposes a 
reading of relational aesthetics as a critique of the social relations of 
exchange under social transformations in the conditions of art 
production.116 His reading is that Relational Aesthetics and 
Postproduction identify new communication and information 
technologies as crucial to the development of new conditions of artistic                                                         
115 This may explain the absence of any comparable critique of dialogic aesthetics in the 
United States, in spite of their similar emancipatory aspirations: the creation of 
‘concrete’ social relations. Bourriaud’s text is a particularly European provocation, 
whereas Kester’s has a more pragmatic tone, and its emancipatory claims are more 
modestly stated. Moreover Kester’s rhetoric is perhaps better attuned to the utilitarian 
demands placed upon art following the debacle of the NEA’s cuts on the public 
funding of the arts. 
116 Stewart Martin,‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, Third Text, 21.4 (2007) pp. 369-
386. Also, by the same author ‘The Absolute Artwork Meets the Absolute 
Commodity’, Radical Philosophy, 146 (2007), pp. 15-25. 
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production and as fundamentally altering the sphere of human relations 
within globalisation. These works emphasise the anti-representational 
basis of relational aesthetics in subordinating art objects to the production 
of relations themselves. Accordingly, Martin cites Bourriaud’s statement: 
‘what [the artist] produces, first and foremost, is relations between people 
and the world, by way of aesthetic objects.’117  Martin proposes a 
‘modification’ of relational aesthetics as follows: ‘the idea of relational 
aesthetics is that art is a form of social exchange’.118 
 
Martin singles out Bourriaud's claims that relational aesthetics overcomes 
the utopianism of the historical avant-garde by realising it through the 
formation of alternative ways of living. He says that:  
 
This realised utopianism, as we might think of it, is described as a micro-
political disengagement from capitalist exchange, definined as a ‘social 
interstice’ in Marx’s sense of a ‘trading communit[y] that elude[s] the capitalist 
economic context by being removed from the law of profit’.119  
 
In its realisation of ‘autonomous communes’ he says, relational aesthetics 
can be read either as ‘a manifesto for a new political art confronting the 
service economies of informational capitalism – an art of the multitude’, 
or as ‘a naive mimesis or aestheticisation of novel forms of capitalist 
exploitation.’120 This is an argument as we have seen, dominates the first 
critique. For Martin, what is lacking is; 
 
a critique of the political economy of social exchange that is implicitly 
proposed by Relational Aesthetics; in other words, a consideration of how 
relational art produces a social exchange that disengages from capitalist 
exchange, and – at the heart of this issue – how the form of relational art relates 
to or opposes the commodity form or the value form.121                                                         
117 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p. 42. 
118 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 370. 
119 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 371, citing Bourriaud, Relational 
Aesthetics, p. 16. 
120 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 371. 
121 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 371.  
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It is this lack of a critique of the commodity form that, in Martin's view, 
renders relational aesthetics ‘helplessly reversible into an aestheticization 
of capitalist exchange’.122 Thus, he seeks to reconstruct relational 
aesthetics along the lines of a dialectical theory of art and its 
commodification. His contentions are as follows: firstly, that relational 
aesthetics should be seen as a development in the dialectical relation of 
art and commodification that is constitutive of modernism. And 
moreover, that this dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy be read as the 
dialectic of fetishism and exchange. Secondly, that: ‘Relational 
Aesthetics effectively manifests an extreme heteronomous critique of 
art’s autonomy and heteronomy’123; and thirdly, that relational art  
‘functions as an immanent critique of the commodity form’ or the 
relational-political forms of subjection to it.124 This critique evinces the 
same reductive reading of mimetics and the absence of any consideration 
of Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism that produce the lop-sidedness of the 
early reception of his work. The claim that Bourriaud’s notion of liminal 
relational forms are posited ‘outside’ of reified relations cannot be 
supported in the light of Bourriaud’s account. 
 
Martin begins his account of the ‘Dialectic of Commodification and Art’ 
with a recap of Karl Marx's account of commodification in Capital as 
revolving around the dialectic of subject and object, persons and things. 
He describes this as a ‘dialectic of inversion’ in which persons appear 
things and things appear persons’.125 In Marx's words ‘To the producers, 
therefore, the social relations between their private labours appear as 
what they are, i.e., they do not appear as direct social relations between 
persons in their work, but rather as material relations between persons 
and social relations between things.’126 This dialectical inversion 
produces a struggle of subjection or subordination in commodification                                                         
122 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 371.  
123 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 371. 
124 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, pp. 371-372. 
125 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 372.  
126 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 372. 
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and, by extension, in art. Martin claims that political theorists of the left 
often demonstrate a ‘general indifference to the political form of the 
commodity and the commodity form of the political,’ and he includes 
relational aesthetics within this tendency.127 He adds that if we think of 
the political in terms of subjection to the commodity form, ‘we can see 
art as politically formed to its innermost core. In a certain sense we can 
think of art as a primal scene of politics in capitalist culture.’128 
 
Again it is unfair to Bourriaud to describe him as indifferent to this 
question. Bourriaud is clear that the project of relational aesthetics aims 
to address commodified relations on the basis of material relations 
between people produced through the commodity form of exchange. 
Historically, the question of art’s commodification is articulated in the 
relationship between pure art and anti-art, which is to say that art is 
criticality determined on the basis of its autonomy within its 
heteronomous determination by the social. Martin’s argument is that this 
opposition is a contradiction internal to the commodity form itself. I do 
not think that Bourriaud would disagree with this. But I think he would 
disagree with Martin’s conclusion that this means that art’s resistance to 
commodification is ‘obliged to take the form of an immanent critique or 
self-criticism’.129 Bourriaud’s emphasis upon an aleatory materialism and 
the annexation of social forms makes him vulnerable to the charge that 
Relational Aesthetics attempts to step outside of this dialectic, rendering 
it ‘the spontaneous theory of art’s heteronomous determination by the 
social.’130 
 
The overriding question for Martin is this: does relational aesthetics posit 
encounters or micro-communities as an exception to universal 
commodification? Or, is its refusal both of the art object and the dialectic 
of art and non-art rather a misunderstanding of the full import of Marx’s 
dialectical reversal of subject and object, including potentially the                                                         
127 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 372. 
128 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 372. 
129 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 372. 
130 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 373. 
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commodity form of the event? Whilst I can see why the objection to 
relational art might be the fleeting nature of its appearance, or for that 
matter its non-appearance, I do not think that Bourriaud’s statements 
demonstrate naivety about the reified nature of relations or their 
entrapment within the principles of exchange. The point here I think is 
rather that Bourriaud accepts this as a fait accompli and seeks to translate 
these forms within topological frameworks. It is Bourriaud’s attention to 
the form of the work that gives it an immanently critical edge. His use of 
productive mimesis as a means of re-deploying the notion of artistic 
autonomy within a principle of co-existence seems to me to pre-empt this 
kind of approach. We can see this lack of attention to Bourriaud’s 
methodology in Martin’s discussion of commodity fetishism. 
 
The Absolute Relational Artwork? 
 
Martin identifies in Adorno's aesthetic theory the notion that art’s 
criticality appears when in Adorno’s words ‘the absolute artwork meets 
the absolute commodity’.131 He says that: 
 
Autonomous art is conceived, by Adorno, as an intense form of commodity 
fetishism, which exposes the contradiction internal to the commodity form: 
namely, that the reduction of use-value to exchange-value is both necessary for 
exchange-value, and impossible for it, since it is ultimately uses – however 
frivolous or ‘unnecessary’ – that are exchanged, and the useless is, strictly 
speaking, rendered valueless. Pure exchange-value is a contradiction in 
terms.132 
 
Thus the commodity fetishism that is inherent in the very mechanism of 
exchange value is intensified in the artwork to a position of reductio ad 
absurdum. Art thereby refuses its social determination and aspires to a 
condition of objectivity. This very objectivity depends upon its singular 
form. Singular in its resistance to exchange value or in Martin's terms                                                         
131 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 374. 
132 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 374.  
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‘the autonomous artwork is a countersubject to capital’.133 For Adorno, it 
is the creation of the illusion of artistic autonomy, which allows art to 
criticise that very illusion, it is ‘a self-conscious illusion mobilised to 
criticise another illusion’.134 
 
Martin proposes that Relational Aesthetics can be read alongside 
Adorno's theory of art’s immanent critique of the commodity form of art, 
and considers whether it might be possible to reconcile this with 
relational aesthetics. This, of course, chimes with my methodology but I 
cannot agree with Martin’s suggestion that Bourriaud seeks within 
relational aesthetics the abandonment of clearly commodified artistic 
objects, in favour of relational forms that are somehow exempt from this. 
Martin claims that: 
 
Bourriaud interprets the social or non-object-oriented character of relational 
artworks as the simple negation of social relations between things, and the 
affirmation of social relations between persons, thereby rejecting Adorno’s 
whole strategy.135  
 
The accusation that Bourriaud steps outside of the question of an  
immanent critique of the commodity form of exchange is inaccurate in 
my view. Martin contrasts Adorno’s enigmatical character of art as 
constitutive of its criticality against Bourriaud's emphasis on 
communication and transparency. He points out that Bourriaud does 
recognise, the necessity for some form of autonomy for relational art ‘as 
an autonomous art of the social’. However the model Martin identifies 
both within Relational Aesthetics and Postproduction is of a somewhat 
simplistic insistence on social relations against any objectification.136 
 
What Bourriaud misses, Martin asserts is Marx's insistence in Capital 
that,                                                         
133 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 375. 
134 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 375.  
135 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 376. 
136 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 377. 
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…the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within 
which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the 
commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but a 
definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, 
the phantasmagorical form of a relation between things.137 
 
In other words Martin says:  
 
Capitalist exchange value is not constituted at the level of objects, but of social 
labour, as a measure of abstract labour. It is the commodification of labour that 
constitutes the value of ‘objective’ commodities. To think that the source of 
value is in the object-commodity is precisely the error that Marx calls 
fetishism. Bourriaud partakes of the common form of political fetishism, which 
thinks that the eradication of the ‘objectivity’ of the commodity eradicates 
capitalist exchange.138 
 
Martin's assessment is that this is a form of Romantic anti-capitalism, 
based upon a misreading of reification, producing that which is 
unwittingly mimetic of what I will refer to as the ‘experiential economy’. 
 
For Martin, the question boils down then to a dialectic between Adorno's 
view of an art that is fetishised against exchange, and Bourriaud’s 
radicalisation of social exchange against fetishism.139 In other words, 
Bourriaud engages in a form of political fetishism, in the mistaken belief 
that the substitution of the relational encounter for the art object, 
eradicates the subjectivity of the commodity form and with it capitalist 
exchange. In so doing, Martin argues that what is eradicated is the 
objectivity of the artwork vis-à-vis its relation to art and anti-art. 
 
Martin's critique is very important for this research, in that it calls for a 
reappraisal of the various ways art has attempted to ‘dematerialise’ the                                                         
137 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 378, citing Karl Marx, Capital, Vol 1, 
p.165. 
138 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 378..  
139 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 382. 
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art object. I do not agree that this is a strategy that influenced relational 
aesthetics, but it remains instructive to see how relational aesthetics 
differs from conceptual art. Martin also opens questions around the 
nature of the artistic event-encounter as a fetishised commodity form. 
This calls for an analysis of the theatricality of relational aesthetics 
certainly, but also some consideration of the documentation of relational 
aesthetics as potentially providing the immanent critique that Martin 
advocates, as a material re-presentation of art’s objectivity, through a 
reassertion of its autonomy. 
 
In a passage entitled ‘The Problem of a Post-Conceptual Art of the 
Social’, Martin reconsiders the ‘covert genealogy’ that shapes relational 
aesthetics. Focusing initially upon the controversies that surrounded 
Minimalism, Martin examines Michael Fried’s seminal critique of 
Minimalism. Fried charged Minimalism with literalism and 
theatricality.140 This is based upon minimal art’s presentation of objects 
in a situation that included the viewer as a focus for the completion of the 
work. Fried’s objections emphasised art’s autonomy as synonymous with 
its need to withdraw from this literalness, principally through its 
opticality. This is the conventional reading of the dialectic of autonomy 
and heteronomy within minimalism. However Martin makes a further 
point, which relates back to Marx's subject-object inversion. He says that: 
 
We can interpret a critique of social heteronomy in Fried’s critique of 
theatricality: art is not subjected to viewers as their object, but considered as if 
it were itself a subject, autonomous, which viewers are required to experience 
through absorption, that is, through their subjection to art. Fried’s position 
would hereby correspond to the critique of art’s subjection to its heteronomous 
determination by capitalist social exchange, with Minimalism rendered the 
agent of exchange value. But it bears no less of a correspondence to a fetishism 
of art, akin to fetishism of commodities, in which autonomous subjectivity is 
preserved for art, to which people/viewers are subjected/absorbed. The 
                                                        
140 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p.382. 
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experience of art is revealed as an experience of subjection to the commodity 
form.141 
 
In other words Minimalism’s mutation of art into its objecthood operates 
as a critique of the ethical encounter with art as subject, a defence of 
artistic autonomy that nevertheless fails to escape art’s subjection to the 
commodity form. Equally for Martin, by dissolving the artwork into its 
social relations, relational artworks dissolve their artistic autonomy 
resulting in ‘social relations that have been instrumentalised’.142 He 
states that: ‘Relational Aesthetics is a new theory of art’s theatricality, 
affirming it and radicalising its consequences’ because it not only 
incorporates the beholder but also reduces the art object to this 
incorporation itself. For Martin this constitutes a politicisation of form in 
which ‘form is rendered a modality of subjection to capital.’143  
 
Martin goes on to consider the practices of institutional critique within 
conceptual art as producing ‘an autonomous art of the social in a critical 
but also negative form’ presenting art’s conditions of production within 
the ideological forms of the art institution.144 This preserved the avant-
garde’s dissolution of art into the social as a presently unrealizable 
utopia. As with relational aesthetics this negative utopianism risks a 
certain reversal in which the taboo upon the avant-garde’s dissolution of 
art into life simply mimics the art institutions alienation of social 
autonomy.145 But it remains important in setting the stage for the 
anticipation of a social autonomy beyond art that informs relational 
aesthetics. 
 
So, in Martin's view, Bourriaud’s refusal of the axis of art and non-art 
subjects relational aesthetics to a theatricalisation of social heteronomy as 
the condition of the possibility of art. Within Martin’s overall conclusion                                                         
141 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 383. 
142 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 383. 
143 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 383.  
144 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 384. 
145 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p. 384. 
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he reflects upon the artistic document, by suggesting that art-photography 
might overcome the taboos of conceptual art and provide an alternative 
presentation of an autonomous art of the social. It is more or less a 
postscript to his article, but a significant one in my view. Discussing the 
work of Jeff Wall he says that, 
 
the self-critical reflection of photography in its use by Conceptual artists 
generated the reflexivity necessary for it to emerge as an autonomous form, but 
without excluding reference to the social in the way that modernist painting and 
sculpture tended to. ‘Photography about photography’ retains its representation 
of the social through its indexical exposure to the world outside it.146 
 
He adds that ‘Relational art and art-photography may well be setting the 
terms of debate over what form a critical art of the social can take 
today’.147 My perspective draws upon this suggestion, but has a different 
inflection. My research question concerns the nature of the documentary 
real within relational and post-relational art practices, and is therefore 
directly concerned with the future of the image, specifically its capacity 
to operate as an immanent critique of the social relations of the 
commodity form. But, as I have said, the mode of visual representation is 
the least important in the proposition of the relational programme. 
Moreover, it is only within networks of exchange and postproduction that 
the image aspires to full representation because it is the form of its 
exchange, which becomes significant in relational art rather than its 
content as such. 
 
A Response to Martin’s Critique 
 
The Extreme Heteronomy of Relational Art 
 
Overall I think that Martin’s reading of Adorno places a disproportionate 
emphasis on Adorno’s analysis of the absolute artwork. What is missing                                                         
146 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p.384. 
147 Martin, ‘Critique of Relational Aesthetics’, p.385. 
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in Martin’s account of Adorno is the role played by mimesis in the 
determination of the contradictory nature of artistic autonomy. In other 
words it lacks Adorno’s mimetic principle of ‘resemblance without 
imitation’. On this point Adorno says that: 
 
Art is not to be reduced to the unquestionable polarity of the mimetic and the 
constructive, as if this were an invariant formula, for otherwise works of high 
quality would be obliged to strike a balance between the two principles. But 
what was fruitful in modern art was what gravitated toward one of the 
extremes, not what sought to mediate between them; those works that strove 
after both, in search of synthesis, were rewarded with a dubious consensus. The 
dialectic of these elements is similar to dialectical logic, in that each pole 
realizes itself only in the other, and not in some middle ground.148 
 
What I regard as important in this statement is the idea that we might 
regard the extreme heteronomy of relational art as a ‘gravitation towards’ 
extreme mimesis. This gravitation towards the extreme by no means 
entails that relational art loses its constructive principle: that is an art of 
constructed encounters. Rather, to follow Adorno’s logic, this art arrives 
at its dialectical relationship to a principle of construction precisely in its 
extreme mimetic comportment. To recall, for Adorno, mimesis contains a 
contradiction of its own. The objective and immanent logic of a work is 
achieved through the anti-mimetic impulse within mimesis.149 This 
means that in its effort to resemble the other the artwork becomes 
qualitatively different: it unites the work as an interior. What is lopsided 
about Martin’s analysis is I think that whilst he relies upon Adorno’s 
assertion that the artwork is an absolute commodity and therefore 
immanently critical, relational art’s extreme heteronomy is not a 
disavowal of this principle. Rather, extreme heteronomy is the mimetic 
comportment by which relational art takes this principle and manifests it 
within the fragmentary or composite form of an artwork that retains its                                                         
148 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 44. 
149 ‘Without its immanent necessity no work would gain objectivation; this necessity is 
art’s anti-mimetic impulse, one borrowed externally, which unites the work as an 
interior. The logic of art, a paradox for extra-aesthetic logic, is a syllogism without 
concept or judgment.’ Adorno, Aesthetics, p.136. 
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autonomy on the basis that the artwork remains critical of its own 
illusion. Bourriaud calls this ‘make-believe’. Make believe is a very 
serious component of relational art’s realist credentials rather than a 
romantic or escapist strategy. 
 
Dematerialisation 
 
Bourriaud emphatically rejects the situation of relational aesthetics 
within the teleology of Conceptual art’s principle of dematerialisation. 
He says that: 
 
While the chaotic proliferation of production led Conceptual artists to the 
dematerialization of the work of art, it leads postproduction artists towards 
strategies of mixing and combining products. Overproduction is no longer seen 
as a problem, but as a cultural ecosystem.150 
 
Elsewhere, Bourriaud talks about ‘New Realism’ in art in which the 
representation of consumption becomes its subject.151  Not only does 
Bourriaud reject a reading of relational art as a strategic 
dematerialisation of the art object he repeatedly asserts the concrete and 
material nature of relational forms, against any notion of immateriality. 
For example, in the following passage he aims to pre-empt such a 
reading: 
 
To head off any polemic about a so-called return to ‘conceptual’ art, let us bear 
in mind that these [relational] works in no way celebrate immateriality. None 
of these [relational] artists has a preference for ‘performances’ or concept, 
words that no longer mean a whole lot here. In a word, the work process no 
longer has any supremacy over ways of rendering this work material (unlike 
Process Art and Conceptual Art, which, for their part, tended to fetishisize the 
mental process to the detriment of the object). In the worlds constructed by                                                         
150 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.45. 
151 Bourriaud says that New Realists take the representation of consumption as their 
subject: ‘the New Realists can be seen as the first landscape painters of consumption, 
the authors of the first still lifes of industrial society. The subject of simulationist art 
is marketing’. Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.26. 
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[relational] artists, on the contrary, objects are an intrinsic part of the language, 
with both regarded as vehicles of relations to the other. In a way, an object is 
every bit as immaterial as a phone call. And a work that consists in a dinner 
around a soup is every bit as material as a statue. This arbitrary division 
between the gesture and the forms it produces is here called into question, 
insofar as it is the very image of contemporary alienation: the cannily 
maintained illusion, even in art institutions, that objects excuse methods and 
that the end of art justifies the pettiness of the intellectual and ethical means. 
Objects and institutions, and the use of time and works, are at once the outcome 
of human relations – for they render social work concrete – and producers of 
relations – for, conversely, they organise types of sociability and regulate inter-
human encounters.152 
 
Martin’s analysis relies upon a separation of object and encounter that is 
not a fair reflection of relational aesthetics. I think his analysis relies 
upon such a separation in order to found the claim that relational 
aesthetics posits an outside of relation: that it is a romanticised critique of 
capital. This relies in turn upon the notion that relational art misreads the 
Marxist inversion of subject-object. Again, I don’t believe there are any 
grounds for this. Bourriaud is consistent in the assertion that the 
commodity form produces relations between subjects as material things 
(i.e. objects). This can be seen within not only the passage just cited but 
also from my earlier account of Bourriaud’s transitive ethics. On the 
question of immateriality, he claims that; if we can speak of an 
immaterialism in nineties art this must take into consideration its spatio-
temporal conjuncture. He says that the 
 
relative immateriality of the nineties art (which is more a sign of the priority 
given by these artists to time in relation to space than a desire not to produce 
objects) is motivated neither by an aesthetic militancy, nor by a mannerist 
refusal to create objects. They display and explore the process that leads to 
objects and meanings.153 
                                                        
152 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, pp. 47-48. 
153 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, pp. 53-54. 
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Fetishised Relation 
 
I think that Bourriaud’s interpretation of reification makes it clear that the 
possibility of relations that sit outside of universal commodification and 
spaces of ‘relative autonomy’ have all but disappeared. On that basis I do 
not think that he fetishises encounters. If anything he recognises, with 
Adorno, the objective nature of the fetish character inherent within all 
exchangeable commodities. Simply because relational artists model 
‘possible universes’ they do not do this from an escapist perspective. 
Rather they ‘expose’ their art directly to the commodity form; again as 
‘landscape painters of consumption’. Take the following passage: 
 
An exhibition will give rise to a specific ‘arena of exchange’ [that] ‘must be 
judged on the basis of aesthetic criteria, in other words by analysing the 
coherence of its form, and then the symbolic value of the ‘world’ it suggests to 
us…Within this social interstice, the artist must assume the symbolic models he 
shows. All representation (though contemporary art models more than it 
represents, and fits into the social fabric more than it draws inspiration 
therefrom) refers to values that can be transposed onto society. As a human 
activity based on commerce, art is at once the object and subject of an ethic. 
And this all the more so because, unlike other activities, its sole function is to 
be exposed to this commerce.154 
 
Again, what is also important here is Bourriaud’s positing of the subject 
and object of art within an ethical principle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
154 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.18. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Archive and Network: Informationalised Relational Aesthetics 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will look at the ways that relational and post-relational 
practice has extended its principle of the use of social forms to 
informational networks and archival-artistic practices. This aspect of 
relational aesthetics is more clearly developed in Postproduction and The 
Radicant than in the earlier Relational Aesthetics. The later works not 
only advance a more overtly technologised form of relational practice but 
also give a clearer account of the Networks of Expanded Authorship 
(NEA’s) that underpin relational art’s model of postproductive 
authorship. This is the principle of the use and re-use of existing forms 
and artworks. Thus authorship is a shared undertaking and the artwork 
becomes ‘a dot on a line’ or a node within an extended matrice of 
relation. The later works evince a more direct engagement with 
informationally focused modes of production but equally this does not 
justify the conclusion that relational art has migrated wholesale into the 
circuits of electronic communication and exchange. It would be more 
accurate to say that relational art has expanded the range of its forms: it 
has increased its ‘stockpile’. 
 
Bourriaud’s later work has not received anything like the same level of 
critical reception as Relational Aesthetics. This affords me the 
opportunity to set out those aspects of his theory that develop the 
programme of relationality explored in the previous chapter. Moreover, 
to look at these developments in the context of a broad range of writing 
that addresses the nature of the network society, the general social 
techniques of informationalised labour, the nature of the archive and the 
performativity of relational art. My aim is, then, to construct a 
constellation in which to examine new aspects of the programme, for 
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example, the full articulation of Bourriaud’s thinking on topology, the 
nature of the informational readymade, and the heterological and 
intertextual motility of his later aesthetics. It also allows for some 
discussion of the wider discourse within contemporary art of the 
relevance of theories of material and immaterial labour, which have 
hitherto been applied to ‘informationalised’ artistic practices. At the same 
time, I will draw upon arguments from the existing critique of Relational 
Aesthetics in order to examine their specific operation and validity within 
an informationalised topology. What persists of the critique within this 
new topology, though they are not addressed directly to Bourriaud, is the 
critique of informationalised artistic labour as an extreme form of 
heteronomy and question marks over its mimetic form. Thus, the 
legitimacy of the internet as a potentially emancipatory tool and site for 
artistic practice takes on a new focus in postproductive and radicant 
practice. 
 
In this chapter, I draw upon a broad range of sources and my 
Adornian/Bourriaudian methodology of the essay as form/polemic is 
therefore indispensable to my objective: to account for the 
informationalised form of relational aesthetics as a radical disjuncture 
from the forms of the avant-garde and its cognates of detournemont, 
montage and collage. This argument requires that one focus upon 
Bourriaud’s claim that artworks are now made within a radically 
reconfigured spatio-temporal relation. This affects both the general 
epistemological field and the category of mimesis to an unprecedented 
degree. Art operates, in fact, within the milieu of hypomnesis: that is 
within an informationalised culture in which memory inconveniences 
culture. 
 
The argument of this chapter can be summarized as follows: the 
conjuncture of globalization identified by Bourriaud can be easily 
disregarded as simply another statement of the obvious. It doesn’t 
ostensibly tell us anything we don’t already know. This is why the later 
writings have been overlooked: they are all too readily within the 
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dystopianism of much postmodern discourse, for example Mark Fisher’s 
Capitalist Realism and Žižek’s eschatology of the ‘end of times’. Upon 
closer examination, Bourriaud’s extreme and heterologically mimetic 
thinking of this conjuncture merit more detailed analysis, specifically, his 
analysis of the changing epistemological field and the temporal-spatial 
relations of the global conjuncture. 
 
The materiality of postproduction and radicant practices are premised 
upon the complete identification of space and time. Relational space is 
thus posited as a ‘substance’ of Aristotelian proportions. Bourriaud 
embraces these conditions and their productive potential. For example he 
embraces the ‘objectile’ as a replacement for the artistic object and 
advances methodologies of screenplay and scripting as forms of 
negotiation in which, radicalizing Adorno, truth is no longer presented as 
an internal contradiction but, rather, becomes a form of illusion that is 
radicant: that is ‘on the move’. In addition, the materiality of 
postproductive and radicant art is reliant upon enactment through 
performed relation. 
 
There is nothing abstract in Bourriaud’s configuration of space and time. 
Perhaps it has been read in rather abstract terms that tend to deflate its 
importance. I will argue that the spatio-temporal relation of informational 
culture manifests itself in lived experience and produces a form of 
subjectivity that can be observed in the general social techniques of 
informational labour. I will be drawing upon a range of thinkers in order 
to advance this argument. Manuel Castells work on the network society 
and his analysis of the techniques of informational labour in which 
relational production and feedback are essential components of the 
production of subjectivity: the goal of capital. Equally, Jon McKenzie’s 
thinking of performativity and the ‘generalised field of performance’ is 
not just a reflection upon the performative injunctions that determine 
subjectivity through labour but is also extremely useful in the analysis of 
the public realm, after Negt and Kluge, within a model that is 
technologically determined. Significantly, his model calls for forms of 
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negotiation rather than for the transgressive model of performance 
theory. John Roberts analysis of the de- and re-skilling of artists and the 
idea of artistic ‘non-productive labour’, in Bourriaud’s terms, ‘silent 
production’ of new forms are crucial to a materialistic understanding of 
post-relational autonomy. I will link the testamentary turn of the ‘archival 
impulse’ in art identified by Hal Foster with Roberts’ thinking of the 
informational readymade in order to examine how productive mimesis 
might operate within the informational realm. 
 
What is also fundamental to this chapter is a reading of the archive that is 
Derridean and a mode of heterological thought that must contest any 
positivistic reading of archival practice. I will argue that the heterological 
strain in Bourriaud’s thinking is in fact not only reconcilable with 
Derrida’s thinking of the archive, but is a precondition for Bourriaud’s 
aleatory materialism, and ultimately his performative presentation of 
relational topologies. 
 
Postproduction and the Radicant: The Constellation of informational-
relational art 
 
From Relational Aesthetics to Postproduction 
 
The passage from Nicholas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics (1998) to 
Postproduction (2002) marks a shift in the critical focus of aesthetic 
theory from situational encounters as artistic forms towards informational 
networks of expanded authorship.  Bourriaud’s polemic does not mark a 
wholesale migration of the artistic vanguard into a new topology, that of 
informational configurations. Rather, it extends the territory of relational 
works towards a more complex matrice of times, places and forms. Thus 
relational and postproductive practices developed contiguously in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century.155 
                                                         
155 There seems to be some acknowledgement of this in The Radicant. Nicolas 
Bourriaud, The Radicant (New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2009). 
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Bourriaud explains that the relationship between Relational Aesthetics 
and Postproduction is that the latter repeats the basic premises of his first 
book within an alternative conjunction: ‘the link between them is simple: 
both present an analysis of today’s art in relation to social changes, 
whether technological, economic, or sociological.’156 However, 
Bourriaud acknowledges a shift in emphasis towards the analysis of a 
particular mode of production and epistemological field. He identifies 
‘the changing mental space’ that has been opened for thought by the 
internet, the central tool of the information age. Therefore, whilst 
Relational Aesthetics deals with a ‘collective sensibility, Postproduction 
analyzes a set of modes of production, seeking to establish a typology of 
contemporary practices and to find commonalities.’157  
 
Within this mode of production the artist relies upon the use and re-use of 
existing forms and artworks. ‘Post’ refers not to a negation or surpassing 
but to a zone of activity in which forms are constantly modified and 
shared. Postproduction does not then deal with the ‘raw materials’ of 
labour but its products ‘held together by exchange’. Postproduction 
undoubtedly challenges the principles of artistic authorship and the 
ownership of works. How then does this differ from previous models and 
the avant-garde in particular? Bourriaud acknowledges that ‘citation, 
recycling and détournement were not born yesterday’.158 However, he 
claims that: 
 
The working principles of today’s artists seem to me to break with the 
manipulation of references and citation: the works… deeply re-examine 
notions of creation, authorship, and originality through a problematics of the 
use of cultural artifacts – which, by the way, is absolutely new.159 
 
This statement needs some qualification, specifically, the need to re-
examine ‘creation, authorship and originality’ arises, as we have seen                                                         
156 Bouriaud, Postproduction, p. 8. 
157 Bouriaud, Postproduction, p. 8. 
158 Bouriaud, Postproduction, p. 9. 
159 Bouriaud, Postproduction, p.9. 
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before, from a conjuncture of over-production that Bourriaud fully 
embraces rather than attempts to negate. Thus, creation, authorship and 
ownership are reconfigured within the radically different configuration of 
globalization and the availability of new forms and social techniques to 
artists. This is what John Roberts refers to as re-skilling.160 Thus for 
Bourriaud: 
 
This art of postproduction seems to respond to the proliferating chaos of global 
culture in the information age, which is characterized by an increase in the 
supply of works and the art world’s annexation of forms ignored or disdained 
until now.161 
 
In The Radicant, Bourriaud asks why globalization has been so widely 
discussed within almost every discipline but lacks its own aesthetics. He 
asks how these developments affect the life of forms. 
 
Bourriaud claims that the diminution of the distinction between reception 
and practice produces new cartographies of knowledge. We have 
encountered this argument before within the ambit of the blurring of the 
distinction between consumption and production. What is interesting in 
Bourriaud’s Postproduction is his approach to the subject-object relation 
of the artwork. He casts them in a radicalised form in which the object is 
in fact ‘objectile’; that is, constantly in flux. I find this interesting 
because assuming that objectiles lack origins or destinations then 
Bourriaud’s transitive ethics take on a renewed importance here that we 
can call post-relational. Specifically it is the motility of the relational 
link rather than the objects themselves that is productive of subjective 
relations within this arena. Moreover, this allows for some minimal 
ontology of this movement of relation. That is a sufficiency of being to 
become an object of knowledge. This is a major theme within my final 
chapter. Bourriaud’s radicant formulation of the artwork is that of an 
artwork torn up from its roots. He speaks of the artwork in                                                         
160 John Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art After the 
Readymade (London; New York: Verso, 2007) 
161 Bouriaud, Postproduction, p.13. 
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Postproduction as a ‘temporary terminal’ within a network and as a 
‘moment’ within a chain of other works. 
 
Postproductive practices call then for new modes of the inhabitation and 
use of forms. For Bourriaud, narrative takes upon a renewed importance; 
‘screenplay’ becomes form in the sense that ones negotiation of this 
territory can be scripted. The semionaut emerges as the artistic director of 
a script onto culture. He advances also, the notion of topological 
construction and the translation of pre-existing forms that overall vastly 
expand the constituency and the ‘stockpile’ of forms available for artists 
to experiment with. What links the principles of narrative and topology is 
I think the notion that one constructs space through narrative itself; that is 
through a process of the translation of forms. 
 
I think that one of the most important of observations that Bourriaud 
makes concerns the relationship between time and the contemporary 
process of materialisation in art. The following comes from Relational 
Aesthetics: 
 
For most people, and in spite of technological development which ridicules this 
type of bias, the time span of an item of information and the capacity of a work 
of art to confront time are linked with the solidity of the materials chosen, and 
accordingly, and thus implicitly, with tradition.162 
 
We have seen that Bourriaud insists in his transitive ethics upon the 
materiality of the relation between things. What is at stake here is slightly 
different: it is that we cannot found our thinking of materiality upon 
temporal notions of duration and durability that have determined our 
notion of the material forms of plastic arts. The radicant artwork and the 
processes of postproduction are precarious activities and its forms 
transitory. This for me demands that we need to be cautious before 
defining artistic or non-artistic labour within the terms of materiality and 
immateriality. I will return to this important point later in this chapter.                                                          
162 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p. 54. 
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The persistent question of Artistic Autonomy 
 
Within the milieu of radicant and postproductive practices, what then is 
the status and role, if any, of artistic autonomy? New forms of sociability 
in artistic practice and in particular, archival and informational practices, 
appear to bring artistic labour within what appears to be a total 
identification with the general social techniques of informational labour. 
The question to be levelled at these works is now familiar: can archival 
and informational artworks mount an immanent critique of the 
commodity form? Are networked-informational artistic practices simply 
another example of art’s subsumption beneath its heteronomy? The 
question is consequently: what would an immanent critique of the 
commodity form look like within an informational paradigm and how 
should we apply or modify the notion of artistic autonomy within such a 
new and challenging configuration? 
 
What is potentially problematic about postproduction is its migration 
towards an informational topology and as such its distinctive series of 
methodologies that identify it ‘mimetically’ with informational labour 
generally. Thus it appears to risk to an even greater extent than early 
relational art, ‘an extreme heteronomous critique of art’s autonomy.’ 
Crucially there is a risk that the differential networks produced in 
postproductive art merely constitute sites of only temporary autonomy (in 
the sense that they remain behoven to the hegemonic forms of 
informational exchange: its logic of de- and re-territorialisation) and 
produce only those weak models of alterity that Bourriaud equates with 
the worst aspects of deconstructive thought. As I said in the previous 
chapter, I think the answer lies in a critique of the reductive charge of 
‘mimeticism’ and a fuller examination of Bourriaud’s account of the 
postproductive methodologies of topology and translation. 
 
The question of postproductive art’s autonomy question is not to be 
simply technologically determined. It must simultaneously be read along 
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side other equally important gravitational shifts we can associate with this 
art, not least Bourriaud’s emphasis upon the narrative forms of 
postproductive and radicant art.  This can be read within the broader 
account of the emergence of a testamentary turn in art. This testamentary 
turn I will trace back to Hal Foster’s essay ‘The Archival Impulse’. I will 
associate this ‘testamentary turn’ with a form of critical realism based 
upon Bourriaud’s idiomatic articulation of this in terms of narrative and 
screenplay. In other words the testamentary turn in fact becomes the use 
of the testamentary form. 
 
The Archival Impulse 
 
In 2004 Hal Foster identified an emergent ‘archival impulse’ within fine 
art practice. Why an impulse? Whilst he acknowledges that the use of 
archives in art is nothing new in itself, he does remark upon the 
‘distinctive character’ of emergent practices as gestures of ‘alternative 
knowledge or counter-memory’, and their organisation within 
collaborative networks of artistic practice.163 Foster claims that an 
important tendency within the archival impulse is: ‘the will to connect 
what cannot be connected in archival art…this is not a will to totalise so 
much as a will to relate – to probe a misplaced past’.164 
 
Thus the spirit of the archival impulse is characteristic of relational art’s 
methodology in that it runs against any desire to totalise. Moreover it is 
an impulse toward the combination of fragments. Foster attributes this 
tendency to a ‘general failure of the symbolic order of the social or a 
failure of cultural memory’ identifiable with much of the mnemonics of 
postmodernism. He terms this a ‘paranoid dimension’ involving the 
projection of meaning onto a world divested of meaning.165 In this 
paranoid dimension we might equally identify a first symptom of post-
relationality. However, in Bourriaud’s terms this paranoid dimension                                                         
163 Hal Foster, ‘An Archival Impulse’, October, 110, (2004), pp. 3-22 (p. 4) 
164 Foster, p. 21. 
165 Foster, p. 21. 
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becomes a virtue to be embraced in the form of the work. It is the 
precarity of the form of the work that comes to the fore and its agents 
constitute a ‘relational precariat’ who are not so much paranoid as 
accepting of hypomnesis as a fait accompli. 
 
Archival artworks mark an initial shift of the archival domicile and the 
annexation of its authority within the artistic domain, and this is what 
links earlier non-web based archival artworks to artistic models of 
institutional critique generally. That is, they are bound up with the 
institutional privileges under which objects are consigned within a given 
configuration of knowledge. This shift is amplified by the development of 
these artistic practices through the web, which further decentralises 
institutional critique to a position beyond ostensive institutional 
frameworks or artistic dependency upon galleries and museums. In this 
respect networked archives assume some of the characteristics of ‘non-
site’ we associate with Robert Smithson’s early site-specific work. 
However, this shift of the archival focus away from institution per se and 
into a closer alliance with non-artistic forms of informational culture, 
opens archival-informational practices to an even greater charge of 
reductive mimesis than we have thus far encountered.  
 
The shift towards informational culture is important because it entails an 
artistic engagement with the relations of production of ‘informational 
subjectivity’; that is a relationship between the individual and the 
network, which both marks artistic subjectivity and also entails the 
mimesis of informational labour within the praxis of artistic labour. The 
informational artwork moves within the dominant cultural logic of 
informationalised social relations and their means of production. Foster 
does not address this technologised stage of the archival impulse, but 
Bourriaud does in his acknowledgement of a radically new set of relations 
of artistic production. For this reason I will be placing archival artworks 
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and postproductive practices beneath the umbrella of ‘informational 
artworks’.166 
 
What is at stake, within new forms of artistic sociability, is a particular 
logic of informationalism which impacts upon the organisation of social 
relations and determines questions of ‘value’ and ‘materiality’ across the 
broader social sphere. I take my lead on this from Hal Foster when I say 
that informational logic transcends the borders of the internet and digital 
networks. Bourriaud also acknowledges that postproductive practices 
need not necessarily take place within the space of the internet. This is 
because the logic articulates the materiality and value of 
informationalised social relations, not the material essence of information 
as such. In fact I would argue that there is nothing essential about 
information. What is important is the type of subjectivity and the form of 
knowledge it produces: this is a fundamentally relational question. 
 
This train of thought is identifiable in Foster’s essay. He refuses to 
identify the archival impulse exclusively with ‘archival’ artworks, arguing 
that the tendency may be better articulated within ‘material’ rather than 
‘immaterial artworks’ citing with approbation for example, the practice of 
Thomas Hirschhorn.167 Foster provides a salutary warning that the 
impulse cannot be subsumed beneath formal questions of materiality or 
immateriality. I think there is a more useful distinction to be made 
between productive and non-productive labour because this tells us 
something about the subjectivity of the labourer. In particular the sociable 
form of non-productive labour, in its material differential relation, to 
informational value. Non-productive labour is by no means unproductive. 
It is what Bourriaud names along with de Certeau’s ‘silent production’. It 
is a form of production that goes largely un-noticed because it falls 
beneath the radar of production determined according to normative 
standards of exchange value.                                                         
166 This is to be distinguished from the informational artwork, on the basis that its labour 
occupies and produces its own topology, and that its logic produces the social. 
167 Hirschhorn’s works are generally described by Rancière as sculptural-monumental; 
they continue within a tradition of installation art at their formal level. 
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Informationalised relations produce themselves immanently through their 
dominance over the general social techniques of labour. At the same time 
these forms cannot be ultimately determined or controlled and are 
therefore open to détournement: they can be translated and migrated by 
social agents who may perform them differently. In other words, whilst 
the logic of informational culture may be hegemonic the forms it 
produces can be used potentially against the totalisation of the social. It is 
precisely the role of informational logic to materialise what has hitherto 
been considered immaterial (information) but this is an after effect of the 
materiality of the relations it produces through labour. Its primary 
operation is the illocutionary metamorphosis of the subjectivity of 
workers. Illocutionary force is understood here in Austinian terms as the 
performance of an act, which produces a change in our perception of 
reality. Its primary product is subjectivity itself and the epistemological 
field that Bourriaud identifies in Postproduction. Foster’s concern about 
the literal identification of the impulse with the archival work is, he says, 
to avoid a machinic processing within which artworks may simply 
articulate decentred modes of subjectivity and scepticism.168 This is 
precisely the model of sociability that informationalism presents, and 
hence we cannot present classically ‘material’ artistic production as 
somehow offering an alternative critical space by virtue of its materiality 
alone.169 Rather than through the opposition of the material to the 
immaterial, critical spaces are produced through the contestation of 
informational logic by non-productive labour.  
 
Foster explicitly links the archival impulse to acts of détournement and to 
a notion of re-inscription; Foster also proposes that they are works ‘signed 
by the community’.170 Thus the presentation of community is also the                                                         
168 Foster, p. 5. 
169 ‘But in most archival art the actual means applied to these ‘relational’ ends are far 
more tactile and face-to-face than any Web interface. The archives at issue here are 
not databases in this sense; they are recalcitrantly material, fragmentary rather than 
fungible, and as such they call out for human interpretation, not machinic 
reprocessing’ Foster, pp. 4-5. 
170 Foster, p. 7. 
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means by which communities will subjectivise themselves. If artistic 
labour is to challenge the ‘subject-object relations of advanced capitalism’ 
Foster suggests that it is not sufficient for artistic practice to migrate 
wholesale to the organisational logic of the archive. Artistic practice must 
retain some reflective space or the dissonance of some alternative placing 
of the work within which established relations might be tested. Put 
simply, then, Foster’s argument rehearses the familiar problem of the 
subsumption of art’s autonomy within that which is heteronomous and the 
danger it creates of a ‘machinic processing’, or, a re- ordering of 
impoverished informational relations. I think that Bourriaud addresses 
this by proposing a model of autonomy based upon the co-existent 
‘tenancy of culture’, a critique of essentialised alterity and a refined 
model of mimetic ‘operations’. 
 
Intertextuality and postmodern heterology 
 
Artistic practices that utilise archival and networked approaches to 
knowledge suggest the emergence of artistic forms of sociability in which 
the works lend themselves to ‘intertextual’ interpretation. Not simply 
because they blur the distinction between art and non-art, artistic and 
informational labour, production and consumption, but also potentially 
they suggest a heterology or weaving of relation in their performative 
undoing and recombination of relational forms.171 They suggest a 
principle of construction that might be suited to a form of artistic praxis in                                                         
171 The possibility of a heterology extends from the restrictions imposed by the operation 
of the symploke. Rodolphe Gashé says, that ‘Symploke can achieve its goal only if it 
expels from the envisioned totality those opposites that cannot be determined in terms 
of negativity, that is, in terms of dialectical Otherness.’ Rodolphe Gashé, The Tain of 
the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Harvard University Press, 
1986), p. 97.  Thus; ‘The new art of weaving suggested by Derrida's heterology... is 
no longer governed by truth values, and it escapes regulation by the ideas of totality 
and unity. Derrida’s deconstruction of symploke – his generalization of interlacing, 
and his thinking of radical alterity – are subversive of thought itself, of what has been 
called by that name in the tradition, namely the thinking not only of something 
specific but of one determined thing, of a thing in its Oneness. Aristotle set the 
standards of thought when he stated that one does not think at all if one does not think 
one thing – the thing in its essential unity. From this perspective, Derrida's 
heterology… is, strictly speaking, no longer a philosophical enterprise…’. Rodolphe 
Gashé, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, 
MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 99-100. 
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which topology and translation will play pivotal roles. The intertextuality 
of postproductive and radicant artworks are important precepts for the 
translatability of forms and the productive model of mimesis. They assist 
in the configuration of a topology for the very operations of Bourriaud’s 
aleatory materialism and its inscription into fact. The production of such 
sites demands, as Derrida would term it, after Maurice Blanchot, a 
‘“holding together” of the disparate itself’.172 The informationalised and 
archival trope within postproduction invites us to consider how the 
precarity of these artistic practices might produce an immanent critique of 
capital without becoming absorbed in ‘a mysterious debate with 
power’.173 How then might they avoid the traps of reductive informational 
mimesis?  
 
The Spirit and Logic of Informationalism: The tendency towards identity 
 
The Net-Self relation 
 
Representations and performative incarnations of community are common 
to both relational and postproductive practices albeit on the basis of 
differing topologies of ‘encounter’. But it is within symptomatic 
articulations of community as postproductive networks that we can 
identify a strand of ‘socially engaged’ art that defends its subjectivity and 
sociability against its sole determination by an emphatically informational 
logic, or a commodity form of subjectivity. The complexity of 
informational mimesis lies in the fact that it is not simply the interaction 
between participants in a network, but also between the net and self, that 
generates its subjects. If the net-self relation is the determinant of 
subjective identity, the question is, therefore, how can reductively 
mimetic relations be avoided? 
 
                                                        
172 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. by Peggy Kamuf, (New York; London: 
Routledge, 2006) ,p.35 
173 Alain Badiou, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction: on Pier Paolo Pasolini’, 
<www.lacan.com/badpas.htm> [accessed on 5 March 2012] (p. 3). 
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Postproduction is prosthetically subjectivised by the network and is 
productive of subjectivity within the ‘net-self’ axis outlined by Manuel 
Castells.174 Informational subjectivity is ‘marked’ through the injunction 
to perform and participate in the informational economy; that is to appear 
as such within its logic. We will need therefore to look more closely at 
the question of performativity within informational labour. Before I do 
this I would like to set out some aspects of Castells’ theory of ‘network 
society’. Castells’ network theory provides some connective thought 
through which to expand my argument about the relationship between the 
artistic and general social techniques of informationalism and Bourriaud’s 
implicit re-definition of artistic autonomy. 
 
One of Castells’ key contributions to this question is to give a more 
detailed and nuanced account of the relationship that he claims to have 
emerged between the net and the self. The network is a key component in 
the construction of contemporary subjectivity since it both fragments 
homogenous subjectivities and communities within its global hegemonic 
logic and facilitates their nodal reconfiguration within new alliances and 
permutations. Its effect is to both de- and re-territorialises identity. 
 
Castells’ thesis is that technological revolution has radically changed the 
relationship between the economy, state and society and that this naturally 
entails a change in the material base of society, which operates at the level 
of global interdependence. Castells claims that within this configuration, 
the search for identity, whether collective or individual becomes the 
fundamental source of social meaning.175 In The Radicant, Bourriaud 
recognises this in his discussion of the dual movements towards the 
creolization or the essentialism of identity within global networks. For 
Castells, the role of the global network in the search for identity is that it 
‘switches on or off individuals, groups, regions and even countries 
                                                        
174 Manuel Castells, The Rise of The Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, 
Society and Culture, 1 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000) 
175 Castells, p. 3. 
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according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the 
network, in a relentless flow of strategic decisions.’ 176 
 
Castells characterises this as a split between universal instrumentalism 
and particularistic identities, thus as a bi-polar opposition between the net 
and the self. On this basis it is the control, or gatekeeping of informational 
flows that ultimately confers the power to bestow identity. Moreover, 
there is within the instability of the strategic management of flows, a 
difficulty in sharing identity resulting in the increasing fragmentation of 
identity. Like Foster, Castells claims that the global network has 
influenced postmodern culture. Specifically, 
 
Postmodern culture, and theory indulge in celebrating the end of history, and, to 
some extent, the end of reason, giving up on our capacity to understand and 
make sense, even of nonsense. The implicit assumption is the acceptance of full 
individualization of behaviour and of a society’s powerless over its destiny… 
[leading to] forms of intellectual nihilism, social scepticism, and political 
cynicism.177 
  
Castells’ overall proposition is similar to Maurizio Lazzarato’s assertions 
that the ‘commodity form’ of the subject has emerged. According to 
Castells this is because ‘the search for identity is as powerful as techno-
economic change in charting the new history’.178 I would argue that this 
fragmentation has engendered a symptomatic response within socially 
engaged practices of the last fifteen years. Relational and postproductive 
practices are practices of self-styled inhabitation of networks premised 
upon the productive potentialities of the fragmentation of social bonds 
and identity. On one level they seek to challenge the subjective logic of 
informationalism and the paralysis of social agency. They are counter 
hegemonic gestures. At the same time, the construction of relational 
forms seems to be homologous to networking logic itself, which is a 
representation of the simultaneous logics of global and local networks.                                                         
176 Castells, p. 3. 
177 Castells, p. 4. 
178 Castells, p. 4. 
 127 
Postproductive practice seeks to expropriate control of the switching 
mechanisms by which subjectivity is determined. 
 
New Forms of Informationalism 
 
Castells claims that informationalism is based upon a technology of 
knowledge and information, this brings culture and productivity into close 
proximity as never before. He states that their contiguity gives rise to 
‘historically new forms of social interaction, social control and 
change.’179 The search for identity is acutely compelled by informational 
logic, because subjectivity is its primary productive output. Castells 
quotes Alain Touraine as follows; ‘in a post-industrial society in which 
cultural services have replaced material goods at the core of production, it 
is the defence of the subject, in its personality and in its culture, against 
the logic of apparatuses and markets, that replaces the idea of class 
struggle.’ 180 
 
Castells gives an indication as to the reason for the emergence of counter-
hegemonic or resistant strains both within art and politics as 
characteristically ‘local’, ‘liminal’ or ‘micro-communitarian’: 
 
When the Net switches off the self, the self, individual or collective, constructs 
its meanings without global, instrumental reference: the process of 
disconnection becomes reciprocal, following the refusal by the excluded of the 
one-sided logic of structural domination and social exclusion.181 
 
In terms of artistic response this can raise both the spectre of weak alterity 
under the mantle of identity politics but also the possibility of counter-
hegemonic networks emerging with very particular goals and self-
prescriptive modes of switching. These are now the parameters of artistic 
networks autonomy. Artistic autonomy is constituted by the interaction                                                         
179 Castells, p. 4. 
180 Alain Touraine, Qu’est-ce que la democratie? (Paris: Feyard, 1995), p.168, cited in 
Castells, p. 22. 
181 Castells, p. 24. 
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between autonomous systems and the goals of those networks it 
comprises. Castells states that: 
 
The performance of a given network will then depend upon two fundamental 
attributes of the network: its connectedness, that is, its structural ability to 
facilitate noise-free communication between its components; and its 
consistency, that is, the extent to which there is a sharing of interests between 
the network’s goals and the goals of its components.182 
 
The autonomy of art within such a model might appear to entail the 
ability to self-differentiate in the production of quasi-independent 
networks. How then are informational relations produced? 
 
Informationalism and Labour  
 
Informational labour is the basis of the production of social relations. This 
form of labour is based upon copying and dissemination. They are its 
general social techniques. The labour force is mobilised in activities of 
informational production, analysis and dissemination without itself 
having a productive goal in the classical sense of the application of 
knowledge to any manufacturing process. The management of knowledge 
and information are essential to the performance of organisations within 
an informational global economy and this in turn is also productive of 
informational social relations: 
 
The process of work is at the core of the social structure. The technological and 
managerial transformation of labour, and of production relationships, in and 
around the emerging network enterprise is the main lever by which the 
informational paradigm and the process of globalization affect society at large. 
183 
 
Castells divides informational labour into three dimensions. These are 
value making, relation making and decision making. The building of                                                         
182 Castells, p. 187. 
183 Castells, p. 216. 
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relations is a normative term within what is considered production. These 
tasks are distributed hierarchically between networkers who establish the 
network and those who implement decisions at an operative level. It is the 
position and privileges of the independent networker, which is of most 
interest when considering the social system of art. The artist as networker, 
operative, and decision maker is increasingly identified as one who 
produces or redefines value by establishing novel nodal connections 
between informational objects and intensifies the flows of information 
within these idiomatic networks.  
 
Informational Artworks 
 
Within the overall project of postproductive practice, the artist is therefore 
called upon to develop these new skills. Here we enter into the dialectic of 
artistic de-skilling and re-skilling identified by John Roberts’ The 
Intangibilities of Form184. Any argument about artistic de-skilling which 
generally emerges within any critique of new forms of art needs to be 
countered with the notion of re-skilling. Within the artistic appropriation 
of the techniques of informational labour, artists seek to annex these 
forms and to use them in silent or ‘non-productive’ activities. This is 
easier said than done, not least because the immanently productive nature 
of information relies upon the recuperation of non-productive labour to 
productive use. Castells takes the view that the ‘informational age’ is one 
in which: ‘The action of knowledge upon knowledge itself is the main 
form of productivity.’185 
 
If there is to be any resolution of this problem of recuperation, I believe 
that it entails a re-thinking of the logic of the readymade within 
informationalised terms. This is because the logic of the readymade is 
premised not simply upon procedures of artistic appropriation but also 
contains within it a principle of translation and topological redeployment.                                                         
184 John Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art After the 
Readymade (London; New York: Verso, 2007) 
185 Castells, p. 17. 
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This is the radical nature of the readymade and the assisted readymade. It 
allows for translation and metamorphosis. Does the network preclude 
this? Is its topology too fluid and prone to re-territorialise counter logical 
presentations? 
 
The Informational Readymade 
 
The analysis of archival-informational labour must address the archival 
impulse’s indebtedness to our post-conceptualist understanding of the 
readymade. Hal Foster identifies the relationship between archival 
information and the readymade, arguing that ‘information does often 
appear as a virtual readymade, as so much data to be reprocessed and sent 
on.’ 186 He also identifies a correlative shift in artistic labour based upon 
inventory, sampling and sharing. Thus the movement towards 
postproductive practices can be seen as a logical extension of the archival 
impulse opening new possibilities for the ‘informational readymade’ as a 
critique of the commodity form.  
 
John Roberts’ The Intangibilities of Form provides just such an approach. 
Roberts contextualises the question as follows; 
 
the new technology is seen as a recombinant form of artistic production all the 
way down – artistic labour becomes the continuous immaterial reorganisation of 
the readymade (the labour of others) on screen and as such a powerful 
democratizer of artistic practice; second, and relatedly, the fundamental 
condition of digital practice as a multiple-entry, non-linear flow of text and 
image successfully dissolves the division of producer and consumer in ways 
that the early avant-garde barely broached. The renewed utopian remit of 
expanded circuits of authorship under digital technology, then, is 
unmistakeable. 187 
 
The readymade is viewed as a break with artistic craftsmanship (de-
skilling) and the valorisation of ‘the interpretive powers of the artist, and                                                         
186 Foster, p. 4. 
187 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form, pp. 180-181. 
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not as a technical category and demand’ (re-skilling). But after Duchamp, 
it becomes an ‘operative process for artists.’188 In response to changes in 
the relations of production there is a point of ‘mimetic identification 
between artistic and social production’.189 This ‘rendezvous’ is the 
function around which the autonomy of art pivots. Bourriaud’s 
assessment of Duchamp is that Duchamp ‘used a mass produced object as 
a ‘tool of production’ and thereby brought; 
 
the capitalist process of production (working on the basis of accumulated 
labour) into the sphere of art, while at the same time indexing the role of the 
artist to the world of exchange…Duchamp started from the principle that 
consumption was a mode of production…’190 
 
Once the artist enters into this indexical relationship to exchange, we are 
faced, with the problem of the immanent productivity of information. The 
chief problem for any notion of informational readymade is, therefore, 
that the circuits of production and circulation are identical; 
 
The novelty of the new informational infrastructure is the fact that it is 
embedded within and completely immanent to the new production processes. 
At the pinnacle of contemporary production, information and communication 
are the very commodities produced; the network itself is the site of both 
production and circulation.191 
 
The potency of the readymade relied, according to Roberts, upon its 
ability to migrate between the circuits of alienated and non-alienated 
labour at will, or through the process of nomination. If the informational 
readymade is enclosed within the identity of its production and 
circulation, how might it achieve such a metamorphosis? I think that the 
answer must lie in the principle of translation that underpins Bourriaud’s 
thinking of topological formations.                                                         
188 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form, p. 22. 
189 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form, p. 25. 
190 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.23. 
191 Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001), p. 298. 
 132 
 
Roberts states that since the autonomous unrepresentable art object no 
longer presents the fetishistic presence it once did, having been 
appropriated by culture, the claims of the classical readymade to disrupt 
the value form are no longer credible.192 Therefore we are no longer faced 
with a choice between the theoretical approaches of Adorno and 
Benjamin in which a challenge to the value form must either elude the 
logic of reproduction altogether, hence it is un-reproducible, or it must 
alternatively be infinitely reproducible. It seems that we are tied to the 
latter approach as of necessity. This second approach must also take into 
account the fact that the reproduction of a ‘digital readymade’ entails no 
actual material expenditure that is, it is not premised upon scarcity. 
 
With the loss of the Adornian argument art is of course placed at risk of 
its loss within the heteronomous forces of productive labour. Roberts 
makes it clear that ‘The struggle for artistic autonomy is not excludable 
from reproducible forms’.193 I think that Bourriaud accepts this position 
when he talks about the multiplication of forms as an alternative to their 
negation. 
 
Roberts reminds us that the readymade’s ‘reliance upon the ‘literalism’ of 
the object of productive labour was too open to confusion as a form of 
artistic nihilism.’194 Duchamp understood this charge, and in order not to 
risk dissipating the potency of the readymade he limited the number of 
readymades he released into the art market. This is a knowing assessment 
of the readymade’s strengths and weaknesses. It marks the extent to 
which an object of mass production can be posited as uniquely non-
alienated. The challenge for the informational readymade is somewhat 
different. Its efficacy relies upon the preservation of its principle of 
metamorphosis, in the modern idiom its translatability and re-use. I am in 
agreement with Roberts that perhaps the efficacy of the informational                                                         
192 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form p. 26. 
193 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form p. 32. 
194 Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form p. 41. 
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readymade lies in its capacity to extend the life of commodities in 
unexpected and unauthorised ways. In other words, to use and re-use 
information in ways that contest their ownership. It seems that its most 
potent use is based upon translation through the principle of sharing and 
modification that Bourriaud suggests but in which it is not only 
authorship but also ownership that is contested. Perhaps it is the 
annexation of ownership that now constitutes the critical import of the 
readymade. 
 
Is Postproduction a Form of Immaterial Artistic Labour? 
 
I have said that digital exchange does not entail any material expenditure 
but of course this needs some clarification. I start from the general 
proposition that all labour is material. At the same time I recognise that 
my reading inevitably calls for some position on the question of material 
and immaterial artistic labour, which has been an important question for 
recent aesthetic discourse. 
 
Within Bourriaud’s later texts, Postproduction and The Radicant, there is 
not only a reflection upon those relations of production prevalent within 
informational communicative networks, but also the nature of materiality 
per se. Some preliminary points need to be made here. Firstly, Bourriaud 
makes it clear from the outset that his later work is simply a deployment 
of the principles of relational art within a particular topology, 
predominantly, though not exclusively, the internet. On that basis I do not 
think that we can regard relational art in any way a thesis on cognitive 
capitalism: that it privileges ‘immaterial’ artistic production over other 
kinds of material production. On the contrary relational art is subject to 
the processes of combined and uneven development and embraces every 
type and means of production. What is also clear is that the relational 
matrices that Bourriaud proposes can produce sites of relation that might 
be topologically situated across multiple sites and through diverse modes 
of reception. In other words postproductive and radicant practices are not 
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simply locked into electronic circuits of exchange. Maurizio Lazzarato 
has identified what is problematic in the distinction between material and 
immaterial labour and the tendential dominance of the latter in the 
theorization of advanced capital. He says that the concept of immaterial 
labour all too quickly lost its political import, that is its articulation of the 
modes of subjectivisation and entrepreneurial individualisation, and 
became systemically applied to categories of economic production. Thus 
there is a danger in the use of the concepts of immaterial labour and 
cognitive capitalism that tend to rely upon a systematic categorisation of 
changing relations of production. This is important in relation to 
Bourriaud’s materialism. As I have stressed, Bourriaud’s materialism 
originates in Althusser’s aleatory materialism of the encounter: this is a 
materialism that is theorised against Marx, or rather Marx’s idealism. In 
‘Marx in his Limits’ Althusser questions the ‘speculative geneticism’ of 
Marx’s account of the modes of production.195 Althusser’s Marxism is of 
a different hue to this teleological account and calls into question the 
historical necessity implicit within Marx’s account. In particular his 
charge is that Marx writes history in the ‘future anterior’. Althusser draws 
upon an alternative ‘materialist undercurrent’ in Marx in which a mode of 
production is seen as the result of the aleatory encounter of independent 
elements: thus modes of production are necessarily contingent in origin. 
To treat them as necessary accomplished facts is to produce the illusion of 
a false totality. 
 
The material/immaterial labour argument that emerged in Marxist 
thinking in the 1970s and 1980s is generally acknowledged to be rooted 
in Marx’s ‘Fragment on the Machine’, which predicts a shift of emphasis 
in the capitalist mode of production towards intellectual labour.196 As 
such it is rooted in a teleological account of the modes of production 
which is at odds with Althusser’s approach and by implication, that of                                                         
195 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87, ed. By F. 
Matheron and O.Corpet, trans. by G.M.Goshgarian (London and New York: Verso, 
2006) 
196 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. by M. Nicolaus, (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 
694. 
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Bourriaud. This is not the only reason why I believe it would be a 
distortion of relational art to classify it as a form of immaterial labour. 
Lazzarato himself has explained that he has abandoned the concept. In 
fact Lazzarato appears now to be advocating a programme in which 
microcommunity might play a role in the production of singular counter-
subjects which might contest the individuating imperatives of capital that 
are currently founded upon a principle of competition. For Bourriaud 
materialism is quite clearly a matter of the ‘lasting encounter’. He 
proceeds by way of the inscription of relations as the means of 
concretising their forms, not by way of prescriptions based upon pre-
established categories. 
 
I will expand upon some of these points in order to demonstrate a key 
proposition of this thesis: the construction of the materiality of forms 
requires the postulation of an ontology and the inscription of materiality 
as a mode of performative labour. I want to look at this in the context of 
material and immaterial labour and to focus upon what, according to one 
of its creators, Maurizio Lazzarato, was lost of its original intentions in its 
critical reception. The ambiguity and inadequacy of the concept exposes 
some of the challenges that network culture presents to resistance. 
 
Is the Problematic Concept of Immaterial Labour Exhausted? 
 
In an interview Lazzarato makes the following initial remarks upon the 
concept of immaterial labour: 
 
By definition, labour or an occupation cannot be immaterial: what would it 
mean if they were? Even if they represented a smaller investment of 
subjectivity, they could not be immaterial. Even if you work on a computer 
there is a lot of materiality at your fingertips.197  
 
                                                        
197 Maurizio Lazzarato and Others, ‘Conversation with Maurizio Lazzarato-Public 
Editing Session 3, June 23, 2010’, TkH Journal for Performing Arts Theory (2010), 
pp. 12-22. (p.13). 
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The only way ahead is to think about the big picture without limiting ourselves 
to the concept of immaterial labour.198 
 
In Lazzarato’s original conception of immaterial labour, there were two 
principal strands. The first entailed a classical Marxist analysis of 
changes in production and labour and the second dealt with the concept 
of subjectivity. Lazzarato says that this second strand has been 
insufficiently emphasized. This dealt with, 
 
the concept of subjectivity production as outlined by Foucault and Felix 
Guattari. We were trying to combine two traditions: an Italian tradition that is 
known as operaiste – or rather post-operaiste, since operaism ended in 1973 – 
and the French tradition. So, starting with this article, the concept of production 
shifted toward the concept of subjectivity production.199 
 
He says that problems arose with the concept of immaterial labour 
because it was ambiguous.  He therefore abandoned it and has never 
returned to it. One wonders, incidentally, whether the delay in translating 
Lazzarato’s work gave the concept of immaterial labour greater longevity 
in the English-speaking world. One of its ambiguities centres upon the 
concept of immateriality itself. Lazzarato says that it became difficult in 
practice to distinguish between the material and the immaterial, as it did 
for Marx. For Lazzarato, the problem with the reception of the concept 
was that people interpreted material and immaterial as opposites and that 
the concept was unable to escape this dualistic reading. He says that 
although the concept was ‘originally conceived as political it was 
“recast” in a socio-economic light as soon as it was published.’200  
 
For Lazzarato, this did the concept a disservice, in that it led to the 
labelling of different industries and types of workers as either material or 
immaterial. In particular this led to the problematic labelling of the 
internet, as a site of de facto immaterial production. This categorization                                                         
198 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
199 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 12. 
200 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 12. 
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was not what Lazzarato had intended, so he abandoned the concept and 
shifted his focus onto subjectivity production. He stresses that Felix 
Guattari has argued that the crisis of the last 40 years is not a political or 
economic crisis but ‘a crisis in the production of subjectivity, a crisis of 
subjectification.’201 Lazzarato says that from this perspective the 
category of immaterial labour no longer makes sense. 
 
Lazzarato experimented with other concepts and principally, 
‘deterritorialization’. But ‘deteritorialized labour’ did not work either, 
because ‘deterritorialization’ lacked some of the nuances of 
immateriality. He experimented with this notion on basis that classical 
modes of Fordist production, concentrated in and around the factory had 
lost their territorial identity.  But this did not work ‘against the bigger 
picture’, and neither did ‘cognitive work’/‘cognitive capitalism’ or the 
‘creative class’.  
 
In terms of the possibilities of an art of immaterial labour, Lazzarato’s 
view is that immaterial labour cannot be associated with creativity 
because what has actually happened is a ‘neutralization’ of creativity. He 
claims that creativity is disappearing ‘except in its most formatted, 
standardized forms’.202 The overall problem he says does not lie within 
the distinction between material labour and immaterial labour, but with 
precarious, short-term, forms of work that cuts across every class and 
sector.  
 
During Bojanna Cvejic’s interview, she asks Lazzarato a very good 
question, which sheds light upon one of the principal dilemmas of post- 
relational practice.  
 
                                                        
201 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 12. 
202 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
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 I’d like to know how you explain the theoretical but also the political 
differences between capitalism’s individualism, which is depoliticizing, and 
singularity as a production of experimental subjectivity. 203 
 
Lazzarato’s reply is that: ‘What capitalism asks for – the subjectivity it 
produces – is a very extreme form of individualization. One has to be 
ones’ own entrepreneur, meaning one must be able to take on all the 
economic and social burdens of production’.204 So the model of 
subjectification is the entrepreneur, but this is a very weak model. 
Lazzarato says that, ‘The model of the entrepreneur does not resolve the 
problem of capitalist subjectification. That is why there is a crisis of 
subjectification.’205 He says that the entrepreneur ‘destroys society by 
definition, it destroys social relations because it replaces them with a 
competitive and purely economic logic.’ 206 Capital deterritorialises and 
reterritorialises using models of subjectification, including religion and 
the nation state. Lazzarato claims that the problem with the 
entrepreneurial model is that it is based upon individual initiative and that 
this ‘is not a form of subjectification that will work.”207 In this we might 
see another reason for hypostatic relation: that is the entrepreneurial form 
of individuation of capital is destructive of the kinds of relations that we 
would associate with the encounter.  
 
Critics of capitalism are hindered because subjectivity no longer depends 
upon a corporately unified working class, and thus ‘the working class has 
lost this capacity to embody capitalism.’ The overall problem then is an 
absence of alternative forms of subjectification. I have referred to this as 
the possibility of counter-subjects to capital. Lazzarato next addresses the 
difference between individualization and singularization. He says that we 
must separate out singularity and individuality. Whereas capitalism 
equates the two, he argues that we need to move beyond the                                                         
203 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
204 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
205 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
206 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
207 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 13. 
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individualised subject, ‘because we are caught in systems that largely go 
beyond the singular individual. But capitalism needs to bring 
deterritorialization back to individualization.208  
 
How then would one define a singularity that could be defined as a 
collective singularity? According to Lazzarato, this problem can only be 
addresses by testing the network. He suggests artists’ micropolitical 
experiments as an example of this. Once again, we return to micropolitics 
as productive of novel forms of collective singularity. And, in a way that 
is by now familiar, Lazzarato introduces the thinking of the event as a 
possible means of producing a counter-subject to capital. He says that  
 
 An event takes place and that event introduces a new temporality. This 
new temporality affects subjectivity first and foremost. The political movement 
opens up a space and it’s in that space that subjectivity can qualify itself.209  
 
This thinking proposes an aesthetic model as interruptive of flows. He 
says that Deleuze and Guattari chose an aesthetic model in order to use 
such a methodology. So an interruption in the spatio-temporal flow 
‘opens up a new mode of temporality, and this new temporality begins or 
triggers a creative process. We go through a window of meaninglessness 
in order to produce a new meaning.’ 210 
 
How then can these micro-interruptions be used? For Lazzarato, these 
interruptions need to be put to work experimentally, rather than 
theorized. Significantly, within his generally aestheticized methodology 
of subjectivity production he sees no continuing role for the avant-garde. 
He says that: 
 
 Once upon a time we could think about artistic revolution, a political 
revolution, or a social revolution on almost separate terms. There were 
avant-garde aesthetics. Today, it is no longer possible to think about an                                                         
208 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 14. 
209 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 15. 
210 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 15. 
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aesthetic change as such, or a political change as such. I think that’s what is 
hard to understand. Apparatuses for producing subjectivity span across all of 
these elements.211 
 
What I draw from Lazzarato’s remarks is firstly that ‘immaterial’ labour 
draws the focus away from the more important process of subjectification 
and the need to focus upon micropolitical strategies of interruption and 
experiments in the production of counter-subjectivity. Lazzarato puts 
event at the heart of the relational act and on that basis he anticipates my 
argument in chapter 4. Echoing Bourriaud’s The Radicant, this event is 
motile. It is a specific operation of time and space.  
 
I will argue that such notions of the event of relation lack any ontology. 
Part of the strategy of making these interventions visible within a 
materialist aesthetic is to grant them some minimal but sufficient 
ontology. The enduring question of the ‘materialism’ of information is 
this: if we are willing to accept that information is ontologised by the 
performative acts of informational labour, why not extend this notion to 
the thinking of relation itself? If the production of a new epistemology of 
information is the result of the action of knowledge upon itself, why not 
apply the performantive aspect of this proposition to ‘immaterial’ 
relations of encounter? This would be to render them factual in the sense 
of granting these notions a philosophical and social mode of appearance.  
 
Archaeological Archives and Anarchivistic Archives 
 
I want to extend Lazzarato’s thread of argument around the potentiality of 
micropolitical experiment to the notion of archive and to ask specifically 
what kind of an archive would be adequate to the fluidity of 
micropolitics? In The Radicant, Bourriaud identifies archival practice as a 
potential site for the construction of singularities, linking its 
compositional form to a series of encounters. In what follows I want to 
consider how this might be done against the totalising tendency of the                                                         
211 Lazzarato, ‘Conversation’, p. 16. 
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archive; that is, its positivistic or encyclopaedic tendencies. What are the 
characteristics of an objectile postproductive or radicant archive? 
 
Castells insists on the hypomnseic nature of informationalism, stating 
that alliances and successes collapse and are replaced by new 
configurations. He identifies a culture of instant consignment to memory 
and claims that memory becomes: ‘Too rigid for the varied geometry 
required by informationalism’.212 This echoes Stallabrass’s reflection 
that: ‘The net has the potential to be the ultimate archive, the repository 
of all human knowledge, opinion and culture, yet it combines that ideal 
with an aggressively amnesiac urge.’ 213Castells states that ‘the spirit of 
informationalism is the culture of creative destruction.’214. 
 
I take this as my starting point. The hypomnesic nature of 
informationalism and the motility of post-relational forms call for an 
appraisal of the archive’s destructive capacities and I turn for this to 
Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever. 
 
Archive Fever 
 
I propose to examine the archive both in terms of its authority and power,  
in terms of its nomological ordering principle and its anarchivistic, or 
deconstructive operations as the source of its evental dynamic. Archive 
Fever sets out the archive’s principle of construction and destruction or 
disassembly. What is at stake here is whether archival-artistic practices 
reproduce the logic of de- and re-territorialisation of capital (the 
reductively mimetic argument) or whether they might constitute a critical 
enclave within that logic. This depends upon the viability of a heterology 
of the archive as a necessary negation of idealism, history and teleology, 
which in fact prepares the ground for the positive articulations of 
Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism.                                                          
212 Castells, p. 215. 
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The search for singular configurations in the form of the archive entails 
the examination an of the archive’s (im)possibility. If archival practices in 
art aim to challenge the ‘subject-object relations of advanced capitalism’ 
as Foster suggests, then we are presented with the need to diagnose the 
conditions under which the symbolic order of informational society might 
be ‘resisted’, if not overdetermined. The relationally hypostatic plane of 
informationalism would seem to be an unpromising site for artistic 
agency, given that informationalism is a logic that serves global 
capitalism, that is, it capitalises relations. And yet the attraction of the 
archive remains compelling as a site for artistic intervention. In Derridean 
terms, it offers a site for the assembly of relations premised upon a 
principle of disassembly. This principle of destruction is for Derrida 
secretly constitutive of the archive’s power and authority. In other words, 
the archival authority provides us with a theoretical model of something 
that is inextricably linked to the subject-object relations of advanced 
capitalism but, at the same time, the archive harbours but erases its 
anarchivistic origin its acute relation of non-relation to that power. On 
Derrida’s reading of Freud, it is the destructive operation of the death 
drive that provides the archival dynamic. Indeed he states that ‘in effacing 
the death drive we are in effect archiving a repression or supression’.215 In 
Derrida’s identification of the mal d’archive as coterminate with its 
otherwise encyclopaedic or archaeological functions. The archive then 
demonstrates the (im)possibility of its own closure. 
 
Much contemporary analysis of artistic-archival practice focuses upon its 
claim to link existing relations within novel configurations. As such it is 
positivistic in character provided that this ‘archaeological’ model does no 
more than link relations within a horizontal epistemological plane. The 
critical endorsement of archival-artistic practices has tended to fetishise 
‘the gathering together of signs’ and appropriates the authority and power 
of the archive as an institutionally legitimised artistic form already                                                         
215 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. by Eric Prenowitz, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 31. 
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established by previous avant-gardes. These practices, however, do not 
venture much beyond this principle of recombination of what is particular 
into the potentially critical form of the archive as a singular construction. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the archival form of relational art has 
developed in the context of an underlying suspicion that it is mimetic in 
character.  The argument is that an archive that conforms to an a priori 
system of enunciation can only be reductively mimetic of those relations 
that ‘belong’ to the concept. For example Okwui Enwezor’s essay 
‘Archive Fever: Photography Between History and the Monument’216 is 
typical of this approach. The essay appears within a book which presents 
a collection of artists’ work in which archival practices have been adopted 
as a formal methodology. The essay presents the potential of the archive 
as contiguous with its didactic powers: to issue the salutary lessons of a 
forgotten history speaking to us across time and space. There is no 
consideration, here, of the social and formal implications of archival 
practice as artistic labour, nor the analysis of the ‘Freudian impression’ 
that is central to Derrida’s text from which it takes its title.217 In short this 
archaeological model does not engage with the (im)possible relation of 
non-relation that must found any claim to singularity. Rather, it relates 
what is ‘not related’ within the functions of a pre-existing epistemological 
plane. This is symptomatic of a Foucauldian reading of the archive. For 
example, Enwezor argues that, 
 
the archive as a representation of the taxonomy, classification, and annotation of 
knowledge and information could also be understood as a representative 
historical form, which Foucault designates as a historical a priori, defined as a 
field of archaeological inquiry, a journey through time and space; one whose 
methodological apparatus does not set ‘a condition of validity for judgements, 
but a condition of reality for statements.218  
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The problem here is that Enwezor grasps the domiciliary and nomological 
function as an invitation for artistic intervention in the structures by which 
archive founds a discourse. His conception of an historical a priori is 
problematic in that it presents the positivism of the archive and bears no 
resemblance to Derrida’s description of the archive as harbouring 
l’avenir; that which is singular and therefore un-knowable as such. He 
leaves untouched the question of the archive’s anarchivistic power, which 
for Derrida is inseparable from its foundational authority. 
 
In his reliance upon Foucault’s archaeological model, Enwezor mirrors 
Foucault’s conception of archive by describing it as a system of 
enunciation. He cites with approval the following passage from the 
Archaeology of Knowledge: 
 
The archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event 
of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escapee; it 
is that, which, at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which 
embodies it, defines at the outset the system of its enunciability.219 
 
Foucault’s analysis is anathema then to the search for a singular relation-
non-relation. It is rooted within the principle or logic of its enunciability. 
It is therefore anathema to Bourriaud’s inductive methodology. Foucault 
says of archaeology: 
 
This term does not imply the search for a beginning; it does not relate analysis 
to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that 
questions the already-said at the level of its existence: of the enunciative 
function that operates within it, of the discursive formation, and the general 
archive system to which it belongs. 220 
 
My purpose here is to demonstrate that for the critical knots within the 
archive to be potentially productive of new relations we must find a way 
out of this ‘enunciative field’. Derrida’s reading appears to offer this                                                         
219 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), p.146. 
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possibility, because it reveals the source of the archive’s contradictions as 
a frontier between the singular and the particular and therefore in 
Bourriaud’s terms a potentially liminal site.  
 
Archive as a Source of Power and Authority 
 
For Derrida, the archive is a point of commencement or commandment. 
This is its ordering or nomological principle. At the same time the archive 
must be placed, and this is its point of contact between nature and 
legislation, its domicile. The point at which order is given, Derrida terms 
the exergue, which he says has both, an ‘institutive and conservative 
function’. It represents ‘the violence of a power which at once posits and 
conserves the law’.221 Significantly he adds that since this point of 
archival commencement operates in silence ‘it never leaves any archives 
of its own’.222 Derrida claims that this concealment is the reason for the 
silent operation of the death drive at the heart of the archive.223 
 
Within Derrida’s exposition of the notion of archive we have then both an 
ordering principle, a nomology, and a placement or domicile. It is the 
figure of the arkheion that gives this principle of domicile to the archive 
and thereby gives authority to those who command it, as ‘having the right 
to make or represent the law’.224 This domiciliary function marks both the 
institutional passage from the private to the public and into a privileged 
topology.225 
 
Within the procedures of archival labour we find that the ‘archiviolithic’ 
nature of the death drive is harnessed in a compulsion towards iteration 
and citation, or towards a prelapsarian and unmediated archival origin that 
produces or posits itself as a stable origin, as law.  Informationalism and 
its cognates of repetition and erasure give an operative force to the search                                                         
221 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. by Eric Prenowitz, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) p. 7. 
222 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 10. 
223 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 10. 
224 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 2. 
225 Derrida, Archive Fever, pp. 2-3. 
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for what the archive conceals. It embodies the search for a point of 
exception, or in Derridean terms an (im)possible search for the other of 
the archive’s symbolic order. 
 
Archive and Network: Derrida’s Question 
 
Derrida’s asserts, that ‘there is no political power without control of the 
archive if not of memory’ 226 We can see the political import of the link 
between archive and network. Since the archive derives its power through 
originary principles of ordering and placement, conferring authority and 
privilege upon those who determine this, any change within this 
configuration entails a possible redistribution of archival power. 
 
Derrida asks the following question; ‘Can one imagine an archive without 
foundation, without substrate, without substance, without subjectile?’227  
 
In the realm of the informational digital network, what are its effects upon 
the nomological and domiciliary foundations of archival practice? Can we 
reconcile the notion of nomological and domiciliary consignment within a 
network that operates upon an entropic substrate in which the 
archiviolithic is facilitated by continuous change and modification of its 
subjects and objects, or rather, in postproductive terms, its subjectiles and 
objectiles? What is at stake here is the precarity of the archive as the 
principle that potentially enables the appearance of non-identity and the 
demonstration of the archive’s simultaneous deconstruction of its own 
law. 
 
Bourriaud’s ‘objectile’ appears to legitimate an anarchivistic 
understanding of postproductive practices as intertextual, in the sense that 
postproduction appears to deny any ontology to its objects, privileging 
instead their directionality. Informationally networked practices appear in 
their intertextuality to be the full realisation of Derrida’s foundationless                                                         
226 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 4. 
227 Derrida, Archive Fever, pp. 26-27. 
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archive in the manner of the general text. Rodolphe Gashé describes this 
as follows: 
 
As [Derrida] shows in ‘The Double Session,’ the general text whose structure of 
re-marking folds the text upon it(self) in a nonsymmetrical and nonreflexive 
manner defers, discards, or sets Being aside (à l'écart). The general text 
marginalizes Being, being itself the margin of Being. As the margin of Being, 
the general text has no ontological status; with regard to Being, it is neither 
absent nor present, since both modes of temporality and of being are particular 
to Being alone.228 
 
In other words it is the very specific spatio-temporal conjuncture that 
Bourriaud identifies within postproductive and radicant practice that 
allows us to think of an archive that abandons its ‘substrate’; that is its 
ontological foundations, in favour of the principle of its relational 
motility. The radicant artwork, to recall, tears up its own roots. I would 
add however that in setting aside being we are speaking here of the 
classical ontological model. This is the Aristotelian model that prescribes, 
‘that which is not a thing is nothing’. We need a way to describe 
postproductive processes that might connect them to aleatory materialism 
as the very emergence of the ‘thingness of these operations’. I will return 
to this question in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Within the objectile field of the general text, the text is never constituted 
as such by signifying units outside of the general text but by traces. 
Therefore, a text is no more than a set of traces, or their linkage within a 
system of textual referral. In this way, the differential network endlessly 
refers to something other than itself and never to anything outside of the 
text that would bring this process to resolution. The general text is 
heterogeneous, and irreducible with respect to any ultimate unity.229 
 
                                                        
228 Rodolphe Gashé, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection 
(Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 286. 
229 Gashé, The Tain of the Mirror, p. 289. 
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In order to fully answer Derrida’s question, it is important to recognise 
that a new configuration emerges in the ‘topo-nomology’ of the 
informational network. To paraphrase Derrida, the archive is ‘no longer 
under house arrest.’230 The network without substrate resists any 
topological determination. Rather, it appears to be atopological in the 
positive sense that it invites diverse topological determination or 
nomination. We might describe the motility of radicant art as a form of 
relational drive.  
 
Derrida’s l’avenir differs from the modernist and subtractive notion of the 
‘passion for the real’ because l’avenir operates upon a principle of delay, 
as an impossible promise, whereas the passion for the real operates as an 
article of faith asserting the immediacy of the present. For Derrida the 
conditions of archivisation make it into ‘a movement of the promise and 
of the future’ no less than a recording of the past’.231 This notion of the 
archive as a movement of the promise is what distinguishes it from the 
modern as ‘messianistic’ without thereby falling into messianism. 
 
This may finally account for the archival impulse, but what are the 
broader consequences of the new topo-nomological configuration? The 
implications of this change run much deeper than pseudo-technical 
democratisation. This is because the archival apparatus of the network 
produces as much as it records its event; it mediates the content. This is 
where I identify a principle of non-mimetic translation at work within the 
anarchivistic and precarious archive. 
 
Derrida discusses this in the following passage, 
 
this is another way of saying that the archive, as printing, writing, prosthesis, or 
hypomnesic technique in general is not only the place for stocking or 
conserving the archival content of the past which would exist in any case, such 
as without the archive one still believes it was or will have been. No, the                                                         
230 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.16. 
231 Derrida, Archive Fever, p.16. 
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technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the 
archivable content even in its very becoming into existence and in its 
relationship to the future. The archivisation produces as much as it records the 
event.232 
 
Derrida’s notion of the archive as hypostatic is crucial to his overall 
question about technology. Derrida describes the archive not as a living 
thing, but as that which submits to the possibility of repetition and 
reproduction. It resists both mnesis and anamnesis, thus at the point of its 
exergue, the forgotten event of its origin is constitutive of ‘a priori 
forgetfulness and archioviolithic in to the heart of the monument’.233 This 
equates not to the a priori precept of enunciation but with the necessity of 
contingency: the credo of aleatory materialism. Derrida says that within 
Freud’s notion of archive, although he produces a model of ‘auxilliary 
representation’, he nevertheless maintains the primacy of live memory 
and anamnesis. That is, he maintains their originary temporalisation. Thus 
the archive for Freud retains a search for live origin. 234Derrida’s 
(im)possible archive braids together the encyclopaedic promise of closure 
and erasure and the operation of the death drive. In reality he says their 
operations can be barely separated. Take the following passage: 
 
As we have noted all along, there is an incessant tension here between archive 
and archaeology. They will always be close the one to the other, resembling 
each other, hardly discernible in their co-implication, and yet radically 
incompatible, heterogenous, that is to say, different with regard to the origin, in 
divorce with regard to the arkhe.235 
 
Derrida claims that by ignoring the hypomnesia of the archive and its 
archviolithic origin the archaeologist makes the archive no longer serve 
any function. It is taken as live and unmediated. As I have said, the 
migration of archival practices into the digital network entails a                                                         
232 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 17. 
233 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 12. 
234 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 92. 
235 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 92. 
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movement into an atopology of radically different spatio-temporal 
relations that is symptomatic of informational culture. This appears to 
allow for increasingly unstable and open ‘objectile’ archives and the 
intensification of archive fever. But it embodies also the precarity of 
network relations that have no intrinsic mnemonic quality and can be 
linked arbitrarily. This is reflective of the precarious topology of social 
relations under globalised capitalism. Derrida’s analysis of the archive 
reveals its constitutive instability as a site of intersection between the 
singular and the particular. On that basis we could say that archival 
practices constitute a fertile space for the staging of artistic autonomy and 
informational mimesis.  
 
Archive and Event 
 
As I have said, Derrida reflects on the archival promise in messianic 
terms: that is as distinguishable from messianism. This is a future which 
is not only unknown, but is unknowable as such. It does not fall within a 
horizon of knowledge or pre-knowledge but is evental in character. 
Derrida describes this as ‘a performative to come’: it has no relationship 
to what is, or to what will have been actually present. 236 The messianic is 
then posited less in the enunciative sense, but rather through the principle 
of delay. 
 
It is this notion of wager that provides the possibility of exception from 
the symbolic order of subject-object relations. The modernist ‘historian of 
the present’ must become the ‘historian of the promise’. This is to say that 
returning to the narrative construction of a topology, this would be a 
presentation of testimony that emerges within, but is in excess of its 
epistemological plane or aspiration. The event of the archive is tied to a 
principle of movement that is potentially productive of new knowledge 
but lacks the substrate of any system of enunciability. It is a movement 
towards knowledge.                                                         
236 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 72. 
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The Question of Realism 
 
Postproduction embraces the hypomnesic character of information and the 
spatio-temporal collapse within networks. Web based, digital exchange 
artworks are constituted within nodal networks whose fragments are 
‘objectile’, occupying no fixed position and as its intertextual figures are 
never fully ‘present’.  What is different then between relational aesthetics’ 
use of secondary documentary material and that of post productive 
content is that within postproduction there are no primary materials. As 
with the aleatory materialism of Relational Aesthetics the model of 
sociability presented by postproduction, relies, in fact, on an articulation 
of informational realism that no longer points to any constitutive 
originary foundation. This informational realism testifies to its state of 
precarity and regulative incompletion. This is perhaps what the globalized 
conjunture brings to bear upon ‘the life of forms’. 
 
The Generalised Field of Performance 
 
Introduction: Informational Performativity 
 
We have already established that the general social techniques of 
informational labour require a performative form of labour in which 
production is based upon the action of knowledge upon itself. 
Informational labour is performative in the sense that it produces a form 
of subjectivity as the principal product of these operations. In this section 
I will examine the nature of informational and post-relational 
performativity in greater detail. ‘Performative’ and ‘performativity’ are 
terms commonly used today within critical art, often interchangeably. 
This tends to diminish the importance of the illocutionary nature of the 
performative that is, its normative and ritualistic function in materially 
changing social and specifically legal relations. Equally, if productive 
mimesis is the guarantor of arts’ autonomy, it is necessary to establish in 
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what sense it differs from the retionalised mode of performance within the 
generalised field of performance. Provisionally I will say that this is 
because the performativity of mimesis inhabits this generalised field but 
proceeds within its own mode of non-rational cognition. It is an activity 
that has no set goals. 
 
In Perform or Else Jon McKenzie identifies performativity as a site of 
normative force, relying upon Judith Butler’s analysis of performative 
speech acts. He says that, 
 
Performative acts are forms of authoritative speech: most performatives, for 
instance, are statements which, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and 
exercise a binding power…The power of discourse to produce what it names is 
linked with the question of performativity. The performative is thus one 
domain in which power acts as a discourse.237 
 
J.L Austin developed the concepts of performativity and illocution within 
his jurisprudence to address the problem that the transformative effect of 
statements cannot be assumed in the absence of any observable change in 
conduct or in social relations.238 Austin’s speech acts are rational and 
empirical devices. Without them, a purported speech act contains no 
warrant as to its efficacy or, more importantly to its enforceability as bare 
promise, in the absence of a normative legal framework, which might 
supports it and provides sanctions against any breach. In essence a bare 
statement provides no guarantee of its veracity unless there is a legal 
framework to support its illocutionary effect. Performative acts are 
rationalised against illusion and deception The theory of illocution is a 
guarantor of certain legal rights and values and it is perhaps no surprise 
that performative theories re-emerge around informational culture. This is 
because information lacks essential materiality. Its materiality depends 
upon the veracity of its performative materialisation through labour. 
                                                         
237 Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (London: 
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Jon McKenzie’s analysis of performativity seeks to give an historical 
account of the genesis of performance studies, performance management 
and technological performance within their distinctive fields, but crucially 
defines a general theory of performance which might link these categories 
within a metatheory. His analysis allows some consideration of 
performativity, which is consistent with my treatment of 
informationalism: that is, as an overriding social phenomenon that affects 
all aspects of social relations, including those within art. It is a totalising 
discourse. 
 
If we accept that the logic of informationalism is linked to a vast 
performative site, which implicates the entirety of social relations, then 
we can see that the notion of illocutionary effect is itself in crisis. In fact, 
it is evident in Austin’s work that this term is designed to express and 
address a certain anxiety about the nature of the ‘real’. It falls within what 
Adorno calls the disenchantment of the world. Performativity is an 
exercise in metamorphosis carried out in the name of instrumental reason. 
When linked to the informational hypostasis of network society we might 
conclude that the auto-affective promise and the desire for illocutionary 
performance nevertheless occlude the necessary movement of the death 
drive which seeks to undo the fiction of informational ‘presence’, 
materiality and all those forces of logical consignment that give 
informationalism its normative power. In fact I would characterise 
informational labour as a form of illocutionary hysteria. This is at once a 
recognition that the forms of material culture have changed irrevocably 
into a system for the production of sign value and at the same time a deep 
anxiety about the use value of this mode of production. 
 
Relational aesthetics through gestures and live performance exhibit an 
illocutionary tendency; or rather they are posited as productive of socio-
artistic forms. This manifests itself in the performance of micro-social 
systems as self-evidentially performative and the mimetic performance of 
heteronomous social relations. Postproductive practices represent nodal 
configurations of anarchivistic, non-productive labour. It seizes upon the 
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principle of immanent informational productivity and adopts it as the 
principle of non-productive exchange. The critical mass or ‘lumpen army’ 
of this non-productive labour not only undermines the traditional critical 
target of ‘artistic authorship’ but the very notion of property rights on 
which authorship rests. The effect of the reproducibility of digital 
information, without its expenditure, has in fact fuelled the emergence of 
the creative commons.239 This is, because the private ownership of 
property is premised upon scarcity, when information is ubiquitous. The 
fact that it can be exchanged without being thereby used up is in fact what 
makes it possible to bring an immanent critique of its logic within the 
terms of delayed and interrupted consumption. Postproduction is a 
critique of the legal norms of performativity that establish authorship and 
ownership. How then does performativity produce what it names within 
an informational society? Within hypostatic and hypomnesic-
informationalism, performativity through labour, guarantees presence as 
such. Echoing Castells McKenzie claims that knowledge has become 
performative in its own right. McKenzie draws upon Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, to account for what he 
calls a ‘qualitative mutation’ in knowledge. His argument is that whereas 
specialised knowledge serves the ends of progress, postmodern 
knowledge is self-legitimating since its aim is to optimise any given 
system’s performance efficiency. Equally, he claims that there has been a 
mutation in the notion of performance, since performance ‘presences’ 
informational relations through their iteration and citation. McKenzie 
states the position very clearly: ‘Performativity in fact extends beyond 
knowledge; it has come to govern the entire realm of social bonds. 
Because performativity is the mode through which knowledge and social 
bonds are legitimated in contemporary societies.’240 
 
 
                                                         
239 Stallabrass argues that it is the cost free sharing of information, which distinguishes 
the commons of a gift economy from that of ‘potlach’. Stallabrass, p. 207. 
240 McKenzie, p. 14. 
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Performance and Feedback  
 
It is within the operation of feedback loops that the mechanism for the 
modification of performed relations is founded within general 
informational labour. The efficient management of informational 
production allows for some ‘creative’ interruption of performed relations. 
McKenzie argues that this casts doubt upon the purely ‘normative’ 
interpretation of performance management. Whilst I would argue that the 
demonstration of internal difference remains grounded within the 
immanent informational plane, it is through the mimesis of this technique 
that art potentially finds its points of resistance. Any notion of an 
autopoietic social system of art, or of artistic ‘autonomy’, must take into 
consideration its placement within a site of generalised performance as 
the point of enactment of aesthetic autonomy. 
 
In McKenzie’s tentative construction of a meta-theory of performance it 
strikes me that the separation of performance management, performance 
technology and performance studies provides an ideal fiction whose 
negotiation provides an expedient foundation for the critique of 
performativity itself. These categories become discursive staging posts for 
a theory of performative artistic autonomy. 
 
One of McKenzie’s most compelling arguments, which he backs up with 
detailed examples, is that we can no longer read performance studies 
simplistically as transgressive or ‘resistant’ performance, and 
performance management and technological performance, as its 
conservative counterpart. Within the generalised field of performance it is 
the unpredictable exchange of forces between these regimes, which 
founds a critical dialectic of performativity. This seems to preclude any 
reading of relational art as simply antagonistic. Such a reading appears 
untenable within the generalised field of performance. 
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For McKenzie the paradox within any general theory of performance is 
that it ‘can be read both as experimentation and normativity.’241 In terms 
of the histories of different branches of performance, McKenzie cites 
Herbert Marcuse, who argued in 1955 that ‘post industrial societies were 
ruled by what he called the “performance principle”, an historical reality 
principle founded upon “economic alienation and repressive 
desublimation”’.242 Equally, within the humanities a theatrical concept of 
performance developed around an analysis of social ritual. This 
manifested itself within political demonstrations and performance art. He 
summarises the development of performance studies as follows: 
 
…within Performance Studies, performance has taken on a particular political 
significance; with increasing consistency, performance has become defined as a 
‘liminal’ process, a reflexive transgression of social structures. Marginal, on 
the edge, in the interstices of institutions and at their limits, liminal 
performances are capable of temporarily staging and subverting their normative 
functions. Through the study of such genres as demonstrations, political 
theatre, drag, public memorials, performance art, and everyday gestures of 
social resistance, performance scholars have sought to document and theorise 
the political practices enacted in performances around the globe.243 
 
A New Performative Heteronomy? 
 
Overall then, the imperative to ‘perform or else’ within performance 
management is complemented by the imperative to perform efficaciously 
within performance theory as resistant to social control. I would argue 
that the key to any negotiation between these performance paradigms is 
the analysis of general informational social technique (or the category of 
technological performance). Since both performance management and 
performance theory are mutually implicated within their respective 
engagements with the value form (as the marrying of feedback and 
neutered creativity into a bureaucratic form) it is only through the analysis                                                         
241 McKenzie, p. 9. 
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243 McKenzie, p. 8. 
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of informational labour that we can step back into a meta-theory of 
performance. Practices of reproduction, archiving and iteration, need to be 
read within a performative paradigm whose consequences are as 
significant for art as was Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’.244 
 
McKenzie links the categories of performance management and 
performance theory through technological performance. Without wishing 
to submit my argument to an abstract technologism, it would be dilatory 
to ignore technological performance as common to both fields and as 
central to their articulation through labour.  He states that: 
 
The fields of organizational, cultural and technological performance, when 
taken together, form an immense performance site, one that potentially 
encompasses the spheres of human labor and leisure activities and the 
behaviours of all industrially and electronically produced technologies.245 
 
What is more, McKenzie suggests that the citation of different concepts of 
performance across these paradigms may also be generated by the power 
of performance.246 I would suggest, quite simply, that what McKenzie 
gives us here is a symbolic model of performance and articulates perfectly 
its repression of illocutionary anxiety within all aspects of the socius. To 
summarise: the critical efficacy of performance within critical art and the 
efficiency of performance within performance management operate 
within the paradigms of performative illocution. Hence they both 
anticipate their own effects. The very delineation of artistic from non-
artistic reason is determined within this general field of performativity. In 
order to develop a model of resistant art, we must introduce from Derrida, 
the notion of originary performance. That is, the pledge or the promise, 
‘that does not conform to pre-existing conventions, unlike all the 
performatives analysed by the theoreticians of speech acts, but whose                                                         
244 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ in 
Illuminations trans. by Harry Zorn (London: Pimlico, 1999) 
245 McKenzie, p. 12. 
246 McKenzie, p. 37. 
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force of rupture produces the institution or the constitution, the law 
itself’.247 It is my contention that this originary performativity takes hold 
within non-productive artistic labour and the principles of postproductive 
art. 
 
From Transgressive to Resistant Models of Performance Theory 
 
McKenzie makes an overall movement from transgressive to ‘resistant’ 
models of performance. I would say that when informational logic is 
pinpointed as the source of a particular subjectivity and social relations, 
‘resistant performances’ might contest informational logic on the basis 
that its wager upon the possibility of an alternative logic against the 
former opens up the un-truth of informational relations, and the fiction 
that its value is produced in the illocutionary precipitation of its raw 
material: that is, as ‘information’, rather than in its mode of 
subjectivisation. The merit of relational aesthetics is that it takes up the 
issue of illocutionary anxiety, and performs this anxiety in the 
construction of informationalised relations even at the risk of its own 
autonomy.  
 
This entails that within current practice, the axis of artistic autonomy and 
heteronomy is traversed by a second axis of normative and resistant 
performativity. In both axes, the transgressive model is superseded by the 
resistant model. The paradigm of resistance therefore assumes, against 
transgressive models, that we cannot simply label performance theory 
radical nor performance management and technological performance 
normative. Artistic autonomy assumes, then, an Adornian complexion 
within a performative field. Autonomy is immanently constituted within 
this field by its heteronomy and the destructive immediacy of the 
transgressive gesture is replaced by the labour of producing informational 
forms that might inhabit this field. This is because the transgressive 
credentials of performance theory are no longer guaranteed or certain. In                                                         
247 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York; London: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 36-37. 
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fact transgression has become subsumed within a performative culture 
that assimilates transgression as feedback. The key to resistance becomes, 
after Adorno, something akin to the occupation by art of the syllogistic 
rational forms of its host. This would be the normative logic of 
‘productive’ performance hosting an irrationally mimetic form of its 
‘make believe’. 
 
Relational Topology and Mimesis 
 
What I propose is that the materiality of postproductive and radicant 
practice rely upon heterological thinking in order to create a space for the 
construction of relational topologies that do not rely upon any pre-
determination within a concept, or in archival terms, within a principle of 
positivistic enunciation. Thus the heterological strain enables the principle 
of the necessity of contingency to challenge reified relations. The 
processes by which these alternative topologies are inscribed is that of 
performative illocution that relies upon the mimesis of the general social 
techniques of labour. At the same time what potentially produces a 
productive rather than a reductive mimesis of existing relations is the 
principle of translation through the extenuated use of forms. These uses 
challenge the legalistic determination of information. This is why I have 
taken the informational readymade as a model. Its efficacy is based upon 
its capacities to link different levels of alienated and non-alienated reality 
through formal migration and metamorphosis. To recall, one of 
Bourriaud’s definitions of form is precisely the fissure that occurs at the 
meeting of these different levels. 
 
What I have established in this chapter is that the spatio-temporal territory 
of electronic communication does not only provide a site for re-
narrativising relations in their particularity, that is, within a principle of 
re-ordering. What post-relational and radicant practices seem to permit is 
a challenge to the performative and legalistic norms of informational 
production. Thus, the heterological approaches of Archive Fever and the 
notion of originary performance can be used to explore the precarious 
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ontology of information as an impoverished form that is exclusively 
reliant upon modes of subjectivisation for its materiality. The totalising 
movement of relations within the performative field of information allows 
for the use of informational readymades as forms of delay and 
interruption that ground themselves in the subjectively ‘rational’ forms of 
illocution. They also tap into the anarchivistic and hysteric drives 
concealed within this. Thus performative mimesis, in the form of the 
readymade, becomes an immanent critique of the logic and value forms of 
informationalism. In its use of the promissory forms of relating we might 
find the mechanism by which aleatory materialist constructions might 
‘take hold’ and the process by which they become forms of knowledge.  
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Chapter 3:  The limits to art as a form of sociability within the political 
aesthetics of Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou 
The (Im)possibility of the appearance of the singular 
 
WHATEVER IS the figure of pure singularity. Whatever singularity has no 
identity, it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply 
indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its relation to an idea, that is, 
to the totality of its possibilities. Through this relation, as Kant said, singularity 
borders all possibility and thus receives its omnimoda determinatio not from its 
participation in a determinate concept or some actual property (being red, Italian, 
Communist), but only by means of this bordering. It belongs to a whole, but 
without this belonging’s being able to be represented by a real condition: 
Belonging, being-such, is here only the relation to an empty and indeterminate 
totality. 
 
In Kantian terms this means that what is in question in this bordering is not a 
limit (Schranke) that knows no exteriority, but a threshold (Grenze), that is, a 
point of contact with an external space that must remain empty.  
 
Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community248 
 
Giorgio Agamben's 'community to come' was formulated as long ago as the early 
1990s. It has since passed from the status of allegorical preservation of the very 
idea of alternative, an exercise in recalcitrant will to puncture capital’s confident 
and triumphant moment of global ascendancy, to something that, if not quite 
approaching practical politics, then certainly speaks to an imaginaire that has 
become conceivable again. It is not just that narratives of retreat gave way to 
those of excess; rather, the very notion of excess is being transformed from an 
allegorical expression of utopian desire to one that is increasingly understood as 
construction of, and through, lived reality. 
  
 Gail Day‘The Fear of Heteronomy’ 249  
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Introduction 
 
This chapter challenges the thinking of relation that has prevailed within 
recent analysis of relational aesthetics and political aesthetics. It seeks 
pinpoint what is problematic in this mode of thinking, which posit 
singular relation as essentially non-relational and thus denies it a specific 
ontology or any productive mode of representation. To suppose that 
singular relation has no ontology or means of representation is to say no 
more than this: the singular cannot appear or it lacks a time and place for 
its appearance. 
 
My premise for this chapter is that the emergence of relational aesthetics 
expresses a desire for the appearance of singular constructions of relation, 
those not pre-determined by thought or thought’s destination. This is the 
ostensibly aporetic demand that singular relations appear within our very 
midst. Agamben’s expression of a ‘utopian desire’ for a materialism of 
the singular has a long genealogy within art philosophy and politics. This 
genealogy is part of an undercurrent of the re-thinking of relation that will 
form the subject of my final chapter. For present purposes, what Day’s 
reading points towards is the emergence of something different: that is, a 
symptomatic understanding of Agamben’s desire in which, on my 
reading, a principle of social construction and a method for its realisation 
is taking hold. This is not a recalcitrant slip into idealism. On the 
contrary, Agamben’s account of the singular eludes the concept or any 
teleology that might make it so. Rather, in the reception of Agamben the 
shift from an allegorical reading to that of the expression of an 
inhabitable, constructed reality poses a more interesting question: if 
Agamben’s position seems far-fetched then the true object of scrutiny 
ought to be the binary classicism of relational thought, that of the singular 
and the particular, concept and object, that produces this idealism as an 
effect. Against concept and object, Agamben ascribes the painstaking 
construction of a material forms of singularity to quodlibet: a form of 
construction that has fallen out of general linguistic usage meaning ‘to get 
on with’, without a sense of destination or origin. It falls outside the 
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notion of ‘to do’ or ‘to make’ that generally discloses a specific 
intentionality.  That is to say, one should critically examine the forms of 
thought and the entrenched ontologies of relation that render the 
appearance of the singular relation idealistic, either as unthinkable or as 
held captive within the suspensive category of the (im)possible. This 
critical examination is based upon my understanding of ontology as 
something ‘predicated’ and therefore subject to change.  
 
In this chapter I will focus in particular upon the notion of ‘community’ 
as cognate with the current relational mode of representation and praxis. 
In particular, I will consider the ways in which Alain Badiou and Jacques 
Rancière’s thinking of the separation of singularity, its non-relation, have 
shaped our thinking about relational art. I will argue that a reductive 
reading of Rancière as the darling of post-relational practice and of 
Badiou as the exemplary anti-relational theorist is to ignore their common 
anti-relational instincts: instincts that are moreover a product of a shared 
classical ontological understanding of relation. My argument is that they 
may appear to be oppositional figures but this apparent opposition is the 
result of the refraction of their classicism through their differing political 
standpoints (Badiou the Maoist and Rancière the anarchist.) These are 
strategies each has adopted towards the crippling and hypostatic ontology 
of relation they inherit. At the same time I aim to salvage certain aspects 
of their thought, ideas that are currently petrified and articulated within a 
‘suspensive’ or (im)possible thinking of relation for my fourth chapter on 
relational ontology and forms of representation.  
 
Much of this chapter is concerned with an analysis of recent writing and 
thinking around the notion of community as indicative of the desire for 
the appearance of singular ‘communities of sense’. I propose that in its 
exploration of new approaches to the thinking of relation and its spatio-
temporal matrices, this writing advances us towards an articulation of 
post-relational art. Post-relational art might then be provisionally defined 
as a mode of thinking of relation that moves beyond the classical binarism 
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of relational ontology towards a material ontology adequate to the 
singular construction. 
 
What I hope to demonstrate is that post-relationality is both an emerging 
form of aesthetics but at the same time, this thinking emerges from 
accounts of communitarian relational praxis. It is praxis that is pushing 
binary, non-relational thinking to a point of reductio ad absurdum. In 
other words, post-relationality has emerged through a dialectical 
exchange in which the praxis of relational art has interrogated the 
premises upon which existing forms of relational analysis have subsisted 
and proved inadequate to the appearance of singular relational 
constructions. 
 
I have said that I regard both Badiou and Rancière as anti-relational 
thinkers, that is, as thinkers of non-relation, and moreover that neither 
theorist is adequate to a faithful reading of relational and post-relational 
aesthetics. This might appear axiomatic to a reader of Badiou but baffling 
to a reader of Rancière. Badiou’s anti-relationality is self-evident. His 
neo-Platonist aesthetics refuse any passage of ‘truth’ or the idea through 
the sensible because his theory of the event, the event of new relation, 
will not sanction it. Badiou’s thought places the event of new relation 
within a destructive/subtractive coupling that owes more to thought than 
to action. In his ‘inaesthetics’, he consigns political art to romanticism or 
didacticism and refuses, in his theoretical writings, any dialectical 
relationship between art and politics. He rejects hybrid forms of art and 
the interdisciplinary methodologies of contemporary art. And yet, in spite 
of this, his polemics flirt with the notion of a political art. Ultimately, 
Badiou brackets out art from politics (an extreme form of artistic 
autonomy) but lays claim and fidelity to art’s potential radicalism as an 
activity performed by subjects he cannot identify or imagine, who 
produce artworks he cannot identify or imagine.  
 
Badiou’s aesthetics are also anathema to the analysis of relational 
aesthetics because they reject the hybrid and interdisciplinary nature of 
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current artistic practice and thereby underdermine relational art’s 
legitimacy. Badiou sees bond or ‘lien’ as the place of relation because for 
him appearances are predicated upon the operations of the logic of a 
world. For this reason, what appears is for Badiou always particular. Any 
rare and fleeting appearance of the singular by way of exception and 
through the eruption of an event within a particular situation entails its 
simultaneous disappearance. The effect of the singular is only registered 
in an implicative way through its effects. These are enacted by subjects to 
the truth of an event through acts of subjectivisation and fidelity. It is thus 
only within the particular that the truth of an event may establish itself 
within what appears. Given the level of abstraction within Badiou’s 
thought it is hardly surprising that it has found little foothold in post 
relational discourse, in spite of Badiou’s significant influence in the 
discourse of political aesthetics. Badiou claims that his system of thought 
can be applied to any truth procedure, including art. Yet his refusal to 
enter the discourse of relational aesthetics seems to leave it marginalised. 
 
What is most crippling in Badiou’s thought to the development of post-
relational thought is, however, his wholesale rejection of the notion of 
community. On the latter he is emphatic, for example he says that: ‘Every 
invocation “of custom, of community, works directly against truths”’ 250 
and ‘philosophy and communal specificity are mutually exclusive: “ 
Every particularity is a conformation, a conformism,” whereas every truth 
is a nonconforming’. 251  For Badiou the only community consistent with 
truth would be a ‘communism of singularities,’ a community of ‘extreme 
particularity.’252 Hallward states that:  
 
What may distinguish Badiou’s critique of the communal is the rigor with 
which he carries it through to its admittedly unfashionable conclusion: ‘The 
whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other must be purely 
                                                        
250 Hallward, A Subject to Truth, p. 26. 
251 Hallward, A Subject to Truth, p. 26 
252 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. by Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 82-83. 
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and simply abandoned. For the real question – and it is an extraordinarily 
difficult one – is much more that of recognizing the Same.’253  
 
And yet, what is maddening about Badiou’s thought is that within his 
polemical writing and political activities his advocacy of cellular models 
of political organisation would appear to offer important formal strategies 
of organisation that conform to the type of micro-communities he rejects 
elsewhere in his writing. It appears at times that Badiou lives a double 
intellectual life and that he uses his polemics as an opportunity to escape 
the ontological straight-jacket imposed by his own system. 
 
Rancière accepts the heteronomous promiscuity of the modern artwork 
within his rubric of redistribution and dissensus. In fact it is his 
dissolution of the categories of the political and artistic within a 
generalised relational field of ‘sense’ that I believe makes him an 
attractive theorist to relational artists. And yet, I maintain that he is, like 
Badiou, a thinker of non-relation. Given that recent writing and relational 
art are clearly influenced by Rancière’s thought this requires some 
justification. 
 
My argument will be that Rancière is a relational anarchist. This means 
that his thinking of relation locates itself within a realm of pure 
heteronomy, lacking any time, or place of appearance of the singular 
community. Rancière’s refusal to locate his dissensual community of 
sense within the social conditions and institutions that condition and 
motivate artistic production produce a measure of abstraction equal to 
that of Badiou’s thought. Rancière proposes his spaces of dissensus not 
as spaces as such but as partitions of sense in which it is impossible for 
any dialectical process to take place. He proposes then: anodine, 
aestheticized spaces of partition in which there are no causes to be fought 
for nor any truly social forms of art to be made. There is nothing new in 
arguing that Rancière’s singular communities of sense lack any 
ontological determinacy, a position I endorse, but what I aim to do here is                                                         
253 Hallward, A Subject to Truth, p. 26 
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to advance this argument through an examination of the precepts of his 
thought. My argument is that Rancière is behoven to a non-relational 
analysis of relational and communitarian art because he has failed to 
recognise certain crucial characteristics of relational and post-relational 
thinking outlined by Bourriaud: in particular, Rancière’s thinking of 
relation lacks Bourriaud’s developed theory of social mimesis. 
Bourriaud’s post-relational notion of mimesis is the key to opening the 
door to the methods of translation and topology that provide relational art 
with its existential legitimacy as a materialist and critical realist 
aesthetics. 
 
If mimesis is thought in Rancière’s terms as a merely parodic activity or 
the political vehicle for the direct representation of social conditions – 
conditions that implore some response or critical intervention – then it is 
easy to see why he would reject mimetic practice as ‘particular’ tout 
court. Equally, without a developed thinking of mimesis, the ethical turn 
in art and the demand of political efficacy identified by Rancière can 
appear as no more than literal and illustrative gestures of art’s 
‘resistance’, demanding again their wholesale rejection. The political and 
ethical efficacy of art, which I suggest are enduring and necessary to 
political aesthetics are thus rejected in order to save them from their 
instrumentalisation within consensus politics. The high cost that is paid 
by Rancière’s aesthetics of separation is art’s irrelevance. 
 
What is a Community of Sense? 
 
How does the notion of a ‘community of sense’ question or perhaps 
affirm the entrenched ontological thinking of relation within the singular 
and the particular? 
 
The prevailing trend within ‘socially engaged’ artistic practice is towards 
the creation of experimental communities based upon theoretical models 
developed principally by Jean-Luc Nancy, Georgio Agamben and Jacques 
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Rancière. My understanding of their positions draws upon a collection of 
writing on post-relational art: Communities of Sense. The notion of sensus 
communis based in part upon Rancière’s redistributive aesthetics, has 
taken hold I think because it is less abstract than Badiou’s thought. For 
Badiou, Rancière’s communitarian ‘apolitics’ entail merely ‘the 
reactivation of sediments.’ What then, for Rancière, is a community of 
sense?  
 
He describes it as follows: 
 
I do not take the phrase ‘community of sense’ to mean a collectivity shaped by 
some common feeling. I understand it as a frame of visibility and intelligibility 
that puts things or practices together under the same meaning, which shapes 
thereby a certain sense of community. A community of sense is a certain cutting 
out of space and time that binds together practices, forms of visibility, and 
patterns of intelligibility. I call this cutting out and this linkage a production of 
the sensible.254  
 
For Rancière the community of sense encompasses both art and politics, 
in fact, he regards them as contingent descriptions of an overall 
distribution of the sensible. He says that art and politics do not constitute 
‘two permanent realities’ requiring discussion of their interconnection. 
They exist contingently. It follows from this that, ‘a relation between art 
and politics is a relation between two partitions of the sensible.’255 
 
Unlike Badiou, Rancière provides a model of artistic practice which 
embraces the formal hybridity characteristic of much of the modern 
period, but, in particular the opening period of relational practice, and its 
cognates: networking, participation, interaction, site-specificity. 
Rancière’s articulation of the autonomy of art is also marked by a 
                                                        
254 Jacques Rancière ‘Contemporary Art and the Politics of Aesthetics’ in Communities 
of Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics ed. by B Hinderliter and others (Durham; 
London: Duke University Press, 2009), p 31. 
255 Rancière, ‘Contemporary Art and the Politics of Aesthetics’, p. 32. 
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rejection of any formalism that might reconstitute the binary opposition of 
autonomy and heteronomy. He argues that: 
 
The political act of art is to save the heterogenous sensible that is the heart of 
the autonomy of art and its power of emancipation. The community of sense at 
work in the politics of aesthetics is a community based on both the connection 
and disconnection of sense and sense. Its separateness ‘makes sense’ to the 
extent that it is not the refuge of pure form. Instead, it stages the very 
relationship of separateness and inseparateness.256 
 
To a certain extent it is the impurity of the relational form, its post-
formalism, which makes Rancière’s notion of separation a productive 
match for the evaluation of relational artworks. Although he is often 
critical of relational art, particularly in its earliest ‘consensual’ 
manifestations, Rancière’s dissensual redistribution of sensual relations 
appears to resonate with Bourriaud’s articulation of postproductive 
practice at some level. However, the question remains whether the 
principle of ‘sensible partition’ is not in itself sufficient to found any sort 
of relational aesthetics.  
 
Aesthetic Separation And Aesthetic Community: Dissensus 
 
For Rancière the aesthetic community is founded upon the paradox of its 
connection and disconnection from the heteronomous realm, and this is 
the basic constitution of the dissensual figure’.257 These realms of 
dissensus stage conflicts between two sensory worlds, and the dissensual 
figure may become manifest in the artwork. 258 Rancière is critical of 
what he terms anti-aesthetics, and sees a role for philosophy in the 
framing of aesthetic discourse, that is, describing the parameters of the 
redistributions of ‘sense and sense’. In this he differs from Badiou, who 
seeks to set out philosophically the general conditions for the emergence 
of truths within the separate and distinct realms of art, politics, science                                                         
256 Rancière, ‘Contemporary Art and the Politics of Aesthetics’, p. 39. 
257 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2009), p. 58. 
258 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 58. 
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and love, without seeking an active role for philosophy in the 
hermeneutics or discourses that they engender. Rancière casts aesthetics 
within the framing of the appearance of the dissensual figure as fiction, or 
the truth of non-truth. This is the basis of his criticality and offers a 
formulation of the ‘real’. Within his dissensual model Rancière proposes 
an overlaying of that which is conjoined in that which is disjoined 
sensorily. This paradox produces a tension between present and future, in 
which the artwork is representative of ‘the people to come’ and is 
therefore a monument to its expectation and to its absence.259  
 
This articulation of the ‘community to come’ within the future anterior 
tense is symptomatic of the separation of the singular from its appearance. 
It posits that some form un-preconfigurable break or event will provide 
the necessary dynamic for the coming of the future. This form of thought 
is therefore non-relational and this form can be observed also in the work 
of Badiou and Derrida. Whilst for Rancière it is the lack of measure 
characteristic of the aesthetic regime of art, the incommensurability of 
appearance and meaning that potentially provides this disjuncture; for 
Badiou this break entails the emergence of the immeasurable excess of a 
situation over itself. For Derrida articulates it as the undeconstructibility 
of the promise or the excess of testimony over fact. In other words these 
thinkers share an instantiation of the singular as (im)possible. 
 
For Rancière the key to this aesthetic disconnection or break lies in 
accepting an end to the connection between poiesis and aisthesis which 
determined the representative regime of art within a binarism of origin 
and destination. He views the rupture of this pairing as constitutive of 
art’s aesthetic regime. Rancière says that we are nevertheless still prone to 
believing in the cause and effect relation of the representative regime of 
art. Rather than accept this unity of the measure of cause and effect 
Rancière proposes a third term, ‘that escapes the dilemma of 
                                                        
259 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 59. 
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representational mediation and ethical immediacy.’260 This third term is 
‘aesthetic efficacy itself. ‘“Aesthetic efficacy” means a paradoxical kind 
of efficacy that is produced by the very rupturing of any determinate link 
between cause and effect.’261 Rancière bases his notion of ‘aesthetic 
efficacy’ upon Kant’s concept of beauty. It is the indeterminacy of 
beauty, quite apart from any concept that grants its paradoxical 
efficacy.262 
 
According to Rancière, by dispensing with the concept, Kant’s 
formulation of beauty entails the loss of any determined relationship 
between poiesis and aisthesis.263 As a result of this separation from the 
concept, art is granted a ‘free play’ that sanctions the emergence of ‘free 
appearance’. 264 Rancière asserts that this free play entails the negotiation 
between art and anti-art. Aesthetic separation from the concept is, for him, 
symptomatic of the dissolution of the boundary between art and everyday 
life.265 
 
In spite of this, relational aesthetics for Rancière, in its literal presentation 
of new forms of community, is an attempt to overcome the cancellation of 
the mediation of being apart and the being together of a new 
community.266 Rancière’s target here is the consensual model of relational 
aesthetics, as an art of consensus based upon some reinscription or 
reparation of the social bond, which writers like Claire Bishop have 
sought to distance from its antagonistic counterpart. This literalism, as I 
have argued in relation to Bourriaud’s approach to the public realm, can 
give relational aesthetics the complexion of liberal dogmatics; as the 
presentation, or rather demonstration, of art’s political efficacy. Rancière 
reads this stage of relational practice as a parody of art’s political 
efficacy. However, one might counter Rancière’s parodic reading with the                                                         
260 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 61. 
261 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 63. 
262 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 64. 
263 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 64. 
264 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 64. 
265 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 69. 
266 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 69. 
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view that relational artworks display a subtle irony, in the sense that they 
present, theatrically, the promise of the same.267 The theory of relational 
mimesis I set out in chapter one would also tend to question Rancière’s 
assumptions about the literalism of political representation within art. It is 
time, then, to turn to the question of post-relationality and its 
representation of singular community in order to establish a more 
complex rubric for relational political aesthetics. 
 
Experimental communities of sense 
 
A selection of texts by Carlos Basualdo and Reinaldo Laddaga, Rachel 
Haidu and Emily Apter that appear in the anthology Communities of 
Sense is a good starting point for the analysis of post-relationality.  They 
are important texts that flesh out relational practice and begin to identify 
its post-relational form.268 They offer some insight into how we might 
analyse an experimental community as an artwork. I would describe these 
texts as significant movements towards the post-relational, on the basis of 
their advocacy of a more radical site-specificity. Though critical of 
Relational Aesthetics, these essays are similar in outlook to Bourriaud’s 
later writings in that they advocate a site-specificity that enters into 
broader spatio-temporal relational matrices that are considerably more 
diffuse and complex than those evidenced in early relational practice. 
 
Basualdo and Laddaga make a distinction between different phases of 
development within relational aesthetics, concurring with Rancière’s 
observations that the site-specific and monumental have displaced 
gallery-based works. They argue, for instance, that Thomas Hirschhorn’s 
work: 
 
differs from those earlier projects that Nicolas Bourriaud addressed in his brief 
book on relational aesthetics. The corpus of relational aesthetics, as it was                                                         
267 One can find a forerunner here in the aesthetics of failure and the humour evident in 
the happenings of Allan Kaprow. 
268 Communities of Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics ed. by B. Hinderliter and 
others (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2009) 
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initially presented in Bourriaud’s book, consisted mostly of punctual 
interventions in relatively homogenous and stable regions of social life. 269 
 
The post-relational stance is then critical of the earlier micro-actions on 
the basis that relational works inflected situations without breaking them. 
Basualdo and Laddaga advocate a model of relational aesthetics based 
upon what they term ‘boundary organizations’, which address 
globalization from below and in this respect they owe some allegiance to 
Hardt and Negri’s theory of the multitude. They describe these 
organizations as temporary spaces for the creation of unlikely 
communicative relations between worlds: places of experimentation and 
research. 270 Against a background of globalization and 
informationalisation this type of post-relational aesthetics resists the 
dissolution of social forms. They present their working methodology as 
follows: 
 
a problem is seen both as an obstacle to be overcome and as the occasion for an 
interrogation of social relations and the subsequent elaboration of alternative 
forms of sociality. During this process, the artist and the newly formed 
community create archives that can be circulated outside the site of their 
original production, whose function is to memorize and publicize the model.271 
 
Rachel Haidu considers practice as an exploration of the precarious 
community. She is critical of Claire Bishop, for example, for adopting an 
aesthetics that expressly absorbs political and social ambitions. She says 
that in Bishop’s model: ‘The aesthetic inherently contains the promise of 
ameliorative social change rather than actively struggling with the 
contradiction such desires and promises impose on the work of art.’272 
Thus we are unable to move away from a model of political efficacy                                                         
269 C. Basualdo and R. Laddaga, ‘Experimental Communities’, in Hinderliter, B. and 
others, Communities of Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics (Durham; London: 
Duke University Press, 2009), pp. 197-214, (p. 204). 
270 Basualdo and Laddaga, ‘Experimental Communities’, Communities of Sense, p. 199. 
271 Basualdo and Laddaga, ‘Experimental Communities’, Communities of Sense, p. 199. 
272 R. Haidu,‘Précarité, Autorité, Autonomie’, in Hinderliter, B. and others, Communities 
of Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics (Durham; London: Duke University 
Press, 2009) pp.215-237, (p. 233). 
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towards the aesthetics of political praxis. Bishop of course uses Rancière 
as a point of reference in her critique of relational aesthetics but she is an 
impatient critic of utility rather than materiality. 
 
Haidu’s articulation of relational art embraces a model of artistic 
autonomy similar to that expressed by Rancière. What is significant in 
Haidu’s writing is the presence of a more nuanced notion of site 
specificity, which pays greater attention to the local topology and 
relations pertaining to the site. Too often, site-specificity is presented on 
the basis of its bare egalitarian credentials of simply being a place 
‘outside of the gallery or institution’. She endorses the following 
quotation from Miwon Kwon; ‘Today’s site-oriented practices inherit the 
task of demarcating the relational specificity that can hold in dialectical 
tension the distant poles of spatial experience.’273 
 
Within the post-relational, some of the lessons of institutional critique 
have been assimilated, along with some of Kwon’s reflections upon the 
shortcomings of nomadic site-specificity in One Place after Another.274 
Site-specificity becomes in post-relational terms, ‘site singularity’, that is 
it simultaneously aims to produce and inhabit a site of enduring 
community along the lines advocated by Grant Kester. Kester’s dialogical 
aesthetics must be credited within this debate as the basis of a thinking of 
relation that is both materialist and realist. His work has not been 
scrutinised to the same extent as Bourriaud’s and I put this down simply 
to the fact that North American relational art does not carry the same 
weight of history, nor the expectations and disappointments (Marxist 
disappointment) that are central to the propositions of new forms of 
artistic sociability in Europe. The importance of topology within Kester’s 
dialogical aesthetics is the recognition that artistic practice is capable of 
‘switching on’ a given community, not as an act of memorialisation nor as 
                                                        
273 Haidu, Communities of Sense, p. 227, citing Miwon Kwon, One Place After Another: 
Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), p.166. 
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a monument, but as a material instantiation of the liminal expression of 
local and global logics.  
 
Emily Apter’s analysis of experimental communities is unusual in that it 
directly references Badiou’s political polemics as a tool for artistic praxis. 
She says, reflecting upon the post-1968 development of socially engaged 
art that: ‘It was within a culture of group activism – collective bargaining, 
discussion groups, group sex, communal property – that the conceptual 
category of the group subject took hold as a kind of Venn diagram of 
militant subjectivity.’275 Apter’s ‘Thinking Red, Ethical Militancy And 
the Group Subject’ reflects her interest in Badiou’s work from the 
perspective of the creation of group subjectivity, and a directly productive 
connection of this with the history of the avant-garde. She draws upon 
Badiou’s commitment to a ‘politics without party’ and the de-
Thermidorizing of political time she identifies with Metapolitics, and 
Badiou’s dispensation with conventional measures of periodicity in The 
Century. Strictly speaking The Century re-Thermidorizes politics and art 
on the basis that it is an historical account of a reactionary political epoch. 
This interpretation is interesting however because there is a strong 
identification with de-Thermidorized politics within post-relational 
aesthetics, as a principle that invites social collage and practices of re-
inscription.  
 
Notwithstanding the fundamental difficulty in applying Badiou’s work to 
the analysis of relational practice, Apter recognises the importance of 
political militancy in Badiou’s politics and particularly the similarities in 
organisational form between L’Organization Politique and the techniques 
of the contemporary post-relational ‘avant-garde’. In fact, whilst I have 
argued that Badiou has been relatively marginal in his influence upon 
contemporary practice, what Apter has seized upon, is that only in 
Badiou’s accounts of cellular political micro-organisations in The                                                         
275 E. Apter, ‘Thinking Red: Ethical Militance and the Group Subject’ in Communities of 
Sense: Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics ed. by B Hinderliter and others (Durham; 
London: Duke University Press, 2009), p. 301. 
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Century, and Metapolitics do we encounter any real glimpse of the 
political form and organisational topology adequate to the future of 
relational-artistic praxis. 
 
Why do experimental communities need to be artworks? 
 
The purported centrality of artistic intervention to the production of 
communities of sense begs the question, why do these communities 
necessarily need to be presented as artworks? The artist Jay Koh, who 
plays a pivotal role in the argument of Grant Kester’s Dialogical 
Aesthetics, an argument for a concrete form of dialogical-situational art (a 
wholesale redefinition of the institution of art), explained to me that he is 
indifferent as to whether his works are received as political or artistic.  
The general migration of politics into art is mirrored by a concomitant 
aesthetics of the political. Therefore art becomes a tool of demarcation, 
and one that requires a specific mode of representation, or imageness that 
reflects its status as a placeholder. Typical of the views of the contributors 
to Communities of Sense, is Jean-Luc Nancy’s claim that political 
transformation is, ‘a question of the art of politics – and perhaps simply of 
art, since the only means civility has at its disposal are statements, signs 
and roles.’ 276 
 
And again echoing Rancière: ‘Art borrows or contests the authority to 
determine where, or in what, politics begins and ends, but only in so far as 
it also redefines the limits, quite simply, of art ‘itself’.277 Again we could 
say that relational artworks have engendered and have been engendered 
by a politics of aesthetics on the basis that relations perform or enact the 
function of redistributing sense as such. So for example, the editors of 
Communities of Sense state in their introductory chapter that: 
 
Relationality is a function of the distribution and organization of sense, what 
Nancy calls ‘spacing’. This approach to the issue of collectivity posits it as                                                         
276 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, citing J L Nancy, Communities of Sense, p. 25. 
277 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 19. 
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internally multiple and dynamic. Being is constituted only in relation to others: 
one’s being is a function of the way in which sense is distributed, or rather, 
spaced. This spacing not only sets the condition of relationality among beings 
but also of each singular being’s relation to itself.278  
 
Whilst I would agree with the importance of this sense of relation as 
being-toward-another and with the editors’ assertion that ‘community 
becomes an enactment of a dislocation’, I would add that artistic-
relational redistributions of sense are linked to political redistributions 
because they are performatively feasible as dislocations through what is 
common to the forms of artistic and non-artistic labour. In other words it 
is the recombination and use of the social forms of relation linked to the 
topological displacement of normative relations through the enactment of 
artistic labour that might specifically delineate these experimental spaces. 
Without explicit recognition of this we risk the creation of communities 
of sense that are a ‘private paradise for amateurs and aesthetes’.279 
 
Rancière may be right to deride the theatricality of some relational art, but 
he lacks any material remedial suggestion. I think this is because his 
model of mimesis as ‘duplicaton’ is unfairly reductive. Mimetic artistic 
labour links aesthetic theory to practice, and art to anti-art, as a 
determinate negation of the subjective relations produced by the 
commodity form. 
 
The problem of the self and relation within relational works 
 
In Communities of Sense there is an acknowledgement that a certain 
notion of the relationship between self and community may produce 
limitations upon art as a sociable form. This is because there is yet 
another binary axis in the thinking of community based upon 
individuality and totality.280 There is in other words a problematic 
presupposition of community as a collectivized self as an a priori totality.                                                         
278 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 14. 
279 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator (London: Verso, 2009), p. 69. 
280 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 14. 
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On this basis the question of community becomes problematic as ‘self 
mimetically linked to the individual self in the form of a unified body 
politic.’281 This approach runs contrary to Bourriaud’s thinking of 
conjuncture and methodology of aleatory materialism. The editors of 
Communities of Sense remark that Nancy’s notion of relation introduces 
an additional movement, towards the thought of being-in-common, 
against ‘the absolutist logic of metaphysics [that] casts itself into relation 
with its other, with that which undoes absoluteness, precisely because as 
absolutes, both individuality and totality exclude the possibility of their 
mediation.’282 
 
Community then is defined for the writers on the basis of Nancy’s 
argument as ‘that which dissolves what Nancy calls “the autarky of 
absolute imminence, the irrational fixity of absolutes”’. 283 This reading 
of Nancy suggests that a ‘community could be rethought, in so far as it 
can be experienced as a single phenomenon, as a form of relation rather 
than as a self or a being’.284 [my emphasis] 
 
The authors suggest that Nancy has ‘redefined community as the being in 
common of sociality’ and against the notion of groups as the sum of 
individually identitarian subjects: ‘community is enacted through 
contingent modalities of spacing’.285 I would agree with this on the basis 
that it identifies important aspects of the thinking of post-relation that 
dissolves traditional categories that determine the exclusion of aformal 
relation. However, as I will argue in relation to Rancière’s work, this 
spacing must be enacted within a particular topology. 
 
What is also important to retain from this approach is of course the search 
for modes of subjectivization through artistic works, which are not based                                                         
281 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 14. 
282 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 14. 
283 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 14, citing J.L Nancy, 
The Inoperative Community, trans. by P. Connor (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1990), p.4. 
284 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 14,  
285 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, p. 15. 
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upon a reductive Cartesian subject. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that we can dispense with the individual subject: rather, we should 
recognize the centrality of the subject as constituted by the ontological 
impasse as such. Indeed much of the rhetoric of Communities of Sense as 
the ‘staging of a gap’ of non-relation is consistent with such an approach; 
a being-in-common of relation must be staged within its site of non-
relation, so within a dialectical figuring. This is because this produces a 
place of critical intervention or critical realism. 
 
If one posits the subject in this way then, to follow Žižek’s reasoning, it is 
not that we need to embrace anti-Cartesianism, but rather to identify the 
radicality of its absent core.286 That is we embrace the anti-philosophical 
foundation of identity rather than disclaim the subject at the risk of the 
loss of any potential social agency.  
 
Communities of Sense and the Question of the Real 
 
According to Beth Hinderliter’s teleology of artistic practice, artistic 
models of institutional critique of the 1970s were based upon a Marxian 
return of the real, becoming in the 1980s models of communicative action 
that served to save the real of political art. However, in the contemporary 
information age, 
 
opacity is often not the outcome of a gap between political appearances and 
social realities, but the results of the ceaseless proliferation of information. It is 
the persistent emphasis on information and the ‘factity’ of knowledge that leads 
to a particular economy of power and visibility in which, as Étienne Balibar 
argues, the dominant powers do not practice ‘secrecy’ any longer…287 
 
This is a familiar argument, to the extent that the hypostasis of 
information leaves nothing of the ‘real’ to uncover or to appear. In the 
light of this Hinderliter claims that if we identify politics with aesthetics,                                                         
286 This is Žižek’s argument in The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political 
Ontology (London: Verso, 2009) 
287 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, pp. 10-11. 
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then the problem is not how to uncover appearances, but to create a 
‘sphere’ in which equality might be enacted. This space of disagreement 
is a space in which forms of subjectivization might appear through the 
redistribution of appearances. 288 For Hinderliter, the task facing 
contemporary artistic practice is the creation of what Étienne Balibar calls 
‘places of fiction’, which she describes in terms of ‘the production of the 
real on the basis of experience itself’. 289  
 
This is where Nancy’s rhetoric of spacing appears to have taken hold. The 
problem is not to uncover the real but to create a space for the ‘enactment 
of equality’. Equality for those, ‘in between names, groups, and classes’. 
The issue, then, is not to re-contextualise the visible, but to reconfigure 
the visible and its spectacular economies through mimetic performance 
and its documentation. This is to use the image and other representational 
forms in order to mediate the social relations under which they are 
constituted. Basically we can identify within this thinking of community a 
strategy of recombinancy in which spacings, dislocations and 
redistributions of the particular allow the singular relation its space of 
appearance as a first movement within the construction of community. 
 
Rancière and the Democratisation of Appearances 
 
It is Rancière rather than Badiou who has become the principle theorist of 
choice for those engaged with relational and post-relational art practices. 
We have seen this in Claire Bishop’s endorsement of Rancière as the 
basis of her ‘antagonistic’ relational aesthetics and also the prominence he 
is given, along with Nancy, in Communities of Sense.  There is no doubt 
that Rancière has been instrumental in the resurgence of political 
aesthetics in recent times, and his re-investment in appearance as a 
‘mechanism’ for producing difference along with the operations of the 
image are essential to the conception of the artistic document I will be 
putting forward in my final chapter.                                                         
288 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, pp. 10-11. 
289 Hinderliter and others, ‘Introduction’, Communities of Sense, pp. 10-11. 
 181 
 
What I will consider here, however, is why Rancière is the contemporary 
thinker of relationalty par excellence. I will argue that his prominence is 
based upon his self-styled ‘relational anarchism’. His theories have been 
welcomed and easily morphed into artistic praxis. This is because 
Rancière conflates art with politics in a convivial fashion. Yet Rancière’s 
valorisation of community begs the question: popularity relies upon his 
valorisation of ‘community’ – what kind of community are we speaking 
of and when and where does it happen? 
 
I will begin with Rancière’s approach to the question of the singular and 
the particular in order to demonstrate the source of his ‘relational 
anarchism’. We have seen that the question of the singular and particular 
forms the context for Rancière’s work, as it does for Badiou and many 
others. Whereas the singular within Badiou’s Platonism has been 
criticised for its submission to the realm of the pure idea, the appeal of 
Rancière, on the other hand, is that he formulates the appearance of the 
singular; he purports to give it a sensible form as a place of dissensual 
exception within the manifold of consensus. Rancière defines consensus 
as ‘an agreement between sense and sense’. This agreement operates, 
 
between a mode of sensory presentation and a regime of meaning. Consensus, 
as a mode of government, says: it is perfectly fine for people to have different 
interests, values and aspirations, nevertheless there is one unique reality to 
which everything must be related, a reality that is experienceable as a sense 
datum and which has only one possible signification. 290 
 
In other words, if we consider consensus as the realm of particularity, or 
‘sovereign relation’, the singular appears through the dissensual dispositif 
as a point of disagreement between sense and sense. For Rancière, 
dissensus occurs as a ‘performative contradiction between sense and 
sense’. Dissensus marks an emergent instance of a truly democratic space 
or ‘community’, ‘brought about’ by the ‘redistribution of the sensible’.                                                         
290 J. Rancière, Dissensus, p. 144. 
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Again the appeal to relational artists is that ostensibly this calls for agents 
to bring this about. It is this promise of an embodied dissensual space – of 
a community of sense – which no doubt explains Rancière’s appeal to 
post-relational practitioners eager to build upon the tradition of site-
specific intervention. However, Rancière’s formulation of ‘sovereign 
singularity’ arguably comes at a price. One might ask: when and where 
does this politics happen and who are its agents? In terms redolent of 
Badiou’s description of the event he claims that the ruptures of dissensus 
cannot be calculated. They are liable to occur at any time in any place. 291 
 
Paula Tambaki’s assessment is that Rancière recognises the problems of 
consensus politics as a unidimensional politics. But he then withdraws 
tout court into the figure of dissensus on the basis that it is disagreement, 
which truly constitutes democracy, or the democratic spaces for its 
emergence. This presents a problem in ‘the arbitrariness of the litigious 
politics which Rancière defends’.292 She says that by setting politics 
against the police order he fails to account for how this might disrupt the 
latter.293 Thus once dissensus has been staged we return to the police 
order: it doesn’t ‘breed’ within the police order. Rancière therefore too 
radically equates politics and democracy. This leads to an impasse with 
the state and given the rarity of this politics, produces a hyperpessimism. 
We are unable to re-invigorate democratic politics using this model and if 
politics is rare, this cancels its dissensual nature.294 The problem as she 
sees it is that, dissensus pertains to ‘episodic’ politics, not to the socio-
symbolic. For her, the separation of politics and the police prevents the 
realisation of Rancière’s supplement. Dissensus institutes, but prevents, 
any facilitation of a litigious politics begging the question: ‘where does 
politics happen?’295 
 
                                                        
291 J. Rancière, Dissensus, p.143. 
292 Paula Tambakaki, ‘When Does Politics Happen?’, Parallax, 15.3, (2009), pp. 102-
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This problem of what I term the ‘atopology’ of Rancière’s thought has 
been criticised by Jodi Dean. She says that Rancière presents our 
democratic milieu as habitat not struggle. ‘Such lived democracy is a 
habitat rather than a struggle; it is the setting in which we find ourselves 
rather than a position requiring sacrifice and decision. As habitat, 
democracy is not itself political.’296 She adds that ‘Democracy is 
anticipated or lost but never present’; and that the torsion of Rancière’s 
politics is that ‘the people and the government are never present at the 
same time.’ She concludes that Rancière’s aesthetic regime of art is 
merely ‘the democratisation of appearance’.297 
 
It is Rancière’s reliance therefore upon a principles of dissensual partition 
based upon a conflation of politics and art as merely instances of the 
sensible that lays him open to this criticism. He advocates a form of social 
collage separated from the social and symbolic orders of the particular, 
that suggests a different order of non-relationality to that of Badiou.  He 
comes dangerously close, in fact, to the de- and re-territorialising logic of 
capital in its aesthetic informationalised form. On that basis Rancière is 
equally open to the charge of aesthetic anarchism.  
 
Rancière’s non-relationality begins with his de-ontologised notion of 
relation. In ‘Heteroreductives – Rancière’s Disagreement with 
Ontology’,298 Bram Ieven points out that for Rancière, the aesthetic 
regime of art, it’s being ‘without measure’ or any intentionality or any 
commensurability between poiesis and aesthesis, is a way out of ‘the 
impasse of particularity’. 299For Ieven, Rancière thereby opens a                                                         
296 Jodi Dean, ‘Politics Without Politics’, Parallax, 15.3, (2009), pp. 20-36 (p. 22). 
297 Dean, pp. 26-27. 
298 Bram Ieven, ‘Heteroreductives: Rancière’s Disagreement with Ontology’, Parallax, 
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299 To recall, for Rancière; ‘poiesis and aisthesis stand henceforth in immediate relation 
to each other. But they relate to one another through the very gap of their ground. 
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humanity to come. From Kant to Adorno, including Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche, the object of aesthetic discourse has only ever been to think through 
this discordant relation. What this discourse has thereby striven to articulate is not the 
fantasy of speculative minds, but the new and paradoxical regime for identifying what 
is recognizable as art. I have proposed to call this regime the aesthetic regime of art.’ 
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heterogenous space, that is, of heterogenous spatiality and temporality. 
This removes Rancière’s position from the space of ontology and places 
him within a relational field dictated by the aesthetic.300 Thus far we 
might make comparisons with Bourriaud’s position: however, in 
Bourriaud’s thought the heterogeneity of non-related singularities find 
their existential adequation principally through forms of social 
interaction, engagement and encounter. They acquire ontology because 
they are determined within a topology and inhabit the socius through the 
enactment of mimetic social forms. It is this formal linkage to the existing 
social, its forms of labour and institutions, which distinguishes him from 
Rancière. Thus Bourriaud articulates a topology of appearance whilst 
retaining a heterological outlook as the necessarily contingent foundation 
for concrete intervention. Ieven says that Rancière moves away from 
ontology because he equates ontology with realism, that is, a realism that 
he associates with the ‘police logic of order’.301 This, in turn, is because 
Rancière views realism exclusively as a methodology, that operates 
according to given ‘partitions of the sensible’. There is no ‘real’ world, 
simply configurations of what is given as ‘the real’. But this heterological 
position lacks any second movement that might nominate a space of 
appearance. Hinderliter describes his methodology as follows; 
 
According to Rancière, the problem in our age is not the ‘loss of the real’, but 
the loss of appearance as a mechanism for producing difference. This enables 
the political constitution of nonidentary subjects who disturb a specific division 
of the perceptible by linking together separate worlds and organizing spaces 
where new communities can be formed. 302 
 
This model of recombinancy becomes problematic, however, under de-
ontologised conditions. Ieven argues that the ontological indeterminacy of 
the aesthetic regime of art begs the question – ‘what enacts realism in the 
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absence of ontology?’303 To clarify, if politics and aesthetics are for 
Rancière indistinguishable within the partition of the sensible, or merely 
terms we apply to a given partition, what is lost within a politics of 
ontological indeterminacy, is any place for its emergence within or 
conditioning of the real in its socially constituted particularity. Gail Day 
summarises the problem as follows: ‘It is impossible to isolate art from 
politics; absolutely true, but dissensual practice, whether in art or politics, 
has to accede to determine points and decisions (and also to partisanship) 
if it is not to be drained of content.’304  
 
Instances of Identification and Separation in Rancière’s thought 
 
Rancière’s strategy for negotiating the singular and the particular retains a 
symptomatic dualism that is repeated throughout his politics of aesthetics. 
They appear within a double movement in the figures of absolute 
identification and absolute separation. Rancière collapses the separation 
of art and politics in order to enable his singular dispositif of dissensus. 
He then separates aesthetico-political singularity from any notion of the 
political efficacy or ethical immediacy of critical art, in order to isolate 
the singular from the injunctions of the consensus of the particular. I will 
argue that this double movement produces in fact the aestheticisation of 
politics: this is a wholesale dis-identification of art from politics. 
 
 The first movement, that of an identification of identification or collapse 
of the division between art and politics can be seen in Rancière’s theory 
of aesthetic autonomy. Rancière’s articulation of ‘artistic autonomy’ 
collapses the distinction between art and non-art in its emphasis upon the 
autonomy of experience, or the ‘free play of the senses’. He says that: ‘the 
artwork participates in the sensorium of autonomy in as much as it is not 
a work of art’305 This formula of artistic autonomy undoubtedly lends 
itself to the analysis of the hybrid and interdisciplinary practices within                                                         
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relational art, but his position differs from Bourriaud in important 
respects. According to Day, Rancière’s placement of the autonomy of art 
within the notion of the sensible means that he ignores art’s social and 
institutional autonomy. It is these aspects of art’s social autonomy that for 
Day firewalls it from what she considers to be the overstated fear of 
heteronomy. Day argues that there has been a significant shift in attitude 
towards political aesthetics, in the sense that the belief that art’s critical 
distance is threatened by what is heteronomous to art, to its penetration by 
the powers of capital, has diminished. She argues that the fear of 
heteronomy is in decline and has been replaced by more explicitly 
committed forms of political art on a scale not witnessed since the 1960s 
or the 1930s.306 She says that: ‘The alleged 'risk' to art today is vastly 
overstated. Indeed, most so-called 'political art' remains thoroughly 
autonomous in its mode, institutional function and discursive situation’.307 
I would add that a faithful reading of Bourriaud’s account of social 
mimesis supports such a conclusion 
 
On this basis, we could say that in alienating the social conditions of art’s 
production and in identifying of art as sensuously coextensive with 
politics (as pure relatum) Rancière facilitates the mere partitioning and 
redistribution of singularities. Not only do they lack a particular locus of 
appearance but they simultaneously deny any partisanship of a political 
art. Thus he repeats the Spinozist model, in which relations proceed in 
baroque form from an all encompassing democratic origin that assumes 
the form of the relational ‘real’ of a community of equals – or the equality 
of speaking beings. In other words, Rancière’s de-ontologised relations 
appear to be accidental emanations of the democratic principle itself. His 
outright separation of consensus from aestheticised politics prevents any 
critical fissure with the social conditions under which the latter emerge 
and relies exclusively upon the force of the ‘heterogenous sensible’. 
Moreover, Rancière’s autonomy of aesthetic experience is problematic in 
the sense that dissensus employs aesthetics to supplant politics in such a                                                         
306 Day, p. 393. 
307 Day, p. 394. 
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way as to present these partitions of the sensible as historically neutral. In 
turn then he fails to address art’s autonomy as equally requiring a history 
of autonomy's social institutionalisation.308  
 
The second movement of Rancière’s theory entails the separation of art 
from the demand of its political efficacy and ethical immediacy. For him, 
these injunctions perpetuate the representative regime of art within critical 
art discourse. Rancière suggests that in spite of the century of critique 
directed at the mimetic tradition in art, mimesis remains entrenched 
within the forms of political and artistic subversion. He says that: 
 
Underlying these forms is the assumption that art compels us to revolt when it 
shows us revolting things, that it mobilizes when it itself is taken outside of the 
workshop or museum and that it incites us to oppose the system of domination 
by denouncing its own participation in that system. This assumption implies a 
specific form of relationship between cause and effect, intention and 
consequence. 309 
 
I think that the forms of artistic subversion he describes are indeed prone 
to literalism and political naievety but equally Rancière does not give 
sufficient weight to Bourriaud’s recognition of the limitations of a 
transgressive political art and rejection of such opportunism. 
 
According to Rancière, the notion of the efficacy of art was ‘debunked’ at 
the close of the representative regime of art, but in spite of this, there 
remains a trace of its causal logic within current thinking. By dispensing 
with the representative model he is able, firstly, to break free of the model 
of the avant-garde on the basis that this has historically overdetermined 
art’s critical functions through its particular model of aesthetics and 
politics. This separation and de-Thermidorized model of the politico-
aesthetic creates a carte blanche for Rancière’s aesthetic regime of art, 
and again this goes some way toward explaining Rancière’s positive 
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reception amongst those who seek to distance themselves from the avant-
garde and its perceived failures. Day claims that Rancière's division of the 
avant-garde into either categories of ‘strategic vanguardism’ or Schiller’s 
aesthetics of sensible partition, introduces a dualism which is ‘totally 
artificial, ignoring the fluidity of social process and the mutability of 
political subject formation under determinate situations.’310  She says that 
this separation demands an anti-historical formulation, in the sense that 
‘his account (of art) is subject to a certain dehistoricisation that follows 
from the rigid separation he makes between the autonomy of aesthetic 
experience and autonomy within historical and institutionalised social 
practices.’ 311 
 
Rancière advocates the replacement of the notion of political efficacy 
with that of ‘aesthetic efficacy’. This entails aesthetic distance through the 
suspension of artistic intention (after Schelling’s notion of the free play of 
the senses). He defends aesthetic efficacy on the grounds of ‘its capacity 
to resist forms of economic, political and ideological domination’, 
through a dissensual commonsense.312 For Rancière the aesthetic efficacy 
of art is based upon a paradoxical distancing in which the artwork is 
premised upon indifference and subtraction. This withdrawal is 
conceptualised by Schiller as ‘free play’ and ‘free appearance’. 313 So the 
artwork is ‘radically indifferent, absent in will or design’ and he 
characterizes this as the aesthetic rupture that is the paradoxical efficacy 
of dissensus. 
 
What is called for is a more nuanced understanding of art’s political 
efficacy that would recognise a principle of efficacy immanent to the 
processes of the translation of social forms and modes of reception 
advocated by Bourriaud. Rancière dismisses as anti-aesthetic the tendency 
of critical art to obey the injunctions of political efficacy and ethical 
immediacy. In other words, for art to ‘step outside of itself’ but this                                                         
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pairing of inside and outside contradicts the sensorium of art and politics 
he advocates elsewhere. Rancière’s aesthetic efficacy is the free play of 
relation assigned to an abdication from the productive relation of non-
relation between art and its social institutions and conditions of 
production.  
 
It is this double movement that perhaps conditions Rancière’s overall 
rejection of the critical model of relational art practice. He says that 
relational art ‘shuttles’ between representational distance – that is, an 
eagerness to avoid representational mediation – by enacting itself 
performatively, and the self-evidence of its efficacy as political art. In an 
important passage in Dissensus Rancière summarises the position as 
follows: 
 
we continue to believe that art has to leave the art world in order to be effective 
in ‘real life’: we continue to try to overturn the logic of the theatre by making 
the spectator active, by turning the art exhibition into a place of political 
activism or by sending artists into the streets of derelict suburbs to invent new 
modes of social relations. It thus appears that, from the outset, the idea of 
critical art is caught between two types of pedagogy: one that could be called 
representational mediation, and another we might refer to as ethical 
immediacy.314 
 
Rancière views relational aesthetics as symptomatic of a post-utopian 
present in which it becomes parodic of so-called political art caught 
within undecidability. He says that this undecideability feeds off the 
equivalence that now prevails between parody-as-critique and the parody-
of-critique.315 What Rancière identifies as pernicious is that: ‘This 
undecidability in turn tends to boil down to the simple parodic mise-en-
scène of its own magic’, and, that this mode of manifestation is 
characteristic of the commodity itself.316  
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This criticism is unduly harsh in the light of this art’s critical role in 
framing the anti-relational as the ‘real’. Non-relational conceptual tools 
hinder the thinking of relation but they also make non-relational form the 
content of this art. This is a content that reverberates around the wider 
socius.  It treats relational art as the self-evident practice of demonstrating 
art’s political efficacy rather than an enquiry into what its political 
efficacy might be, driven by a clear methodology.  
 
Rancière’s views on critical art it must be noted have been subject to a 
number of fluctuations. His tendency to re-work and re-publish some of 
his texts can make it difficult to track the development of his thought. In 
spite of this difficulty, it is fair to say that Rancière’s de-ontologised view 
of relation is behoven to a classicism of relational thought that actually 
obstructs the new thinking of relation. 
 
Collage and Montage  
 
Within Rancière’s proposal for new critical art there is an underlying 
methodology of collage or montage that mirrors relational aesthetics: it 
proposes a recombinant practice. Rancière’s theory of dissensual 
community is though, a poor model for a performative methodology of 
social action. Jacques Aumont’s analysis of montage is clear in that it is 
the relationship of the inorganic to the organic of the social whole that 
distinguishes productive montage.317 I contrast this with Jameson’s 
unproductive model of bricolage.318 Rancière’s social montage, lacks or 
rather rejects outright any relation to the socially organic, socio-symbolic 
forms or the social autonomy of art and its institutions, and is therefore 
open to the charge of ‘social bricolage’. 
 
Rancière seeks to unproblematically migrate the pictoral logic of montage 
into a principle of social action, as we can see in the following passage:                                                         
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If collage has been one of modern art’s major techniques, the reason is that its 
technical forms obey a more fundamental aesthetico-political logic…. Collage 
can be realized as the pure encounter between heterogenous elements, attesting 
en bloc to the incompatibility of two worlds. 319 
 
What Rancière regards as affirmative in collage is that it is a process that 
is, ‘nourished in the performances of critical art’ and that it is polemical in 
form. 320 In Aesthetics and Its Discontents, Rancière establishes a 
relationship between dissensus and collage in which ‘redistribution’ has 
two different inflections through ‘dissensual collage’: the first is 
destructive of existing sensory distributions, and the second entails the 
placement of one logic inside another - in Rancière’s words ‘placing one 
sensible world in another’321 or dividing something – a community, in 
relation to itself. 
 
For Rancière, collage facilitates the practice of fiction, as a matter of 
inventing new framing strategies within the sensible realm.  But I think 
that this does not entail any crossing of a boundary between fiction and 
reality, but rather, multiplies fiction against reality. Overall I would 
summarise Rancière’s position as follows: He attempts to present the 
aesthetic regime of art as an exemplary paraconsistent logic in which the 
difference between sense and sense might emerge in the form of the 
dissensual dispositif. But the heterological separation of its relatum from 
the state or the police order, cannot achieve this because he severs the 
sensible from the social in such a way as to produce a space of dis-
identification.  
 
 
 
                                                         
319 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and its Discontents (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2009), p. 47. 
320 Rancière, Dissensus, p. 151. 
321 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: on Politics and Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2009), 
p. 211 
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The anti-relationality of Alain Badiou 
 
I will now consider Badiou's anti-relational philosophy and Peter 
Hallward’s critique of Badiou’s thought in Think Again (2004) and 
Badiou: A Subject to Truth (2003). Badiou's thought takes us to the very 
limit of what is sayable of relation at the level of classical ontology and 
logic. But I will begin with Hallward’s useful analysis of Eduard 
Glissant’s ‘Poetics of Relation’, in order to begin to determine the context 
within which relation might be viewed as complicit with a deterministic 
politics and the ‘extinction’ of the singular.322 Hallward posits the binary 
poles of ‘sovereign relation’ and ‘sovereign singularity’ as the dualism of 
particularity and singularity that informs Badiou’s thought. 
 
A clear distinction must be made between relation, classically defined as 
not an object for philosophy or as a vector within logic and the notion of 
material singular relation proposed by post-relational practice. Classical 
thought can only really conceive of the latter as some form of evental 
occurrence: that is a mechanism for acknowledging its influence without 
granting it a determinate ontology. 
 
For Hallward the consequence of thinking within sovereign relation and 
sovereign singularity creates a twofold danger. The first entails a 
positivist Grundnorm of relation, which authorises a structured system of 
relation equating the rational with the good. The second danger is that of a 
‘totality of equivalences’. In its second guise then it takes on a Spinozian 
or Leibnizian promise of totality. To follow Hallward’s critique of Eduard 
Glissant’s Poetics of Relation, relation takes the baroque form of a self-
regulating nature in a discourse based upon the ‘extinction of the 
specific’, 323 or the dissolution of the individual in the whole. 324                                                         
322 Peter Hallward, ‘Edouard Glissant : Between the Singular and the Specific’, The Yale 
Journal of Criticism 11.2 (1998), 441-464. 
323 Hallward, ‘Edouard Glissant’, p. 458. 
 324 ‘Here, Relation is reality, it is not a ’relationship’ between things. In perhaps what is 
the most and important declaration of the book Glissant explains that: ‘to the degree 
that our consciousness of relation is total, that is immediate and turned immediately to 
the realizable totality of the world, we no longer need, when we evoke a poetics of 
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This binary rubric then lends itself towards a thinking of Relation as that 
which equates all forms of reality. ‘Relation abolishes all representation 
of relation; ultimately it even abolishes the very idea of relation, to simply 
become… Relation.’325 Rather than claim any being of relation, a 
proposition that would thereby relate, it aims, ‘to arrive at that perfect 
tautology, ‘only Relation is relation’.326 Ultimately this thinking produces 
an aporia of non-relation based upon a principle of identity. 
 
The Dangers of non-relation 
 
It is the ‘twofold danger’ of Relation modelled as a sovereign concept – 
as liberal democratic positivism or as the baroque ‘extinction of the 
specific’, which informs Badiou’s insitence upon ‘implacable singularity’ 
and therefore the primacy of ‘non-relation’ – within a militant politics of 
the event. This adherence to the singular, defined as that which subtracts 
itself from any situation, forms the basis of Badiou’s critique of ‘didacto-
romanticism’ in art in the Handbook of Inaesthetics. In other words it 
would seem that art, as a truth procedure, must in Badiou’s writing remain 
subordinate to the achitecture of the philosophical framework established 
in Being and Event. Badiou’s supporters, notably Bruno Bosteels, have 
expressed the view that Being and Event is a necessary step within the 
development of Badiou’s overall philosophical system and have 
emphasised that Badiou’s more recent work, which seeks to theorise those 
mechanisms of appearing which lie between being and event, constitute a 
return to the materialist dialectics of Theory of the Subject.327 Both Being 
and Event and Logics of Worlds can therefore be characterised as 
systematic explorations of the relation that is no-relation, between 
                                                                                                                                       
relation, to add: relation between what and what? That is why the French word 
‘Relation’, which functions a bit like an intransitive verb, does not correspond for 
example to the English term relationship.’ Hallward, ‘Edouard Glissant’, p. 456. 
325 Hallward, ‘Edouard Glissant’, p. 457. 
326 Hallward, ‘Edouard Glissant’, p. 457. 
327 Bruno Bosteels, ‘Alain Badiou’s Theory of the Subject: the Recommencement of 
Dialectical Materialism?’ in Lacan: The Silent Partners, ed. by Slavoj Zizek (London: 
Verso, 2006), pp. 115-168. 
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implacable singularity and determinate particularity. From the perspective 
of the development of a materialist dialectic, there is support for the view, 
notably again from Bosteels, that Badiou has succeeded in moving 
beyond the abstraction of Being and Event. However in relation to 
Badiou’s pronouncements on art, there remains a clear division between 
his anti-relational theory and his polemical work. Even his ‘Manifesto of 
Affirmationist Art’ retains a baffling abstraction. 
 
In other words there are fundamental problems with Badiou’s aesthetic 
theory and this is reflected in the lack of interest or application of his 
theories within the contemporary critical discourse of aesthetics. 
Rancière’s caustic analysis of Badiou, is that his neo-Platonic adherence 
to ‘the passage of the idea’ denies the subtractive or singular event any 
sensible form – hence the lack of examples in his work of what an 
affirmationist work of art might be, or look like. Badiou also identifies a 
notion of the subtractive artistic work with artistic autonomy that is 
classically modernist in hue. That is to say, whilst lauding artistic 
autonomy as subtraction, his theory simply does not recognise the 
properly dialectical relationship between artistic autonomy and artistic 
heteronomy. Badiou’s subtractive delineation of what is proper to art is 
thus strangely non-dialectical. Rancière condemns it as anti-aesthetics. To 
take Badiou at his own word, this is, indeed, an ‘avant-garde without the 
avant-garde’.328 
 
These two criticisms culminate in what Rancière describes as Badiou’s 
‘twisted Platonism’, an unlikely alliance between the condemnation of 
images and the necessity of their appearance as the sensible passage of the 
pure idea.  Moreover Badiou’s rejection of hybrid forms of artistic 
practice aligns his thinking with modernisms that make his ideas difficult 
to reconcile with contemporary artistic practice. Badiou identifies not just 
what is proper to art, but to the various arts: his analysis of cinema as a 
‘bastard art’ is typical of this trait. More fundamentally Badiou’s                                                         
328 Alain Badiou, The Century, trans. by Alberto Toscano (London: Polity Press, 2007) 
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separation of art and politics seems untenable in the present moment. 
Significantly this separation ignores the relationship between artistic and 
other types of labour, and the fact that in whatever form it takes, art 
remains tied inextricably to a model of production. 
 
Sovereign Singularity as Subtraction 
 
In Polemics, Badiou is scathing about the influence of particularity in its 
post-modern form: 
 
we can refer to as ‘postmodern’ that which bears witness to the unlimited and 
capricious influence of particularity. Two types of particularity exist: there is 
communitarian, ethnic, linguistic, religious, sexual, and so on, particularity; and 
then there is biographical particularity, the self as that which imagines that it 
can and must ‘express itself’.329  
 
He says that these ‘postmodern products’ are the material form of a pure 
and simple regression to Romanticism.330 Badiou proposes an 
affirmationist art contrary to the saturation of didacticism, classicism and 
romanticism and the didacto-romanticism of the 20th century. Against the 
problem of ‘domination in all the arts by the figures of egoistic and 
communitarian expressiveness, which is only a degraded didactico-
romanticism, a kind of avant-garde without avant-garde.’331 This 
difference between the singular and the particular posits the singular as 
non-relation and the particular as relational. Badiou speaks of an 
‘implacable singularity.’ 332 Badiou relates the singular to ‘subtraction’ as 
follows: ‘In subtraction art destines the real it encounters to all people, 
negating the influence of particularity. Subtraction is the modern method 
for integrally affirming the universal.’333 According to Badiou’s logic this 
is the ‘maximal appearance of the singular’ or what I term relation 
without relation, as a thinking of the positive.                                                         
329 Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. by Steve Corcoran (New York: Verso, 2006), p. 134. 
330 Badiou, Polemics, p. 135. 
331 Badiou, Polemics, p. 136. 
332 Badiou, Polemics, p. 143. 
333 Badiou, Polemics, p. 142. 
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Badiou’s Manifesto of Affirmationist Art, which repeats the aesthetic 
figure of the idea as supra-sensible is symptomatic of a broader problem 
in Badiou’s thought: it is anti-relational all the way down. To put this in 
terms of Hallward’s terms, we might say that Badiou’s response to the 
danger of ‘sovereign relation’ is an espousal of ‘sovereign singularity’. 
That is, Badiou’s thought represents the binary completion of an axis of 
relation and non-relation in which the dialectical middle ground or 
mediating term is excluded because the singular is at all times irreducible. 
This is the residue of Badiou’s Maoism. Hallward’s suggest against this, a 
potential middle ground. He proposes that philosophy can and must 
address what is specific rather than specified. Hallward’s assertion is that 
some consideration of the time, place and quality of relation allows for 
the emergence of a properly dialectical relationality, which is excluded by 
Badiou’s logical or set-theoretic construction.334 
 
Badiou’s supporters might object that Hallward’s critique in Subject to 
Truth is based upon a reading of Being and Event, and must be read in 
this light. Badiou addressed the problem of location and topology well 
before this in his materialist dialectic, Theory of the Subject (1982) and 
returned to this materialism in the form of the logic of appearance in 
Logics of Worlds (2006). I will discuss this in due course when I consider 
Hallward’s response to Logics, but for the moment I wish to set out the 
‘rules of engagement’ that govern the critique of Badiou’s anti-
relationality.  
 
Rather than solve the question of non-relation through the introduction of 
a mediating term it is more fruitful to ask why is Badiou an anti-relational 
thinker all the way down? Hallward cites two major influences on 
Badiou’s thought: these are Maoism and set theory. Badiou’s Maoism 
influences his theorisation of the event as the splitting of thought, in                                                         
334 Peter Hallward, ‘Order & Event: On Badiou’s Logics of Worlds’, New Left Review, 
53 (2008), 97-122. 
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which the ‘third term’ does not arise stricto sensu unless externally 
imposed. The split creates an instance of pure decision between 
undecideable terms and as such there is no necessary relation that 
emerges between evental terms in a reflective dialectical sense, rather, the 
third term remains external to them both. This is one instance of anti-
relationality all the way down. 
 
Set theory forms the basis of Badiou’s ‘monumental construction’, as 
Benjamin Noys terms it.335 Badiou’s monumental theoretical construction 
is perhaps the final attempt to resolve the antinomies of metaphysics 
within a coherent philosophical system. This meta-ontology relies upon 
the absence of objects for mathematics, its pure abstraction, in order to 
construct an account of the relationship between what inexists as purely 
multiple and that which is determined according to the One of a logic. It 
also seeks to account for the passage from one to the other through the 
overdetermining and diremptive effect of an event upon a situation. 
 
Since, in terms of set theory, the event can only occur at the void point of 
a situation, Hallward identifies a dualism in Badiou’s thought between 
that which is presented and that which is represented in a situation. The 
void as described by Badiou, accepts no more than an existential 
predicate, that is, its elements exist but eschew any relational predication 
all the way down. In Hallward’s terms, such relations are punctual rather 
than qualitative. 
 
Hallward, it seems to me is right to express misgivings about the dualism 
at the heart of Badiou’s thought. In Alberto Toscano’s ‘Introduction’ to 
Logics he remarks upon the marked difference between Badiou’s 
philosophical and polemical writings. This in fact has influenced my 
choice of an Adornian methodology. This brings me back to a primary 
assertion of this research; that it is only through the dissimulations of the 
essay or the polemic that we are provided with the means to explore what                                                         
335 Benjamin Noys, ‘Monumental Construction’: Badiou and the Politics of Aesthetics’, 
Third Text, 23.4 (2008), pp. 383-39. 
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is singular rather than specified or particular, or to address the appearance 
of the sensible without being thereby determined beneath a sovereign 
relation or sublimated within sovereign singularity. 
 
Thawing relations? Badiou’s Onto-logy of Appearances 
 
In ‘Some Replies to a Demanding Friend’, the Afterword of Hallward’s 
Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, Badiou issued 
an emphatic response to the criticism that in Being and Event, his anti-
relational use of set theory rendered it too abstract and non–dialectical.336 
In this text he set out an ambitious statement of intent, in which broadly 
speaking he indicates the proposed teleology of his logic of appearing. 
His aims can be summarised as follows: to provide an account of Dasein, 
of being-there, or the structure through which appearances are manifested 
within a situation, whilst maintaining the ontological primacy of 
mathematics through set theory. Badiou’s approach to this precarious task 
is to maintain a metaontology of mathematics, and at the same time to 
provide an account of logical relation that avoids any return to post-
Fregean analytical logic.337 To recall, Badiou’s Theory of the Subject 
proposes an evental model as a first dialectical movement within a second 
dialectical passage based upon topology or ‘splacing’ allied to a model of 
subjective agency in turn reliant upon forcing and fidelity. 
 
This was based upon a rather narrow prescription of the event as a rare 
occurrence, lacking any possibility of pre-evental analysis. The important 
question that drives this analysis is whether one can instigate a categorical 
or ordered logic of relation, capable of serving any practical purpose in                                                         
336 Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. by Peter Hallward 
(London: Continuum Books, 2004), pp. 232-237.  
 337 ‘That logic can be properly understood as mathematical requires a conception of 
logic that allows it to emerge from within the movement of mathematics itself, rather 
than from the application of a linguistic frame to mathematics.’ So the real question is 
‘what event of thought, with regard to logic, enables philosophy to evade the hold of 
grammar and logic?’ Badiou finds his answer in category or topos theory so that 
‘Logic is a local dimension of possible mathematical universes’ Peter Hallward, 
Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 
302. 
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the analysis of art, politics or any other truth procedure. Must Badiou’s 
philosophical and polemical writings remain themselves in a relation of 
non-relation?338 
 
The stakes though are much higher than this. Hallward opens this out into 
a broader question – that of the catachrestic relation-non-relation between 
classical and intuitionist logics.339 The first, which is punctual in 
character, remains bound to the law of the excluded middle. Badiou’s 
militant Maoism paradoxically positions him within a classical system, 
which denies the emergence of any third or mediating dialectical term 
between the objects comprised within a category. 340 Badiou rejects 
mediation within a categorically determined situation tout court. Peter 
Osborne describes Badiou’s Being and Event as ‘perhaps the great work 
of philosophical neo-classicism.341  
 
Intuitionist logic would allow for such mediation, and crucially, 
temporalises the splitting of terms. It would allow also for the quality of                                                         
 338 ‘Now nonrelational abstract being is itself endowed with a more relational, more 
emphatically situated onto-logical dimension: the dimension of its appearing or being-
there. As Badiou writes, ‘being is essentially being-there (Da-sein),’ and ‘being-there 
is conceivable only in terms of relation’ since every ‘there’ is the product of a 
particular set of differential relations that flesh out a situation in a particular way. 
There is thus less of a stark choice between disjunction and relation, between 
deliaison and liaison, than there is a recognition of the apparent paradox that ‘being is 
multiple, in radical disjunction [deliaison], and yet at the same time everything is in 
relation’ (TA  16.1.96) To some extent at least, Badiou has incorporated the relational 
alternative his philosophy, thus far, had always sought to exclude.’ Hallward, Badiou: 
A Subject to Truth, pp. 293-294. 
 339 ‘The overcoming of classicism requires the three-’if not-not p is to be something 
more (or less) than P, we need a third position that is that of the time of creative 
negation or transcendence. Nonclassical logic, in other words, presumes a genuine 
mediation of P and not P as a relation over time (the disjunction of outcome from 
origin), whereas classical logic presumes the immediate identity of P and not – not P 
(the identity of outcome and origin)’ Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth p. 310. 
 340 ‘The essential thing to remember is that the configuration of a two always eliminates 
relations between two elements. Such relations are indeed, as Badiou argues, 
describable only from the position of an implicit third element. The ‘between’ is 
external to the two. As pure splitting, the two has no discernible terms in the strict 
sense; such terms come to exist as a consequence of the two, as a result of a true 
decision, itself made as a choice between strictly ‘indiscernible’ elements, the two of 
a truth will divide its situation between those who are for or those who are against, but 
this division is always a result: before the two, the situation was governed by the false 
unity of consensus, by the apparent identification of elements with their situational 
place.’ Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, p. 47. 
341 Peter Osborne ‘Neo-Classic: Alain Badiou’s Being and Event’ Radical Philosophy, 
142, March/April (2007), pp. 19-29. (p. 19) 
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relation to count for something.342 This distinction is very much redolent 
of Gashé and Schimmel’s exposition of relation as ens minimum (minimal 
being) with which I will begin my final chapter. If we are to mitigate the 
ultra-Platonism of the purely singular non-relation, through the 
promissory and intuitionist notion of a relational configuration, the purity 
of any classical logical construction becomes untenable. This is borne out 
by Badiou’s efforts to accommodate the demands of the intuitionist-
relational imperative within a classical logical framework. He produces a 
general logic of marvellous intricacy, but perhaps also an epitaph to ‘what 
is proper to philosophy’. 
 
In this vein, Logics makes adjustments to the architecture of Being and 
Event, firstly by retroactively ascribing being to the multiple on the basis 
of axiomatic inference as the first principle of materialism.343 Formally 
speaking this is a perfect solution to Badiou’s distrust of Hegel’s absolute; 
it defines Badiou’s logic in materialist terms, and it is his only concession 
to temporality, a necessary concession since it creates a fissure between 
being and appearing. So, the transcendental functor of a situation confers 
being upon multiplicity a posteriori. This fissure finds its expression 
through Badiou’s postulate of materialism. 
 
The postulate of materialism in conjunction with the retroaction of being 
qua being crucially introduces an onto-logy of what appears in a rather                                                         
 342‘Philosophy can have no distinctive purpose if thought is not conceived as a creative 
practice that resists, in its essence, specification by an object, interest, or identity. 
Thought cannot be reduced to the passivity of consumption or representation…. My 
own question is simply this: what kind of de-specification does thought involve? 
Does it involve subtraction not only from the positively, objectively specified…but 
from the properly specific as well, in the sense of being specific to but not 
determined by something? Should we not distinguish a specified realm of definition 
or classification from a properly relational realm of the specific per se? This is a 
distinction Badiou is generally reluctant to make.’ Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to 
Truth, p. 28. 
 343 ‘Between two objects A and B there can exist relations (i.e., variations on the 
relation of order, or is> and<), on the condition that these relations ‘preserve the 
essential characteristics of their regime of appearing: localizations, and intensities of 
existence.’ Or again: a relation between two objects preserves the atomic logic of 
these objects’ That is they are particular but logically (mathematically) determined.’ 
Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, p. 300. 
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unconvincing theory of atomism.344 Therefore, in spite of Badiou’s 
rejection of any ability of a categorical element to differ or differentiate, 
he needs a basic thread of relation between being and appearance, which 
he can therefore only expresses as a logical existential predicate. Category 
theory then is used to confer a materialist ontology upon set theory, in a 
way that compounds the overall abstraction of Badiou's philosophy.345 
 
The question of ‘actuality’ in Logics is linked to the ‘Transcendental 
functor’, in terms of the degree of an element’s appearing. This is a basic 
relation of ordering (> or <). Again both being and quality are simply 
predicated as ordered categories and the theory remains essentially 
abstract.346 Overall, then, we might say, to mimic Rancière that the future 
of relation is already behind us. It will always remain a philosophical 
problem provided one remains within the confines of what is proper to 
philosophy, a classically structured ontology. Aesthetics has grown 
restless with this impasse. This is because Badiou’s classical logic cannot 
rise to the challenge of expressing any relation that is not already subject 
to a transcendental functor of its appearing.347 This is the basis of the                                                         
344 ‘If the objects that appear in a world can be broken down into such minimal and 
indecomposeable components then it is logically possible to correlate them directly to 
the comparatively minimal elements of a corresponding mathematical set’.There is no 
doubting such a logical possibility. Crucially, however, Badiou’s theory offers no way 
of demonstrating that such a correlation is actually real or effective. That every such 
atomic prescription is real must be assumed here is a pure postulate, which Badiou 
names the postulate of materialism’.’ Peter Hallward, ‘Order & Event: On Badiou’s 
Logics of Worlds’, New Left Review, 53 (2008), 97-122 (p. 113). 
345 In ‘Some Replies to a Demanding Friend’, Badiou says; ‘The main theorem of this 
whole theory demonstrates the existence of a crucial link between appearance and 
being, namely the retroaction, onto a pure multiple, of the transcendental structuring 
of a world. Using the pure relational logic of Topoi, we can actually demonstrate that, 
when it is caught up in a determinate world, a multiple receives an intrinsic form. This 
theory ‘shows both that every object is composed of atoms and that every’ 
homogenous’ part of an object can be synthesized (i.e. enveloped by a dominant 
term)’, Hallward, Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. by 
Peter Hallward (London: Continuum Books, 2004), p. 235. 
346 ‘What a transcendental does, essentially, is to order the various elements of its world 
in terms of their existential intensity: the fundamental wager of Logics is that the 
simple mathematical relation of asymmetrical order (i.e. the relation that ranks any 
given quantity as greater-than or lesser than other qualities) suffices, ultimately to 
organize the otherwise infinitely ramified complexity of a world’ Peter Hallward, 
‘Order & Event: On Badiou’s Logics of Worlds’, New Left Review, 53 (2008), 97-122 
(p. 111) 
347 ‘as long as philosophy is defined as singular rather than specific, as long as it 
preserves itself in its pure de liaison, as long as it retains a strictly axiomatic integrity, 
it will not be able to provide a fully convincing account for the shift from withdrawal 
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crisis of relation in art. The question is, then, whether an ‘intuitionist 
logic’ might avoid this determinism? 
 
In conclusion, what this chapter demonstrates is that the re-thinking of 
relation requires us to critically examine, and where necessary discard, the 
conceptual tools of philosophy currently at our disposal. I say this in the 
spirit of Adorno’s identification of the problems of philosophy as the 
insistence upon the thinking of identity. In the next chapter I will explore 
a rethinking of relation and representation that seeks to avoid the pitfalls 
of non-relational thinking identified in this chapter. What this chapter also 
demonstrates is that an anarchistic and exclusively heterogenous thinking 
of relation is no less anti-relational than the articulation of appearance 
through a formal logic. What is required then is an epistemology of 
singular relation, which might allow its own topologies upon a principle 
of inhabitation of extant social forms and institutions. What I have sought 
to identify is that it is the praxis of relational art that in fact demands a 
theoretical approach adequate to its appearance as an object. 
Consequently, post-relational thinking as an emerging category, defines 
the parameters of a new political aesthetics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
to intervention, from subtraction to transformation, from prescription to production.’ 
Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003), p. 322. 
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Chapter 4: Relational Form as Representation 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will be addressing one of the pivotal questions of this 
research: whether forms of non-visual representation might be available 
to relational and post-relational practices without thereby compromising 
their credentials as micropolitical works? As I indicated in my first 
chapter, notwithstanding Bourriaud’s hostility towards ‘the visual’ he 
insists that the art of ‘the present day’ must find languages, 
epistemologies and forms of representation appropriate to a globalized 
aesthetics and which might challenge the ‘problem of general reification’. 
In the first part of this chapter I consider various proposals that have been 
put forward and identify the different types of representation that might 
be included within a ‘defence of representation’. Essentially the need for 
new forms of representation is a response to the requirement that 
relational forms appear; that is, in Bourriaud’s terms that they are capable 
of inscription ‘as fact’. It also enables a rethinking of the political efficacy 
of art which has tended to reject relational artworks on this very basis. 
 
Re-thinking representation is not simply a matter, however, of expanding 
the notion to include formal topologies or more sophisticated spatio-
temporal relations that allow for the conjuncture of extenuated formal 
matrices. I will argue, following on from my analysis of classical relation 
in the previous chapter, that relation itself needs to be re-thought in order 
that these representative forms may take hold. So for example the 
thinking of the ‘aformal intricacy’ of relation and ‘relational shape’ 
suggested by Rodolphe Gashé requires a movement of thought beyond 
the general/particular division and some recognition of the relational 
event that the principle of relating entails. What I aim to demonstrate is 
that the notion of relation has a long provenance and contested ontology, 
and that certain features of the ontological problem of relation are 
currently being rehearsed within arguments around political aesthetics. 
They re-appear now, I suggest, because, against a backdrop of capitalised 
relation, in which every relation is an object, the subject appears 
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inadequate to its object. The contested ontology of relation grants certain 
permissions to the artist, a certain freedom that enables a critique of 
advanced capital and the commodity form. This requires, the positing of a 
non-relation between ontology and knowledge. This is a complex point. I 
intend to move the thinking of relation into closer alignment with 
Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism and inductive methodology: towards a 
thinking of complex and novel relations as objects that have their time 
and place, or topology. The aim then is not to re-ontologise aformally 
intricate relations: this would entail their particularisation and return us to 
the aporia described in Chapter 3. Rather the aim is to grant some 
epistemic validity to emerging aformal relations as evental relations that 
require no ontology and in fact must precede their eventual ontological 
and epistemological determination as accepted or ‘established fact’. 
 
In order not to totally abandon ‘the visual’ I will then look at the 
documentation of live art and the ontology that underlies this in order to 
consider how relational art might use, or continue to use visual 
representations – principally still and moving images – against ideology. 
This entails some thinking of the way in which documentation is in fact 
the staging of an encounter itself between performer and documenter, and 
the ways in which these documents ‘invite discourse’, as potentially 
transitively ethical. This will require some re-thinking of the image. I turn 
to Jacques Rancière for this in order to move the emphasis away from 
meaning and mute alterity (Roland Barthes’ analysis) and place the image 
within its circuits of exchange and its formal operations. I will then 
complete the chapter with some reflections on the potential use of 
matrices and relational shapes as objective categories of the real. This is 
an Adornian movement and relies, once again, upon what is inductive, 
fragmentary and aleatory in these constructions as at once the presentation 
of an immanent logic that also contains shards of the wider social without 
thereby totalising it. It proposes the singular relational formation as a 
singular and thereby objective appearance of the real. 
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Critical Realism and Documentation after Micropolitics 
 
Critical realism or social realism has emerged as possible only with the 
demise of micropolitics. It forms an important part of the credo of the 
group Chto Delat for example. For Roberts, the Russian groups Chto 
Delat exemplify a third avant-garde: 
 
In contradistinction to the historic avant-garde, the new avant-garde ‘necessarily 
has the negation of capitalism's totality as its point of departure.’ At the same 
time it strives to connect this negativity with aesthetic method, adequate to the 
study of the world in which new subjectivity arises not only as something 
destructive, but as something that produces social life.348  
 
Chto Delat’s avant-garde model is divided into three categories or 
principles: 
 
realism as critical-modernist method in the spirit of Bertholt Brecht  (mapping 
as a form of resistance, counter-narrativization and counterhistoricization, 
montage, subversive affirmation, the carnivalesque, fictional reenactment); 
fidelity to the revolutionary impulse of the historic avant-garde as totalizing 
critique; and a defence of artistic autonomy as a principle of self-organisation. 
349 
 
Chto Delat’s model of practice encapsulates the strands of 
internationalism and networked organisation, with a commitment to a 
post-relational capitalist realism. Its utopianism and revolutionary pathos 
are not premised upon the oxymoron of critical engagement, but operates 
as a heightened sensible form of fiction that sits within the hypostasis of 
relation-non-relation, or as Adorno would call it a ‘wrong world’. Roberts 
points out that in their work the gap between the actual and the ideal is a 
productive one. Their work does not entail a production of new utopian 
forms of disengagement from the world, but rather it seeks these fissures 
                                                        
348 Roberts, ‘Revolutionary Pathos, Negation and the Suspensive Avant-Garde’, New 
Literary History , 41 (2011), 717-730., p.728. 
349 Roberts, ‘Revolutionary Pathos’, p.724. 
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in the world as points of critical artistic engagement. 350 In other words, 
we need to view its utopianism not in the terms of utopian modernism 
rejected by Bourriaud or by Rancière as a paradise for aesthetes and 
amateurs, but rather, regard it as a productive fissure in which we can 
critically rediscover the communist form.  
 
If social realism emerges from post-relational models of suspension, I 
think that documentary artistic practices serve an important role in this 
respect. I have already explored the de-ontologised document through the 
work of Auslander. To recall, the document is now defined by its role as 
mediator rather than in relation to any original event. Boris Groys has 
recently put forward the idea that the document is no longer based upon 
any solid foundation of time, and that it points always away from the 
present. In ceasing to be of the, or any, present, he says that it no longer 
‘presents’ art but merely stores it – alluding only to its deferral.351 This 
may offer some solution to Badiou’s conundrum of presentation without 
representation. More than this it reflects the suspensive nature of post-
relational practice in such a way that allows for the presentation of 
relational shape since it is both a representation and a form of mediation 
between subjects. 
 
A Defence of Representation 
 
The artists collective Chto Delat have recently published a collection of 
essays that call for a reappraisal of the role of representation within 
politically engaged artistic practice. Dmitry Vilensky argues in an essay 
titled, ‘In Defence of Representation’ that it is reductive to equate 
representation with hierarchy or to alternatively to assume that the 
rejection of representation denotes its absence.352 Moreover, he warns                                                         
350 Roberts, p.724. 
351 Groys, B., ‘Comrades of Time’ in Cognitive Architecture: From Biopolitics to 
Noopolitics: Architecture & Mind in the Age of Communication and Information, ed. 
by Deborah Hauptmann and Warren Neidich (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2010), p. 
96. 
352 Dmitry Vilensky, ‘In Defence of Representation’ http://chtodelat.org (unpaginated). 
Downloaded on 08/08/12. 
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that it is dangerous to leave a vacuum of representation that is left open 
to precisely the forms of ideological exploitation that politically engaged 
artists generally seek to avoid. He argues that the role of representation is 
to produce consciousness and that the acquisition of consciousness is 
itself an act of representation. David Riff makes the point more strongly 
when he says that a representation divorced from consciousness is not 
actually a representation.353  What is more, Riff observes that 
consciousness can breed productively upon ‘representations of 
misrepresentations’. 
 
Vilensky makes what might appear to be the trite observation that radical 
art ‘needs to be noticed’ and that events ‘need to be experienced’. In the 
light of my observations on the critique of relational aesthetics, the point 
is anything but trite. One of the major obstacles that early relational art 
encountered was an inability to account for its mode of appearance. This 
not only led to a misreading of relational art as a project of 
dematerialisation, it pushed the documentation of relational art into an 
ontology of performance/document, which is unhelpful. I will deal with 
this question in due course. Vilensky’s overall position is that you cannot 
change the world without representations and that globalization calls for 
new systems of representation. He proposes a dialectic of representation 
and participation. Bourriaud is of course in overall agreement with this 
position. 
 
If participation is then, to be considered within the ambit of 
representation then we might add the other ‘performative’ cognates of 
relational art on the basis that they are performative acts of 
consciousness.  Gene Ray argues that as reality changes reality requires a 
change in the modes of representation and the means by which to de-
reify society.354 On that basis we might include within these new modes,                                                         
353 David Riff, ‘A Representation Which is Divorced from the Consciousness of those 
whom it Represents is no Representation. What I do not know, I do not worry about’ 
http://chtodelat.org 
354 Gene Ray, ‘Radical Learning and Dialectical Realism: Brecht and Adorno on 
Representing Capitalism, http://chtodelat.org 
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encounters, gestures, discussion, along with some of the operations we 
identify with informational labour. We could then include feedback, 
networking and the management of the nodal switches that dictate 
informational flows and produce counter-networks. Specifically, 
postproductive and radicant practices such as montage as a principle of 
social action, screenplay and sampling might also be fitted within the 
ambit of representative actions. Provided one reads these performative 
actions of and upon consciousness within a mimetically productive 
framework, one can see here, the basis for a counter-public. That is, a 
series of operations of Erfharung that produce spaces for consciousness. 
What is more Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism prepares the ground for 
the recognition of new categories of representation. Gene Ray observes 
that in order to de-reify society one must be able to recognise it not as 
natural (in Althusser’s terms necessary) but as a changing ‘causal nexus’ 
as an ensemble of relations that are historical. In other words, the 
elements of a theory of relational representation are in place, but at 
present, the micropolitical influence over its programme has inhibited 
Bourriaud in making a strong and direct connection between his 
performative principle of social action and the appropriation of forms and 
the articulation of this as a methodology of representation. One might 
argue after Jodi Dean and Jason Jones that this form of territorialised and 
non-totalising representation might be named ‘post-representational’.355 I 
would add that this would need then to be closely aligned with 
Bourriaud’s methodology of the fragment. 
 
I have said that Bourriaud fails to make emphatic the connection between 
the principles of social action and representation. In Steve Edwards ‘Two 
Critiques of Representation (Against Lamination)’ he identifies another 
problem with the rejection of representation. This is the substitution of 
‘bourgeois’ forms of representation with problematic models of 
participation as a form of direct democracy. He claims that this is naive 
and idealistic on the basis that representation not only persists but is,                                                         
355 Jodi Dean and Jason Jones, ‘Occupy Wall Street and the Politics of Representation’, 
http://chtodelat.org 
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moreover, essential to ‘naming collective life’.356 We have seen this 
objection raised in the critique of Rancière’s aesthetics of dissensus as a 
disassociated politics. Where Edwards advances that argument is to point 
out that this type of extreme autonomy in fact pays insufficient regard to 
the representative forms of liberal democracy itself and the ‘interpellative 
processes of capital and the state’. This mode of the refusal of 
representation therefore posits an idealised autonomous subject capable 
of operating beyond these strictures. In recent art he says that the 
communist critique of representative democracy becomes laminated with 
the ethical edict against ‘speaking for the other’, which thereby produces 
a reluctance to engage in representation; and in relational aesthetics, the 
endorsement of participation against representation. I would agree that 
there is some truth in this, particularly in early relational art. This is why 
this debate might catalyze relational art’s call for new forms of 
representation and give a vigour to its materialist claims: claims that 
currently lack credulity. It also permits and necessitates some reappraisal 
of the role of documentation in relational art. 
 
Before I consider this I want to turn to the philosophy of relation. I do this 
in order to look at the premises upon which the representative forms of 
relationality I have discussed might take hold and avoid regression into 
the binary aporia of generality and particularity. 
 
What is a Relation? 
 
The problem of relation turns upon its ambiguous ontology. Should we 
treat relation as a thing? Or, is the real of relation that relation that is no 
relation, expressed as the singularity of the minimal thing? This disputed 
ontology remains essential to current thinking in which the anti-
relationality of the singular is posited against the materialism of the 
particular. Relation has emerged as a crucial category in the rethinking of 
artistic political agency because for the left this ontological schism is                                                         
356 Steve Edwards, ‘Two Critiques of Representation (Against Lamination)’, 
http://chtodelat.org 
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overshadowed by the seeming political failure of classical Marxism and 
the purported failures of the avant-garde. On this basis, the thinking and 
production of the new must therefore be formulated in terms that abandon 
the party structure and the utopian forms of modernism. This produces an 
appeal to the appearance of the singular. We might say that the antinomy 
of this demand forms the situation within which aesthetics is called upon 
to re-think its modes of representation. 
 
In his introduction to Of Minimal Things: Studies in the Notion of 
Relation, Rodolphe Gashé provides an overview of the history of 
‘relational’ ontology.357 He begins with the claim that the subsumption of 
the category of relation to formal predictive logic in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, along with the ‘re-elaboration of the foundations of 
mathematics’ gives the impression that relation has run its course and 
finds philosophical elucidation only within the analytic tradition.358 In 
Hegelian terms, he claims that this perspective produces a one-sided logic 
of relation, which in fact subsumes mathematical logic beneath 
linguistics. 359 What interests Gashé is, rather, the classical theory of 
relation. This provides him with a point of departure from which to 
reopen its ontology. Significantly, he introduces this question as being 
extra- philosophical, on the basis that relation in fact defines the limits of 
philosophical enquiry itself. Relation can be articulated not only within 
predicative logic, but also within the rhetoric of the limit. And from this 
perspective it is specifically the negotiation of this limit, which is the 
central challenge to its ontological determination or non-determination.  
 
Gashé tells us that the increased sophistication of the medieval framing of 
relational terms, and the attendant philosophical debate around diverging 
theories of relation in the 14th century, gave rise to those contradictions, 
which are of continuing relevance today. He says that: ‘realist and                                                         
357 Rodolphe Gashé, Of Minimal Things: Studies on the Notion of Relation (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999) 
358 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 1. 
359 It is important to retain some essence of this notion of relation, perhaps in abeyance, 
since it does link a certain notion of relation to informational and networking logic. 
 211 
conceptualist theories of relation were pitted against one another’ and that 
this was motivated by a theological enquiry, which asked whether there 
existed a real relation, ‘between God and his creatures’.360 This debate 
drew heavily upon Aristotle’s assumption that a relation is an ‘attribute, 
or accident’, of a subject, or substance’. In spite of this aleatory quality 
Gashé asserts that mediaeval theories of relation were nevertheless realist: 
 
Contrary to the Stoics, who held all relations to be subjective and to lack all 
extramental reality, medieval philosophers believed in the reality of relations. 
Their overall concern was what kind of extramental being to ascribe to 
relations. Generally speaking, the type of being that Scholastic philosophy 
accorded to relations is that of a thing.361 
 
Notwithstanding this: ‘If by conceiving of relations as ‘things’ the 
Scholastics credited relations with extramental reality, they nonetheless 
accorded a very specific ontological status to this reality.’362 The 
scholastics accorded being to relation as a thing, but its ontological status 
remained essentially an accidental attribute; ‘a real relation is an 
Aristotelian attribute, or accident, one that amounts to the property, 
inhering in a thing, of being-toward-another’[my emphasis].363 This is the 
sense in which Aristotle terms the being of relation as pros ti, being-
toward-another, but it must be emphasised, always as a categorical 
derivitave. 
 
In Aristotle’s metaphysics, relative terms, or things whose essence refers 
to something else, were therefore accorded the lowliest status of beings 
amongst beings. The scholastics viewed relation as res relativae: relative 
things, which are nevertheless real. They remained relative, whether 
‘dependent on the foundation in which they inhere’, therefore, real as 
modes of things, or having ‘an accidental being of their own independent 
                                                        
360 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 2. 
361 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 2. 
362 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 2. 
363 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 2. 
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of the being of their ground’.364 Gashé says that in spite of this 
ontological difference between a dependently and independently real 
relation, they nevertheless remain only relative things, having ‘less reality 
than their foundation’ and ‘in the case where being-toward-another-thing 
differs from its foundation, the extramental reality is, according to Duns 
Scotus, that of a ‘tiny being’, or, in Richard of Mediavilla’s terminology, 
a minus ens.’ 365 
 
It is worth dwelling upon this distinction between the being of dependent 
and independent relations. Firstly, because if relation as a ‘minimal thing’ 
can be ascribed irreducible singularity as opposed to the derivative 
particularity of other determinate beings, it might be possible to find even 
within the singular, a distinction or splitting of that which in itself is 
dependently and independently grounded within being. This would 
indicate being-toward-another or pros ti, which departs from the 
Aristotelian categorisation of relation. I will return to this point in due 
course. The distinction, I would argue, has also gained a renewed 
significance in the light of our encounter with hypostatic informational 
networks. Informational fragments, exhibit no foundational relational 
quality, and, therefore, exist as minus ens, or at the very limit of 
ontological determination. What I am seeking to connect between this 
thinking and the overall thesis is that the question of relation currently 
emerges within the context of impoverished ontological and mnemonic 
conditions. Archival-informational practices themselves entail the 
retroactive construction of dependent foundational relations from the 
independent minus ens of informational ‘fragments’, and in turn, the 
foundation of relational being within the exergue of a subject. The 
following quotation from Gashé may serve to illustrate: ‘For Thomas 
Aquinas, a real, or categorical relation inheres only in the subject, or 
foundation, of a relation, and the category of relation itself is ‘the weakest 
or least real’ of all the categories’.366                                                         
364 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 2. 
365 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 3. 
366 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 3. 
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Within Gashé’s overview, relation is inherently a being that requires a 
support. Relations are, therefore, for Gashé, minimal things and thereby 
easily confused with intra-mental realities. He says that ‘a predicative 
relation is an accident of the least being’ when compared to substance.367 
 
Gashé proposes, however, that the scholastic definition of relation need 
not prohibit its analysis upon differing terms to the substance/accident 
ontology that he claims limits its development. He argues that the 
realisation of formal predicative logic implicitly recognizes in its 
limitations, the continued relevance of the question of intra-mental or 
mind independent relation. The nature and quality of their existence has 
not been resolved. The logic of relations he says, remain a tributary to the 
ontological and metaphysical assumptions of Plato and Aristotle.368 
Gashé refuses the ontological determination of ‘thing’ and ‘no-thing’, 
using the term ‘minimal things’ to refer to the smallest and most 
elemental issues or matters of concern to philosophy.369 Relation, he says 
is ‘one of the most (if not the most) extreme of philosophy’s elemental 
topics’.370 A minimal thing constitutes the thing at its most minute and is 
therefore the most basic and simple of philosophical problems. He cites 
Julius Jakob Schaaf approvingly, who speaks of philosophy as 
intrinsically a science of relation: ‘Taking up the Scholastic designation of 
relation , he explicitly emphasizes a positive moment contained in the 
expression, in addition to its characterization of relation as a deficient 
thing.’371 This positive moment, he writes, ‘consists in this: the being of 
relation [Beziehungsein], precisely because it is an ens minimum, is not an 
object among objects, a thing amongst things, but reveals itself to be the 
trans-objective as such.’372 [my emphasis] 
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This is why, for Schaaf, it is the founding category of philosophy. Gashé 
disagrees with Schaaf on the basis that relation is more elemental than 
anything of explicit philosophical concern and thus sites it outside of 
philosophy. But he does retain what is affirmative in Schaaf’s account.  
For Gashé, relation is too small a thing for philosophy, which overlooks it 
and undervalues it, notwithstanding that relations may have a ‘deciding 
philosophical importance.’ 373 For him the question of what is proper to 
philosophy indicates that what is thematically grouped under relation is 
necessarily and productively indistinct. He states that: ‘if not the minimal 
“philosophical” problem: it is a limit-problem, an issue at the limit, to 
which all other questions of philosophy, large or small, are indebted and 
to which they must be traced and related back.’ 374 
 
This I would suggest is a very significant passage for the exploration of 
the relation of non-relation; of the liminal relation with which I am 
concerned. Gashé does not, or will not, explain the precise nature of this 
‘indebtedness’ or ‘deciding philosophical importance’. On my reading, 
whilst Gashé is prepared to accept that a relation may be ontologically too 
indistinct to be determined negatively as a thing, he is reluctant to 
embrace what is of ‘deciding philosophical importance’ about the 
minimal thing within the tenets of a positive philosophy.375 It seems to me 
that some version of a positive philosophy is the only possible solution to 
relational hypostasis and that Gashé’s willingness to ‘step outside’ of 
philosophy or more precisely, negatively determined logic, need not entail 
a return to an inclusive metaphysics as self-completion in the name of 
philosophy. Rather, we should read the ontological indeterminacy of 
relation as a supplement. The relation-of-non-relation of ens minimum is                                                         
373 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 5. 
374 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 5. 
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then a foundational metaphor for philosophy, and links the limits of 
philosophy to its others, literature, art etc.  
 
This metaphor, logically determined as the aporia of the ontological limit, 
permeates discussion around new relations and their promissory or 
possible emergence, based upon the wager that they will become extra-
mental things.  Thus, I would argue that the point of indistinction between 
what is particular and what is singular, precisely the question of limit is 
that which founds relation as the point of affirmative departure for a 
materialist dialectic, within an anti-historicist configuration.  In Gashé’s 
terms a minimal thing is not to be conceived of as a simple or indivisible 
element of philosophy; rather, minimal is to be given the meaning – least 
possible quantity.376 He says that: ‘such decrease in the being or quantity 
of an entity is valued as a deficiency precisely because the least possible 
marks a limit beyond which no quantity obtains anymore.’377 
 
Gashé seeks to identify this as the point at which ‘least possible’ quantity 
enters into a manifest relation with others outside of bare opposition. He 
states that minimal things are not simply things on the verge of ceasing to 
be, but are already ‘something other than things’. 378 
 
This rather intriguing statement suggests some new means with which we 
might engage with the relation of non-relation, namely the positing of 
being outside of itself. In a key passage Gashé explains his position as 
follows: 
 
Understood as minimal things, relations, therefore, not only hold toward the 
non-relational, whether in the sense of a deficiency of relation or in the sense of 
the Absolute, but also imply a being-toward-something that is no longer of the 
mode of what philosophy has always thought of as the relational379 
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He continues: 
 
As a minimal thing, relation is reference to the others of philosophy: others that 
are not limited to its canonical others, such as literature, theology, or the natural 
sciences, and also, more disquietingly, others that are others in non-predictable 
ways. The plural of minimal things is irreducible. Qua minimal things, relations 
indeed refuse the identity of the concept.380 
 
In some sense then, the notion of relation as minimal thing points us to 
the limit that separates philosophy from anti-philosophy and cognitive 
from non-cognitive reason.  Gashé’s explanation is that classical 
philosophical accounts of relation proceed from those qualities the object 
possesses in respect of itself or attached to another thing. The logic of 
relation links and erases the singularity of relation. In classical logic, 
therefore, there is a failure to solve the expression of relation precisely 
because the logic of relations is ‘haunted’ by ontological questions.381 In 
this respect, Gashé draws upon Heidegger, who, he says, expresses his 
doubt that pros ti, translated as ‘relation’ takes sufficient account of its 
Greek sense, that of being-toward. He says that for Heidegger, relation is 
a ‘subjectivist metaphysical reduction’ of its true sense of being toward 
another.382 It is this being toward another that is the essential peculiarity 
of relation. Gashé asks: 
 
How does the thought of the other toward which the relation holds itself bear on 
the relation itself? Further, what are the senses – the direction and the ways in 
which it has to be taken – of such relating to something other?  Is being-toward-
another possible without a movement away from and ahead of the subject of the 
relation? Can relation be adequately thought without heeding the implication 
that its relatum lets the subject come toward it in the first place? If this is a 
necessity that is structurally implied in the very thought of relation, then is not 
relation primarily a response, a yes, to a prior invitation?383 
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We can read here an important correlation between relation and transitive 
ethics. If it is the other that relates to the subject, that draws the subject 
towards it as much as the subject that identifies its other and subjectivises 
it, then it is precisely the mimimal being of this kind of relation that is key 
to the singular or non-identical. At this point there is a marked difference 
between Gashé and Badiou, in particular Badiou’s axiomatic approach to 
relations in Logics of Worlds. Badiou’s position is as follows: ‘But a 
relation as such is precisely not an event. It does not transform the 
transcendental evaluations; it presupposes them, insofar as it too appears 
in the world.’384 
 
One might say that for Gashé eventality is the essence of relation as 
minimal thing, rather than viewing relation as the axiomatic combination 
of objects. What is evident in Gashé’s analysis is its suspension between 
positive and negative philosophy; it is a supplemental account. Gashé 
proposes on the one hand that the directionality of a relation impacts upon 
its own object so that an object might move away from its self-identity. If 
the Absolute of relation is negative self-relation or identity, constitutive of 
a thing then the movement towards some other entails a ‘breach’ of 
identity.385 Furthermore, self-relation or identity includes the demarcation 
from its other. This is how Hegel’s logic addresses the concept. The 
absolute contains a ‘trait’ towards the empty place of the other.  Therefore 
the relatum to which another is held ‘is by definition only within the place 
of the other’.386 
 
Again the following passage is helpful: 
 
the relation is not conceivable without heeding that space and place of the other 
– a place that can be occupied but that no host can ever saturate, and that is, by 
definition, a place awaiting another to come. But if the subject to a relation is 
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dependent in this manner on the other, the subject is never at its place either. In 
its place, too, there is ‘only’ a subject to come.387 
 
What Gashé is proposing, then, is that if a relation is essentially being-
toward something other it may not have an essence of itself. 
Paradoxically, relation directed to another entails that such ‘relation to the 
other precedes all identity’.388 He emphasizes that we ignore this at our 
peril. The subject must already be in the place of the other. This approach 
produces certain consequences for our thinking of relation. Gashé 
summarises them as follows: firstly; ‘the event of relation [is] anterior to 
relation’; and secondly that the rethinking of relation requires us to think 
of its occurrence in non-relational terms. 389 If we embrace Gashé’s 
position, then, any consideration of relation rests upon a distinction 
between its expression within terms of the absolute, and as self-identity. 
Gashé’s assertion that, ‘to engage the opening event of relationality is not 
possible without at the same time reconceiving the traditional 
philosophical ways of thinking of possiblization’,390 This is why Gashé 
can be productively read along side Althusser’s aleatory materialism and 
other more recent accounts of finitude in which contingency replace 
originary thought and conceptualisation.391  Thus, if materialism is 
premised upon its contingency, materialism arises from an evental 
digression from non-relation. As Gashé says: ‘The very concept of 
relationality carries with it a reference to the nonrelational’. And this, he 
states, was recognized as an essential trope of relation by the skeptics. It 
was also Hegel who demonstrated, ‘that the Ab-solute is the highest form 
of relation in that it accomplishes relation to itself and thus relates relation 
to the nonrelational.’392 
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Gashé  says that Schaaf similarly links the relational and non-relational by 
highlighting the indivisible unity between that which is absolutely without 
relation, a singularity that is beyond the power of negation, and that, 
which exists in relation. 393 Gashé further claims that philosophy has thus 
far addressed the problem either by severing relation from non-relation to 
the benefit of one term of the relation, or by staging relation and non-
relation within a binary dialectical opposition. 394 Gashé is critical of 
dialectics in this respect. He says that if thinking relation must entail its 
relation to the ‘without-relation’ then thinking in terms of dialectical 
opposition offers only a single and limited notion of relation when what 
are required are altogether different terms. He says that: ‘Visibly, relation 
has with respect to substance, and its unity, a multiplying power. It 
secures the difference of things, their singularity. Indeed, the being-
toward-other-things, is an expression of a things ‘finitude’.395 
 
He states that:  
 
the very fact that being-toward-another presupposes a place of the other, a place 
that can be occupied by the opposite, or other, of the subject (entity or self) but 
which is not saturated, fulfilled, or exhausted by this occupation; the fact that 
the identity of the subject of a relation comes to the subject only from the 
relatum and, hence, is always in waiting; and the fact that, finally, all relation 
involves a relation to a non-relational that is something other than a negative 
modification of relationality – these very facts narrow the proliferation of the 
multiple implications of and cross-references to what I would like to call a 
‘simple complex’.396  
 
Relation as simple complex is not for Gashé the very first thing 
philosophically speaking, but rather a threshold of the communication 
between entities or domains, which are in the position of others among 
each other.397 The notion of relation as minimal thing emerges from                                                         
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Gashé’s reflection upon its philosophical history, but remains primarily 
useful for Gashé as a singular configuration. He advocates the 
dismantling of relation as a formal concept together with the ontologies to 
which it has been subordinated. For Gashé: ‘The first item on the agenda 
of a rethinking of relation is thus to free relation as pros ti from the pro 
hen, the relation to the One, and to restore the specificity and singularity 
of relations.’ 398 
 
Gashé describes relation as having many shapes, rather than the 
modalities of a concept of relation, which he claims are irreducible. He 
offers examples such as encounter, arrival, address, contact, touch, 
belonging, distance, accord, agreements, determination, measuring, 
translation, and communication. He describes this approach to ‘relational 
shape’ as a restoration of the ‘aformal intricacy’ of relations.   
 
Gashé explains that:  
 
Without such an account, all restoration of relation to its aformal intricacy 
remains an exercise in empiricism, that is, in an approach that is only the 
negative of the exigency to relate (everything) to the One. Rethinking 
relationality cannot consist simply in turning one’s back to that demand. Rather 
than submitting to this demand for unification into the One, the rethinking of 
relation in question transforms this demand by tying into knots the cluster of 
traits involved in relations – that is, traits directed toward, and stretching from, 
the place of the other to the place of the subject of a relation, according to a 
relation that combines with modes of comportment that are no longer 
conceivable in terms of relation or non-relational.399 
 
What is compelling in this for my overall thesis is that the re-thinking of 
relation that abandons its conceptualisation and admits its ‘traits’ and 
aformal intricacies might found a theory of relational representation                                                         
398 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 11. What Gashé proposes is a splitting of pros ti, 
simply (being-toward-another) from pro hen (relation as an attribute of totality). 
Gashé posits that relation might establish itself outside of substance or self-identity, 
that is non-conceptually, thus proposing an ontology of pure singularity. 
399 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 11-12. 
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capable of articulating singular and non-identical relational forms. In 
divesting relation of its empirical and its ontological determination we do 
not thereby sacrifice its value: to recall Schaaf’s expression, we reveal its 
‘trans-objective’ form. In Gashé’s conviction that relation is granted 
primarily by the other we find a thinking of relation that supports 
Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism. Gashé says that relation, ‘it is not 
something that can be calculated, predicted or secured. To come into a 
relation is, therefore, also a matter of chance, luck, as it were.’ 400 What is 
thus paradoxical in Bourriaud’s search for new forms of knowledge based 
upon the encounter is, in fact, the recuperation of an old form of 
knowledge. The materiality of post-relational art in fact relies upon two 
neglected undercurrents of thought: aleatory materialism and the 
Scholastic thinking of relation. 
 
The form of the ‘simple complex’ of aformal relation advanced by Gashé 
is homologous to Bourriaud’s micropolitical stance. I think that it 
addresses the impasse identified by Steve Edwards between the ethical 
demands of non-representation and the political demands of 
representational critique. For Gashé, ‘simple complexes’ are relationally 
evental and thus they take non-relation as the principle upon which 
relationality can be re-thought. The importance of the ‘simple complex 
for artistic practice is that Gashé posits the evental relation as prior to 
relation as such.  To summarise, then, what Gashé’s account offers us is 
firstly a description of relation that is so much conditioned by its non-
relation as to fall outside the purview of philosophically determined 
being, that is determined through negation. At the same time he asserts 
the influential value of this minimal being upon philosophy as what is 
heterogenous to it, not in terms of ‘positive’ philosophy, but in terms of 
those others of philosophy in which the plurality of relations remain 
irreducible but nevertheless capable of presentation. 
 
The Future of the Image                                                         
400 Gashé, Of Minimal Things, p. 13. 
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In the course of this chapter, I have identified a reaction against the 
prevalent mistrust of images and the reductively ‘anti-representational’ 
stance taken within various forms of recent ‘situational art’. This 
prejudice persists in Bourriaud’s thinking of the ‘visual’. Can visual 
forms of representation escape the prohibition of images and their ethical 
condemnation: that images ‘speak for the other’? This is an important 
question because relational art relies upon its visual documentation in 
order to disseminate its ideas and to produce audiences for its artworks. 
 
In this section, I will consider Rancière’s essays, ‘The Future of the 
Image’ and ‘Sentence, Image, History’.401 What Rancière offers us is a 
clear analysis of the problematic fatalism that surrounds images, and as 
such, the recognition that a new distribution or regime of imageness 
associated with the critique of fatalism is identifiable with what he calls 
the ‘operations of the image’. This carving out of a ‘dissensual’ space for 
the operations of the image is dependent upon challenging the rigidity of 
a clear distinction between the indexicality of signification (that which 
we associate with positive knowledge) and the constructive principle of 
the operations of the image in preserving the persistence of testimony, as 
an excess of signification and constitutive of the social bonds or 
community based not upon signification, but rather upon the principle of 
recognition.  
 
Rancière’s provocation is that:  ‘the end of images is behind us.’402 What 
exactly does this mean? Rancière begins with an analysis of the 
eschatology of the image, identifying two ‘catastrophic’ opinions about 
image and reality. On the one hand; ‘there is no longer any reality, but 
only images…[And] conversely, that there are no more images but only a 
reality incessantly representing itself to itself… ‘403  
                                                         
401 Jacques Rancière, The Future of The Image (London: Verso, 2007) 
402 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 17.  
403 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 1. 
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In fact, he says that both positions testify to the collapse of the distance 
that used to enable us to distinguish between images and reality leading 
to the conclusion that the image no longer exists. Rancière urges that 
rather than think of images as realistic reproduction, we should instead 
examine the rules by which a given regime of the image determines what 
is representable and unrepresentable. On this basis he directs us towards 
the operations of the image, which is to say, ‘operations that couple and 
uncouple the visible and its signification or speech and its effect.’404 
Rancière distinguishes the image conceived of as a simple relationship 
that produces a likeness of the original, as that which stands in for it, 
from ‘the interplay of operations that produces what we call art: or 
precisely an alteration of resemblance.’405 The images of art produce 
dissemblance and he equates this dissemblance with a subtraction from 
meaning. 
 
For Rancière this alterity, which he maintains ‘enters into the very 
composition of the image’,406 if dissociated from the operations of the 
image produces the notion of hyper-resemblance in which the alterity of 
images is posited as material presence. He explains that hyper-
resemblance is the ‘original resemblance’ that does not attest to an 
elsewhere of reality but to a form of alterity itself that is either demanded 
of the image, or whose absence is deplored. In other words this is a form 
of hypostasis of the image’s alterity: it makes of it a relation that I would 
term ‘romantic’ and ideological.407  
 
This model, in fact, is underwritten by the mode of the image’s material 
production. The indexicality of the photograph, as exemplified by 
Barthes’ Camera Lucida, in which studium and punctum divide the 
image between sayable and visible, into photographic meaning and mute 
presentation or wordless image, is an artificial division. Rancière asserts 
that this is premised upon a naive transcription of the techniques of                                                         
404 Rancière, The Future of The Image, pp. 4-5. 
405 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 6. 
406 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 3. 
407 Rancière, The Future of The Image, pp. 8-9. 
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photographic reproduction into the concept itself.408 For Rancière this 
relationship merely defines a specific regime of imageness, or, a 
relationship between the visible and the sayable. My understanding of his 
criticism of Barthes is that the latter recognises a decoupling of the 
formerly stable relationship between the sayable and the visible 
characteristic of the representative regime of art, (a movement that can be 
traced back to the 19th century novel), but ignores the potency of the 
incommensurability of the aesthetic regime that replaces it; and in fact 
Camera Lucida can be read as a mourning for the representative regime 
itself. Thus the indexical theory of photography for Rancière fleshes out 
the fantasy of the romantic poetics of ‘everything speaks’, facilitated by 
an arbitrary separation of studium and punctum. He says that: ‘What the 
simple relationship between mechanical compression and the punctum 
erases is the whole history of the relations between three things: the 
images of art, the social forms of imagery, and the theoretic procedures 
of criticism of imagery.’409 
 
In essence, then, Barthes recognises the rupture within representative 
signification, but petrifies the image within an ontological binarism that 
remains premised upon a model of authenticity, or reality as a given 
rather than an operation.  He thereby excludes the social relations that 
govern this regime of imageness, which is now premised not upon 
reproduction but repetition, not singular production but the mass 
production of this very alterity. In other words Barthes brackets out 
alterity from the very heart of the image and from its conventional forms 
of signification. He ignores the social relations that determine the 
image’s reception and meaning. And what is more, Barthes fetishises 
what is not exchangeable in the image as the benchmark of its alterity. In 
other words he associates the alterity of the image with art when in fact it 
is the truth of the social.  
                                                         
408 The photographic image appears through its method of production to be a good match 
for symploke, but is in fact reduced from the metaphor of the weave to the metaphor 
of the index or ‘natures pencil’ as Henry Fox Talbot described it. 
409 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 15. 
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Rancière asserts that the dissimulations of artistic images and the 
commerce in social imagery of the 19th century produces a hermeneutics 
of decipherability, driven on in part by Marx and Freud's writings. 
Rancière says that this forged a relationship between ‘the operations of 
art’, ‘the forms of imagery’ and ‘the discursiveness of symptoms’ 
premised upon a loss of use and exchange value. 410 
  
 Rancière asserts that a new image value is produced through a twofold 
power of the aesthetic image: ‘the inscription of the signs of a history and 
the affective power of sheer presence that is no longer exchanged for 
anything’.411 So the fate of the image is already behind us in the sense 
that we have moved beyond what Rancière terms, a contemporary 
mediological discourse that asserts the identity and alterity of the image 
yet denies the apparatuses of their production and circulation. 412 In fact 
he asserts that the end of the image had already been rigorously explored 
in the art of the early 20th century, which sought the abolition of the 
mediation of the image in order to ‘realise the immediate identity of act 
and form.’413 This immediacy of act and form is characteristic of 
relational art and perhaps its hasty disassociation from the lessons of the 
avant-garde. 
  
 Rancière proceeds with a classification of the operations of the image, 
which he considers to be symptomatic of our current regime of 
imageness. He singles out the naked image, the brute trace of history, 
‘testimony to a reality that it is generally accepted will not tolerate any 
other form of presentation.’414 Also the ostensive image which asserts its 
power of sheer presence without signification, in the name of art. This 
operation he says is the presentation of the obtuse presence having the 
capacity to interrupt histories and discourses. It presents a singular mode 
of testimony. Finally the metaphorical image that refuses to isolate artistic                                                         
410 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 17. 
411 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 17. 
412 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 18. 
413 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 21. 
414 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 23. 
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operations and products from ‘forms of circulation of social and 
commercial imagery and from operations interpreting this imagery’.415 
This operation entails the singular rearrangement of circulating images’, 
and is he says a more playful operation, or entails, a form of 
recombinancy. What is important about Rancière’s analysis is that these 
operations do not work in isolation, but rather, they call upon elements of 
the logic of one another, that they in fact operate dialectically, in the 
production of a narrative supplement. He says that they are ‘three ways of 
coupling or un-coupling the power of showing and the power of 
signifying, the attestation of presence and the testimony of history’.416  
  
 My reading of Rancière’s operations of the image is as follows: if we 
accept that alterity enters into the very composition of images then we 
cannot simply divide the place of testimony from that of signification or 
indexicality. Rancière says in Dissensus, that residues of the 
representative regime of art persist within our contemporary reading of 
the image. It is essential that some trace of this remain in order to create a 
tension between the powers of signification and powers of testimony. 
Another way of describing this would be to regard this as being 
comparable to the ineliminability of the aesthetic as commensurate with 
an administered world.  
 
 Rancière’s sentence-image-history echoes Ricoeur’s view that it is 
testimony that is productive of social bonds and indeed of community.417 
Ricoeur identifies the ethical dimension of dissensus in his account of 
testimony as the opening of a discursive space through the presentation of 
divergent testimonies within the ‘sensus communis’ or community of 
sense.418 In Rancière's terms, this becomes the incommensurability of 
community as differing from itself, as therefore, a singular production of 
itself. These singular presentations both undo the representative                                                         
415 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 24. 
416 Rancière, The Future of The Image, p. 26. 
417 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006) p. 166. 
418 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: on Politics and Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2009) 
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relationship between text and image and provide their own principle of 
linkage or measurability between the sayable and the visible. 
  
 What Rancière appears to suggest for my overall thesis, and frames for 
my enquiry into the documentary real is this: the mourning for the 
efficacy of images and the valedictory pursuit of ‘the social bond’ are but 
different attributes of the same question.  Just as the future of the image is 
already behind us so is the future of relation. Relation as relation, and the 
photographic image are similarly burdened by the repeated self-evidence 
of their indexicality.  Both relation and index possess no ontological 
‘presence’: as simply being toward an-other, they are no more than an 
expression of finitude. Henry Fox Talbot’s’ use of the term ‘nature’s 
pencil’ as a description of the indexicality of the photograph, well before 
its consecration as art, might equally serve as a description for relation, 
and its burden in achieving recognition as an artistic form. 
 
Whilst I have been critical of Rancière’s political aesthetics, his analysis 
of the image is crucial to a thinking of the image which is in itself 
redefined within the overall project of relationality. Under the weight of 
the ethical prohibition upon images the reception of images must 
embrace the use and dissemination of images as essential to the social 
system of art and its circuits of exchange. This entails the recognition of 
the relationality of the image as a ‘simple complex’ in its own right. 
 
The Ontology of Performance and Performance Documentation: Live Art 
and Relational Aesthetics 
 
Relational artworks are generally documented and disseminated in the 
form of still and moving images, very much in the manner of live and 
performance art’s circuits of publicity. What then is the role of 
documentation within relational art? A first question is whether live art is 
really a model for relational and post-relational art practice? Given that 
they appear related perhaps only through their post-formal homologies 
and cognates: performance, participation, event, collaboration, this was 
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my initial assumption. But as I have already demonstrated, these 
similarities are not so much qualitatively different within relational 
practice to their precursors within 1960s live art as qualitatively 
indifferent. By this I mean to say that it is very difficult to separate the 
cognates of performative art from the performance management of labour. 
This was McKenzie’s observation. 
 
A second line of enquiry might be the assumption that they share the 
evental ontology of performance, and that relational aesthetics has 
somehow assimilated to its own ends that which appears radical in live 
art: its claim to resist the mediation of representation and its substitution 
of a direct form of social action. This seems to square with the model of 
relational art as a strategy of dematerialisation, but Bourriaud expressly 
rejects this charge. But does relational art retain any of the vestiges of the 
essentialist ontology of performance art? This is an insistence upon the 
ontological primacy of the live art event. Live art and relational aesthetics 
differ markedly, in that the former adheres to the purity of performance 
whereas Bourriaud distinguishes relational art’s use of performance in 
terms of the use of the performance form. Not only do I think that 
performance within relational art differs from its precursors in live art it is 
important to recognise that the ‘unmarked’ and ‘unmediated’ model of 
performance is itself questionable. It is necessary to question this model 
in order to liberate the documentation of performance practices from the 
shadow of this essentialist ontology of the ‘live’. Within this model, 
performance is privileged as the ‘true’ site of the work. Its classification 
of performance documentation as secondary, serves to preserve the 
authenticity and singularity of performance, and to preserve the 
mnemonic hierarchy that privileges mnesis above anamnesis.  In what 
follows I will question whether performance substantiates its radical 
credentials as ‘unmarked.’419 I will seek to establish that the relationship 
between performer and documenter is often an important encounter in its                                                         
419 The term ‘unmarked’ valorizes the performance as non-commodifiable. See Peggy 
Phelan, Unmarked: the Politics of Performance (London; New York: Routledge, 
1993) 
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own right and that the very notion of the ‘unmediated’ is idealistic and 
untenable. 
 
The ontological distinction between event and document 
 
Within the community of live art, practitioners who have their roots in the 
theatrical tradition tend to place greater emphasis upon the singularity of 
the performance as event, and so have a more problematic relationship 
with documentary material than those who have entered live art practice 
from a training in the plastic arts. Peggy Phelan asserts the radical nature 
of the ‘unmarked’ event as naturally resistant to the kind of 
commodification that bedevils fine art production. This argument is 
pursued to the extent that both she and Susan Melrose420 question the 
effect of their own discourses upon the events they describe and upon the 
need for specialist expertise in live art respectively. Phelan describes the 
relationship between event and document in the following ontological 
terms: 
 
Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, 
recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other 
than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the 
economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. 
Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes 
itself through disappearance.421 
 
Phelan’s overall assertion of the strength of an ontology of disappearance 
might be described as an extreme form of the taboo upon images 
criticised by Edwards. In her analysis of performance and its 
photographic documentation, Phelan states that: 
                                                        
420 Susan F. Melrose,‘Confessions of an Uneasy Expert Spectator’ 
<www.sfmelrose.org.uk>  [accessed 5 March 2012], (p. 1). 
421 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: the Politics of Performance (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p.146. 
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While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, 
performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. 
Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential 
revaluation gives performance art its distinctively oppositional edge. 422  
 
 It appears that the radicality of the event as ontologically pre-eminent can 
only be maintained at a cost: that of denying any dialectical or 
performative role for the document itself and for a dialectical relationship 
between mnesis and anamnesis. These documents constitute a fixing or 
naming of themselves at the very edge of the work’s disappearance. Their 
singularity is premised upon the documents’ fragmentary nature by which 
they might evade the ontological dualism of the generic and the particular. 
In Agamben’s words in their ‘manner of rising forth; not a being that is in 
this or that mode, but a being that is its mode of being, and thus, while 
remaining singular and not indifferent, is multiple and valid for all.’423  
 
 Put simply, Phelan gives insufficient weight to what is indiscernible in 
the image at the expense of its capacity to substitute or stand for the 
event. In fact, her position assumes a certain regime of imageness: that of 
the representative regime of art. For her metaphoric/metonymic 
distinction I would substitute the category of the paradigmatic as a means 
of overcoming the ontological separation between event and its 
documentation. My focus is upon what is irreducibly singular within both, 
and their dialectical intertwining.424 For many of the live artists working 
outside of the theatrical tradition, and particularly those asserting leftist 
agendas, it appears necessary to engage in both metaphorical 
(representational) and metonymic (unmarked) activities at the same time. 
Thus the artwork comprises a number of operations of image in relation to 
event. For example the artist Mark McGowan considers these two                                                         
422 Phelan, p. 147. 
423 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis; 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 28. 
424 The distinction between the two is anyway more often than not unclear. Again see for 
example Driven, R and Porings, R (eds.), Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison 
and Contrast (Berlin; New York: Mouton De Gruyter, 2003). 
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activities as complementary practices.425 He claims that the uncertainty 
and purity of the event as it unfolds under chance conditions remains 
central to his practice. At the same time, drawing upon Unmarked he 
claims that this event is ‘buttressed’ by documentation that gives rise to a 
narrative both before and after the event. So for example a press release 
would form the pre-evental narrative, whilst a video of the event posted 
on You Tube forms its post-narrative function. Leaving aside for the 
moment the issue of his solicitation of media attention, the question 
emerges whether this dualistic activity is driven by economic necessity, 
an elaborate game, or a contribution to a wider narrative about the 
conditions of the production of the artwork and the necessity of 
representation. It is worth looking at the particular passage from 
Unmarked, in which Phelan raises the notion of the document as a 
‘buttress’: 
  
The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the 
reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the ‘now’ 
to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the 
now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting camera, the video 
archive.) Performance occurs over a time, which will not be repeated. It can be 
performed again, but this repetition itself marks it as ‘different.’ The document 
of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory 
to become present.426 
  
 Unmarked itself contains a number of these ‘spurs to memory’ and they 
are unquestionably valuable in advancing the discourse of live art and 
productive of defining the social system of art. The fact is that the United 
Kingdom’s annual National Review of Live Art is systematically 
documented and archived by the University of Bristol. And yet private 
photography and video performances of the event are frowned upon. For 
me this raises worrying issues about the professionalisation of 
documentary practices. There is a vitality and intimacy to many                                                         
425 Yesvember, ed. by Claudia Milioti, (London: University of The Arts London and 
Chunky Arts, 2004) 
426 Phelan, p. 146.  
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recordings of historical performances. Often they are recorded by artist’s 
friends collaborators and bystanders. It also draws an artificial divide 
between performer and camera-person that ignores the collaborative 
nature of much early performance art in particular.427 More importantly 
the fact that documentation is universally practiced yet widely condemned 
exposes a symptomatic ‘philistine’ tension between metonymic and 
metaphorical approaches to the event, and a corresponding discourse of 
resistance to and complicity with documentary practices that are 
constitutive of the current conditions of a possible post-relational practice. 
Mark McGowan’s exemplary philistinism for example is that he willingly 
makes of himself a focus of this aporia. 
  
Auslander’s Challenge to Essentialist Performance Ontology: What is 
Liveness? 
 
I am suggesting that thinking about the relationship between live and 
mediatized forms in terms of ontological oppositions is not especially 
productive, because there are few grounds on which to make significant 
ontological distinctions. Like live performance, electronic and photographic 
media can be described meaningfully as partaking of the ontology of 
disappearance ascribed to live performance, and can be used to provide an 
experience of evanescence. Like film and television, theatre can be used as a 
mass medium. 428 
 
For Auslander the relationship between live and mediatised forms is 
historical and contingent rather than ‘ontologically given or 
technologically determined’. He bases his opinion upon examples of 
theatre in which performance might take place concurrently across a 
number of different sites, and upon the vanishing and temporary nature of 
recorded documents (his discussion focuses upon the use of analogue                                                         
427 Tracey Warr, ‘Image as Icon’ in Art, Lies and Videotape, ed. by Adrian George 
(London: Tate Publishing, 2003), pp. 30-37. 
428 Philip Auslander, ‘Ontology vs History: Making Distinctions Between the Live and 
the Mediatized’. The Conference Archives 
<www.webcast.gatech.edu/papers/arch/Auslander.html1997> [accessed on 5 March 
2012], (p 4). 
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recording media). Auslander leaves open the question of whether 
digitisation might re-instate the ontological distinction based on its 
relative permanence as a medium.  
 
 A more pressing argument, is Auslander’s position on the ontology of 
‘liveness’, a term which has more or less displaced the traditional 
category of ‘performance’. On one level we might read this simply as an 
acknowledgement that the camera is part of the performance. For example 
Alice Maude Roxby talks of the art of documentation in terms of arriving 
at the performance image, and emphasises the collaborative nature of 
such an undertaking.429 However, to simply recognise the imbrication of 
performance and documentation cannot fully address the continuing 
polarisation of the ‘live’ and the ‘mediated’. 
  
In Liveness; Performance in a Mediatized Culture Auslander examines 
the nature of ‘liveness’ more extensively.430 Through an historical 
analysis of the mediatisation of theatre through film and television, he 
concludes that the category of liveness is in fact premised upon that of 
mediatization. Significantly, his analysis also considers their relationship 
from the perspective of cultural production and specifically the 
commodification of liveness. Auslander begins by noting that whereas in 
their early form, mediatized events, particularly television, were modeled 
on live ones. He says that: ‘The subsequent cultural dominance of 
mediatization has had the ironic result that live events now frequently are 
modeled on the very mediatized representations that once took the self-
same live events as their models.’431 
 
Auslander states that the relationship between the live and the mediatized 
as oppositional occurs at the level of cultural economy rather than from 
                                                        
429 Alice Maud Roxby, ‘The Delicate Art of Documenting Performance: Me and My 
Camera (Person)’ in Art, Lies and Videotape, ed. by Adrian George (London: Tate 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 66-77. 
430 Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (Abingdon, New 
York: Routledge, 2008). 
431 Auslander, Liveness, p. 10. 
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the intrinsic characteristics of their forms.432 For example, live 
performances often incorporate mediatization to the extent that the live is 
a product of media technologies.433 Moreover, Auslander cites with 
approval Jacques Attali’s description of the cultural economy of 
performance as requiring a distinction between economies of 
representation and those of repetition; the distinction between the 
representation of a singular act and the repetition of mass production.434 
Attali proposes that although ‘representation emerged with capitalism’, 
ultimately capital ‘lost interest in the economy of representation’. 
Repetition of the mass production of cultural objects allows, against the 
singularity of a representation, the stockpiling of mediatized performance 
as accumulated value.435 On this reading, performances serve therefore as 
raw material for mediatization.436 Auslander says this is very clear within 
the world of commercial entertainment, but is not restricted to that realm. 
So, for example, he says that that the early documentation of performance 
and body art of the 1970s documentation was not initially carefully 
planned, but artists quickly became conscious of the value of 
documentation and the need to stage work for the camera.437 Auslander 
cites Gina Pane’s description of the role of photography in her work: ‘It 
creates the work the audience will be seeing afterwards. So the 
photographer is not an external factor, he is positioned inside the action 
space with me, just a few centimetres away. There were times when he 
obstructed the [audience’s] view!’438 
 
In addition he states that: ‘It is clear, then, that such archetypal works of 
body and endurance art as Burden’s and Pane’s were not autonomous 
performances whose documentation supplements and provides access to 
an originary event.’439                                                         
432 Auslander, Liveness, p. 11. 
433 Auslander, Liveness, p. 25. 
434 Auslander, Liveness, p. 27. 
435 Auslander, Liveness, p. 28. 
436 Auslander, Liveness, p. 28. 
437 Auslander, Liveness, p. 31. Chris Burden’s practice is identified as exemplary in this 
respect.  
438 Auslander, Liveness, p. 31. 
439 Auslander, Liveness, p. 31. 
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On this basis, he asserts that a documented work of performance art is not 
performed as an end in itself, rather ‘performance art is the virtual 
equivalent of its representations.’440  
 
It is not simply mediatization however that produces this model of 
liveness, but also a change in the nature of performance itself: in its 
rejection of theatrical paradigms, and specifically the assumed separation 
between actors and audience. Auslander relies upon Michael Kirby's 
description of this kind of performance within experimental theatre as 
‘nonmatrixed representation’ in which characterisation is abandoned and 
the performer merely carries out certain actions that nevertheless have 
referential or representational significance.441 This model for Auslander 
remains useful in describing much performance from the 1960s to the 
present, and serves also as a bridge from the experimental theatre of the 
1960s in its opposition to the mass media to a mediatized performance 
model.442 
 
I would note at this point that nonmatrixed performance-representation 
certainly ought to be included within the covert genealogies of relational 
aesthetics. However I would say that what is produced is a separate 
matrix: one that explicitly explores the forms of the social. Kirby also 
claims that: ‘in nonmatrixed representation the referential elements are 
applied to the performer and are not acted by him’ in such a way that the 
performance requires some form of mediation of the performers actions 
to create their meaning. This model of nonmatrixed, task-based 
performing therefore not only creates the need for mediation but allows 
the performer to move from the context of the avant-gardist mode of 
reception to that of mass culture.443 This dependence of the performance 
                                                        
440 Auslander, Liveness, p. 31. Citing Kathy O’Dell. 
441 Auslander, Liveness, p. 32. 
442 Auslander, Liveness, p. 32. 
443 Auslander, Liveness, p. 33. 
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upon mediatization significantly produces a situation in which ‘the 
performance is only successful as a simulacrum of the record.’444 
  
Auslander gives the following assessment: he says that mediatization is 
now explicitly and implicitly embedded within the live experience, and 
that: ‘Within our mediatized culture, whatever distinction we may have 
supposed there to be between live and mediatized events is collapsing 
because live events are increasingly either made to be reproduced or 
becoming ever more identical with mediatized ones.’445 
  
 This diagnosis, he says, is pervasive even in intimate, small-scale live 
performances, because it is a matter not simply of the use of technology, 
but also the influence of ‘media epistemology’. Reality itself is perceived 
through the mediation of technology and therefore provides a framework 
for perception. Benjamin's influence is evident here in that the assertion is 
that sensory norms are by their nature partially historically determined.446  
Benjamin’s mode of perception within mass culture as premised upon the 
desire to overcome distance or bring things closer, overcomes the auratic 
object through the reproduction of its likeness. This entails that the 
quality of the original's presence is always depreciated. However, for 
Auslander the live inscription of representation within the real 
compensates for, this depreciation.447 
  
We could say that live performance, in fidelity to its prohibition of 
images, serves to naturalise its mediatized representations through our 
nostalgia for the ‘im-mediate’. So the mediatized image can be recreated 
in a live setting, and therefore authenticates its reality, creating a 
circularity, rather than opposition between the live and the mediatised, 
which in fact augurs in a culture of simulation. The replacement of the 
live with technological and epistemological mediatisation produces an 
anxiety around the live which underpins the ontology of performance                                                         
444 Jacques Attali cited at Auslander, Liveness, p.33. 
445 Auslander, p. 35. 
446 Auslander, pp. 36-37. 
447 Auslander, pp. 38-39. 
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exemplified in Peggy Phelan's position.448 The assertion of the 
ontological primacy of the performance over its documentation allows the 
former to present the illusion of its elision of the economy of repetition. 
Auslander’s position is, of course, that the distinction does not hold on the 
basis that this: ‘is embedded within the language of live performance 
itself’. This destabilises Phelan's claims for independence. Auslander says 
in relation to Phelan’s position; ‘I doubt very strongly that any cultural 
discourse can stand outside the ideologies of capital and reproduction that 
define a mediatized culture or should be expected to do so, even to 
assume an oppositional stance.’449 The assertion of the oppositional 
character of performance art reflects an ideology, which Auslander claims 
is self-legitimating through a reductive adherence to the principle of 
authenticity based upon photographic indexicality. Auslander’s claim is 
however that the photographic or filmic document presents a mode of 
performativity itself, an argument I will expand in due course. Auslander 
takes a similar view to Rancière in which the reality of the performance 
consists in all of its apparatuses of representation.450 
 
Auslander asserts the relationality of liveness as a concept used to 
distinguish among cultural forms, and not a value neutral category. 
Importantly he analyses the claim that live performance builds 
community through its creation of bonds between the members of an 
audience. He claims that the unifying effect of audience participation 
may, though, ‘be little more than the common consumption of a particular 
performance commodity’.451 His assertion is that communality on 
whatever level is not a function of liveness: it is not dependent upon any 
spectacle, but rather upon the ‘specific audience situation’.452 Equally the 
notion that bringing performer and spectator together creates community 
is, he says, unsustainable on the basis that the elimination of the 
distinction between performer and spectator destroys the possibility of                                                         
448 Auslander, pp. 43-44. 
449 Auslander, Liveness, p. 45. 
450 Auslander, Liveness, p. 57. 
451 Auslander, Liveness, p. 64. 
452 Auslander, Liveness, p. 65. 
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performance per se. He says that for example Jerzy Grotowski and 
August Boal’s attempts to bridge this gap necessitated them abandoning 
the category of performance altogether.453 This is because the experience 
of theatre actually relies upon this separation, something inherent also to 
live performance. It is premised upon a desire for unity based upon an 
essential separation, which precludes this. Mediatized performance, 
however, may provide a satisfactory experience of community in its 
capacity to bring this about within an‘audience situation’. What is evident 
is that we encounter different forms of community of varying ‘distances’, 
for example, ‘virtual’, ‘existent’ or ‘transpatial’. This model, of 
performance matrices seems to me a better match for postproductive and 
radicant art practice than the ontology, which produces a misreading of 
relational art as the ‘fetishization’ of the encounter or event. 
  
 The Performativity of Performance Documentation 
  
 In an essay bearing this title Auslander develops his analysis further, this 
time, placing a greater emphasis upon the nature of the relationship 
between document and artwork.  
  
 Auslander begins with a comparison between Chris Burden’s Shoot 
(1971) and Yves Klein’s Leap into the Void (1960) and asks what 
difference does it make to our understanding of the performance 
document that the first really happened, whilst the latter was staged. He 
proposes a fundamental division between two categories of the 
performance document, which he names the documentary and the 
theatrical.454 The documentary category is conceived within the 
traditional ontological primacy of performance over its representation, the 
former authorising the latter. Picking up his association of this ontological 
model with a trivial realism in photography, he remarks that the 
documentary mode posits a correspondence between the signifier and the                                                         
453 Auslander, Liveness, p. 65. 
454 Philip Auslander,‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, PAJ, 85 
(2006), 1-10 (p.1). 
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signified, or a particular connection to the real in which the document is 
allowed to substitute for the performance. In relation to the classic 
iconographic imagery of performance documentation,455 he notes Jon 
Eriksson's suggestion that the use of black-and-white photography 
reinforces the documentary status as a supplement. This supplementary 
model does suggest a relationship of mutual dependence, with the 
photograph operating as an indexical anchor, but, overall, he proposes 
that within the documentary model the photograph acts as an access point 
to the reality of the performance.456 
  
 Within the theatrical category, Auslander places artists such as Marcel 
Duchamp, Cindy Sherman and Nicky S. Lee. In their work the 
performances are staged in order to be photographed or filmed and have 
no autonomous existence, or existence as presentations to an audience. He 
says that: ‘the space of the document (whether visual or audiovisual) thus 
becomes the only space in which the performance occurs.’ 457 In other 
words it resembles the photo-shoot. In spite of the ostensible differences 
between the categories, Auslander’s view is that both are equally staged 
for the camera. He reads within both, the use of documentation to achieve 
symbolic status within the realm of culture.458 
  
 Auslander bases the ambiguity of the distinction between the categories 
upon his account of Vito Acconci’s Photo Piece (1969) in which the 
performance consists of the taking of photographs (they are taken while 
Acconci is performing, rather than being photographs of Acconci 
performing). He claims that this artwork points towards a central issue, 
namely ‘the performativity of documentation itself.’459 This notional 
performativity recalls Austin's distinction between performative and 
constative utterances, between description and enactment. Auslander 
draws an analogy between the documentary category viewed within its                                                         
455 See Paul Schimmel, Out of Actions, Between Performance and the Art Object 1949-
1979 (London: Thames & Hudson, 1998) 
456 Auslander ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p. 2. 
457 Auslander,‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p. 2. 
458 Auslander, ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p. 3. 
459 Auslander, ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p.5. 
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traditional ontological statement as constative, whereas performance 
documents, 
 
are not analogies to constatives, but to performatives: in other words, the act of 
documenting an event as a performance is what constitutes it as such. 
Documentation does not simply generate image/statements that describe an 
autonomous performance and state that it occurred: it produces an event as a 
performance…460 
 
 In this sense performance becomes a pro-filmic event. Auslander says 
that it is through performativity that actions are framed as display, and 
through which the artist assumes responsibility to a different audience. 
This is not the audience for the live event but the audience for its 
documentation.461 I have already noted the emphasis that performance 
places upon the presence of an audience and its interaction with 
performers. However, Auslander identifies a different set of assumptions 
within performance documentation. He says that: 
 
It is very rare that the audience is documented at anything like the same level of 
detail as the art action. The purpose of most performance art documentation is 
to make the artist’s work available to a larger audience, not to capture the 
performance as an ‘interactional accomplishment’ to which a specific audience 
and a specific set of performers coming together in specific circumstances make 
equally significant contributions. For the most part, scholars and critics use 
eyewitness accounts to ascertain the characteristics of the performance, not the 
audience’s contribution to the event, and discussions of how a particular 
audience perceived a particular performance at a particular time and place and 
what that performance meant to that audience are rare. In that sense, 
performance art documentation participates in the fine tradition of the 
reproduction of works rather than the ethnographic tradition of capturing events. 
462 
  
                                                        
460 Auslander, ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p. 5. 
461 Auslander, ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p. 6. 
462 Auslander, ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’, p. 6. 
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 Of course the documentation of relational art does seek to include its live, 
or participatory audience, within encounters. But this does not mean that 
its documentary audience is any less significant or any less the ‘site’ of 
the work. In other words it seeks to do both. It is worth noting however 
that it is one of the means by which relational art presents the self-
evidence of its ethical immediacy, in having staged the overcoming of 
theatrical separation. I would call this its use of the theatrical form. 
However in the manner of the nonmatrixed performance, relational 
aesthetics is equally reliant upon some mediatization of its actions in 
order to confer meaning, or indeed, to give its encounters any formal 
integrity. In other words, relational art entails a situation of generalised 
performance, in which the artist is distinguished from other participants 
on the basis of their responsibility for the production and circulation of 
the performance documentation itself: this is documentary performativity. 
 
Conceptual Art and the Politics of Publicity: The Uneven Development 
of the Ontology of the Performative Document 
 
At this point I now want to consider a particular account of the way the 
plastic arts have responded to the potentialities of the document’s 
ontological uncertainty and have exploited its form. This is the subject of 
Alexander Alberro’s Conceptual Art and the Politics of Publicity (2003). 
What is important in Alberro’s analysis to the artwork/document 
distinction is his analysis of primary and secondary materials. He derives 
this from Seth Sieglaub’s assertion that: 
 
when art does not any longer depend upon its physical presence, when it has 
become an abstraction, it is not distorted and altered by its representation in 
books and catalogues. It becomes PRIMARY information; while the 
reproduction of conventional art in books or catalogues is necessarily 
SECONDARY information…When information is PRIMARY, the catalogue 
can become the exhibition.463                                                         
463 Seth Sieglaub, cited in Alexander Alberro, Conceptual Art and The Politics of 
Publicity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 155. 
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Installation art is paradigmatic of this post-conceptual condition. This 
passage, taken from an interview with Seth Sieglaub on early conceptual 
art, introduces an important approach to the ontology of the document 
rooted within the fine art rather than the performance tradition. Its 
influence continues to be felt in the current work of artists experimenting 
with the archival form. Its fundamental radicalism appears to be that it 
refuses to distinguish between artwork and document; indeed, it appears 
to render such a distinction unimportant. What then is the relationship 
between this approach and that of Phelan? What is Sieglaub’s conception 
of the event, if any? This is a difficult question for a number of reasons. 
The first and most obvious is that Seth Sieglaub was first and foremost an 
art dealer, and according to Alberro, a skilled and wily publicist who 
borrowed from and bought into the burgeoning cultural capital of public 
relations in the early 1960s. Add to this the fact that the artists 
represented by Sieglaub ranged in their diversity from Allan Kaprow, 
whose ‘happenings’ we might formally place within the performance 
tradition, to the documentary works of Joseph Kosuth and Douglas 
Huebler. The latter’s substitution of the idea of the work for the work 
itself is perhaps a better fit for the notion that the document 
performatively displaces the work itself as primary.  
 
The distinction between an artwork of whatever form and its 
documentation remains important at the level of form rather than 
ontology and yet this is at odds with the dissolution of the 
primary/secondary distinction suggested by the analytic philosophical 
tendency within some conceptual art practices. This tendency tends to 
suggest that there remains nothing of the work outside of their descriptive 
or propositional content. Rather than positing the disappearance of the 
‘event’, we are faced with a rejection of any ontology of art whatsoever. 
The primary/secondary distinction within conceptual art (or at least hard 
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conceptualism)464 is a substitution of terms for concepts, in fact, a series 
of exchanges at the level of representation whose primary concern lies 
within the dematerialisation of the art object and its rematerialisation as a 
sign of that dissolution rather than with metonymic questions of body and 
memory we associate with performance work. I prefer to see the 
primary/secondary distinction as indicative of the possibilities of 
translation that inhere within the work/document form. This entails that 
one bracket out what is normative in the distinction from its ontology. It 
is the normativity of the distinction, which makes it a potentially useful 
social form. In the conceptualism of the 1960’s, Duchamp’s question, 
‘Where is the work?’ is inflected with anti-retinality and a commitment 
towards the artistic proposition rather than exclusively towards 
ontological disappearance. The work endures as a concept, and 
specifically as the documentary representation of that concept. On that 
basis, it remains fundamentally metaphorical, and yet critical of its own 
metaphoricity. Alberro describes this process as: ‘The development of a 
type of work that could be presented without originals – a syntagmatic 
work whose materiality slid along a chain of signifiers…’.465 Thus the 
thinking of the artwork within chains of signification appears to be 
related to the manipulation of the forms of original and copy. 
 
I would like to explore the primary/secondary distinction in a little more 
detail comparing, in particular, the work of Robert Barry and Douglas 
Huebler. In Barry’s Inert Gas Series of 1969, the artist released canisters 
of inert gas into the atmosphere at a site in the Mohave desert. He then 
photographed the site to document the work. As Alberro explains; 
 
Since the inert gas is not only formally unstable but also invisible, the 
photographs Barry took of the site in the Mohave desert occupied by the gas 
                                                        
464 This term is derived from Peter Osborne, ‘Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy’ in 
Rewriting Conceptual Art ed. by Michael Newman and Jon Bird (London: Reaktion 
Books, 1999) pp. 47-65. 
465 Alberro, p. 74. 
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represented nothing more than desert landscape... Paradoxically, then, Barry 
made the photographs to deny the existence of visual evidence.466 
 
The photographs were not shown but publicity materials with a written 
description of the piece gave a telephone number through which the 
public might hear an audio recording describing the piece. In Alberro’s 
account he examines Sieglaub’s objective in marketing the artist as such, 
notwithstanding the lack of any marketable work. What interests me 
about the work is the way that it demonstrates various tactics of 
documentation. Firstly Inert Gas Series entails an action by the artist. 
This gives it a basis in an event for which the photographs are explicit 
representations of the event’s disappearance, or in Alberro’s terms 
‘imperceptable signs’. In this sense we can consider such photographs as 
inherently metonymic (Alberro’s paradox of the representation which 
fails to represent). It is clear in this instance that we are not being shown 
the work since the gas itself refuses to signify anything but this does not 
equate to the failure of signification; what is signified is the event of the 
artwork.  
 
The descriptive documentation of the work entails another strategy, that 
of substitution.  It can stand for the work or operate as an instruction as to 
how it might be repeated. In this respect we return to the sliding chain of 
signification. And thirdly, the telephone message represents a nascent use 
of basic technology to engage with an audience on the level of post-
narration. It is a forerunner of Mark McGowan’s use of You Tube.  
 
In Douglas Huebler’s Rochester Trip (1968), the work need not be 
performed at all. There need not be an event as such. The documentary 
material is an injunction to perform. It has the quality of an instruction 
manual. What unites Barry and Huebler’s work is that they are premised 
upon the distinction between primary and secondary material and seek to 
question the role of representation within aesthetics, or rather the 
aesthetic regime that founds artistic autonomy. What emerges                                                         
466 Alberro, p. 118. 
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paradoxically is the ineliminability of representation from aesthetics. 
This is one of the propositions with which I began this chapter. Peter 
Osborne’s analysis is instructive here. Reflecting upon Joseph Kosuth’s 
conceptual art practice and its relationship to the logical positivism of AJ 
Ayer, Peter Osborne states that Kosuth ‘directly contrary to his own 
understanding…. enacts an aestheticization of logical positivism’.467 That 
is, it is the artist’s ‘total signifying activity’ that becomes the content of 
the work, and the resulting disintegration of the distinction between 
primary and secondary materials flows from this. However, there are 
consequences. This aestheticization of the logical proposition robs 
Kosuth’s readymades of their indeterminacy or its negative charge. The 
readymade thus becomes a modality of determinate negation. 
 
Kosuth identifies the artwork as tautologous: that is it says nothing about 
any matter of fact, merely that it is art and on that basis equates its 
autonomy with self-referentiality. In this way he proposes that works of 
art are analogous to analytical propositions thus attempting to formulate 
an anti-aesthetic artistic autonomy. For Osborne, Kosuth then advances 
upon this proposition of analogy to a further proposition, namely that, 
‘Works of art are analytical propositions’. In so doing he, 
 
simultaneously introduced and foreclosed the semiological character of visual 
art, by abstracting from all questions of medium, form, visuality and 
materiality, while nonetheless continuing to pose them, implicitly, in his 
presumption of art’s difference from other forms of signification.468 
 
Kosuth’s implicit presumption of art’s difference can only be presented 
as a proposition within the context of art, and again as Osborne points out 
an analytical proposition is tied to a model of meaning, which is 
‘resolutely anti-contextual.’ Speaking of Kosuth’s attempt to eliminate 
aesthetics from the traditional question of aesthetic autonomy Osborne 
states that:                                                         
467 Osborne, p. 62. 
468 Osborne, p. 59. 
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The question is not how to eliminate or reduce the aesthetic dimension of the 
object (its morphological characteristics) but how, in each instance, critically to 
regulate the play between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘conceptual’ terms. As the 
institutional history of the documentation of performance pieces and temporary 
works shows, it is an irreducible dimension of the logic of the artistic field to 
present in visual form, however attenuated or seemingly irrelevant.469 
 
Both Alberro and Osborne make the point that any challenge to the 
aesthetic quality or materiality of the artwork within conceptual art 
entails a necessary foregrounding of the personality of the artist and of 
the nominative function of artistic subjectivity. When Osborne is 
speaking of Kosuth’s flawed ‘aestheticized logical positivism’ he claims 
that Kosuth’s need to downplay the contextuality of his work in order to 
emphasise its propositional quality. According to Osborne this deprives 
him of what was a key ingredient in the work of Marcel Duchamp: the 
capacity for negation inherent to the unassisted readymade as constitutive 
of its aesthetic autonomy. As a consequence, he argues, Kosuth was 
forced into a corner, in which his authority as an artist (and the necessary 
merger between artwork and professional criticism entailed by the 
‘proposition as to art’s nature’) rested upon his ability to establish his 
authority in such propositions upon pure artistic intention, so the artist as 
author, is replaced with the (meta) artist, an individual who confers 
artistic status through nomination. This is a reflexive form of self-
curatorship. 470 
 
On this basis, what may seem a rather simplistic argument on Alberro’s 
part, that the conceptual artists associated with Seth Sieglaub operated 
within a growing public relations economy, and thus relied upon 
publicity as a figure for the absent or dematerialised field of artistic 
production, can be re-cast decisively within the framework of the artistic                                                         
469 Osborne, p. 62. 
470 Osborne, p. 60. In fact this is a flaw inherent within any logic. The nominative 
procedure within which one grounds a given logic, becomes aestheticized through the 
legitimizing function of the artist-curator’s personality and reputation. 
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negation of aesthetic autonomy. Alberro states that: ‘The emergence of 
conceptual art is closely related to [the] new moment of advanced 
capitalism…[its] unusual formal features and mode of circulation in 
many ways utilize and enact the deeper logic of informization.’471  
 
We might understand this as an operative re-distribution within the field 
aesthetic of an avant-garde based upon the ‘event’ of conceptualism. It is 
a rehearsal of what is occurring now. That is, an attempt to re-define the 
role of representation in response to a particular conjunction of social 
relations within public relations. This has little to do with its ‘failure’ to 
dematerialize the art object. Osborne provides the helpful analysis of 
philosophy as art’s ‘vanishing mediator’ and describes what I would call 
conceptualism’s event as: 
 
through its identification with philosophy, to have reasserted the ineliminability 
of the aesthetic as a necessary element of the artwork, via a failed negation. At 
the same time, however, it also definitively demonstrated the radical 
insufficiency of this element to the meaning-producing capacity of the work. 
As such, it reaffirmed the constitutive ambiguity of philosophy’s double coding 
within the artistic field, as an enduring productive resource.472 
 
What I draw from this, and which corroborates Auslander’s account of 
the performativity of documentation, is that the ineliminability of the 
aesthetic is both tied to the ineliminability of art’s status as a commodity 
amongst other commodities, and the need for art to invent forms of 
representation in order to remain immanently self-critical: this in fact 
conditions its concept of autonomy. To recall, Adorno tells us that art 
becomes social by its opposition to society, and that it can only occupy 
this position as autonomous art, and yet art remains part of society and 
empirical reality of which they are part. Art must therefore accede to a 
certain form of mediation that places its autonomy in a place of acute 
tension. He says that:                                                          
471 Alberro, p. 3. 
472 Osborne, p. 65. 
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 Art keeps itself alive through its social force of resistance; unless it 
reifies itself, it becomes a commodity. Its contribution to society is not 
communication with it but rather something extremely mediated: It is 
resistance in which, by virtue of inner-aesthetic development, social 
development is reproduced without being imitated. At the risk of its self-
alienation, radical modernity preserves art’s immanence by admitting society 
only in an obscured form, as in the dreams with which artworks have always 
been compared.473 
 
The ‘Documentary Real’  
 
My understanding of the documentary real is that it is constructed through 
a matrix of relations that includes any interpretive task or performative 
mediation through the agency of the artistic document. Thus the real in 
the sense I use it, maps the relations that configure a work’s discursive 
‘site’. I would describe the encounters of relational aesthetics as the 
performance of inter-subjective encounters that require and indeed are 
conditioned by the expectation that they require some extraneous or 
additional mediation or supplement. There is an in-built expectation that 
they will be viewed by audiences who understand and participate at 
different places within the relational matrix of mediation necessary to 
ascribe meaning to the work. That is, an audience whose proximity to the 
work varies, and who are subjectivised by the work on different levels. 
 
The point here is that if we accept that relational forms are discernable 
within networks of encounter then the relation of the photograph to the 
work and the mediation, and the auto-affective capacities of the 
document’s circulation and reception, must be read into this matrix in 
order to define the present institution of art, literally art’s sociable form. 
Bourriaud himself suggests that the work ‘does not offer itself as a spatial 
whole, but as a time span to be crossed’.474 The work comprises ‘the                                                         
473 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans and ed. by Greta Adorno and Rolf 
Tiedemann (London: Athlone Press, 1997), p. 226. 
474 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p. 73. 
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totality of the artists practices of signification’.475 Monica E McTighe’s 
work around the relationship between installation art and its 
documentation is helpful in formulating the ‘documentary real’ in these 
terms. 
 
McTighe’s work looks at the connections between installation art 
photography and memory. Installation art and photography present a 
particular mnemotechnics within contemporary art practice. She claims 
that photography connects the practice of installation art to the way 
contemporary society cultivates memory and constructs history 
particularly in relation to archives and collections. This relies upon a 
Derridean conception of the photograph as supplementary in the sense 
that it thereby ‘presences’ the work. The ‘sequence’ of supplementary 
mediations of the art work form a chain that in fact produce the sense of 
the work in the very deferral of it. This is similar to Auslander’s notion of 
informationally-mediatised epistemology. McTighe’s formulation relies 
upon Miwon Kwon’s and Robert Smithson’s thinking of site-specificity. 
In Smithson’s work, it is the non-site of the work in relation to its 
photographic documentation that is key. The photograph itself as this 
‘non-site’ adds to the mobility of the work and allows for an expansion of 
the ‘site’ of the work to extend its epistemological field and interpretation. 
On this basis, she asserts, following Kwon, that the discourses of memory 
and history can be included within the contemporary discourse of the site-
specific to include, in addition to material content, people, objects, places 
and disciplines. In other words, the move from gallery based relational 
practice towards post-relational experimental community, is both 
facilitated by this expanded field of epistemology, but moreover, the post-
relational work produces its own site. The site consists of that in which 
topology and discursive symptoms become the work’s ‘locus’ and its 
production. This approach is helpful to re-thinking sites as a 
‘configurations’, as Badiou would term it, and to the question of the pre-
evental analysis of a site, based on its relative ‘discursive instability’. For                                                         
475 Monica E. McTighe, Epic Forgetting: Mapping Memory Practices in Installation Art 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2005) 
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McTighe it is the installation and its documentation that marks those sites 
as ‘heterotopian’ – as sites that connect to other times and places. In other 
words, they form a site of intersection. 
 
If we accept that relational forms are produced within a matrix, 
comprising the relation of the photograph to the work in its mediative and 
auto-affective capacity; and include within this matrix the document’s 
circulation and reception, then the ‘documentary real’ can be read as a 
productive site that nominates the ‘institution of art’. It is within this 
expanded matrix that we can begin to speak of relation in terms of its 
relational shape. In order to bring my analysis of the re-thinking of 
relation into the analysis of post-relational art, what I am proposing is that 
Bourriaud’s topologies and matrices of encounter demand some means of 
thinking of relation in its non-relationality, that is as a singular 
construction.  
 
Realist Topology 
 
The development of the post-relational idiom is defined by the emergence 
of topology as a key artistic category that responds to, and augments, the 
local and micropolitical configurations of relational art. In particular, the 
notion of relational shape emerges from a heterology of thought that is 
sympathetic to Bourriaud’s aleatory materialism. Gashé’s rethinking of 
relation as riven by the event of its non-relation might take hold 
symptomatically as the basis of a material aesthetics in which the event is 
placed at the heart of relation rather than outside it. This tends to ground 
Bourriaud’s transitive ethic within the notion of being-toward-another as 
a category of relationality that has its own particular history. It lies within 
a notion of relation that Gashé argues has been forgotten or erased. 
 
Post-relationality also requires a re-thinking of the relationship between 
the real and the virtual in which minimal relations comprise a form of 
realism that sets itself in opposition to the actual. ‘Capitalist Realism’ 
ought properly, then, to be termed ‘Capitalist actuality’, given that it is 
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merely a logical and contingent form of appearance. This introduction of 
‘the actual’, liberates ‘realism’ from dystopian discourse and allows it to 
enter into a critical relation to post-relational practice’s ‘realism’. In other 
words, it recognizes in aleatory materialist form, the contingency of the 
real. 
 
Another movement towards the form of this realism relies upon an 
Adornian reading. The post-relational matrix is a fragmentary 
construction. In this respect, it denies the real as a totality of relations and 
rejects any Grundnorm of relation that might dictate the ordering of its 
relations. By doing this it not only presents the internal logic of its 
configuration but immanently questions the necessity of the logic of the 
‘actual’ within which it inheres. In Adornian terms this grants the 
matrices of relational shape their objective credentials. 
 
What I am proposing is that post-relational forms entail both the thinking 
and the representation of ‘realist’ topologies that move us beyond the 
constrictions of metapolitics that conflates all forms of representation 
with ideological or ‘actual’ appearance. Topology, and matrixed topology 
in particular, is the ‘post-public’ model for the production of discursive 
space. Within the broadening rubric of representation I have identified, 
the production of this space is therefore an act of representation on the 
basis that it produces subjective consciousness. 
 
If such a topology is to be an immanent critique of the actual, then it must 
produce itself within vastly transformed conditions of production. These 
are the conditions of disorientation and precarity: of de- and re-
territorialisation. I would describe it as the performance of a topology 
within the promisory form of social realism, in which the virtual is the 
necessarily non-relational part of productive relation as representation. If 
we are to formulate some programme of representational efficacy for 
post-relational practice, this must occur on the basis that the forms of 
representation are now inherently topological rather than semiological. 
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The ‘visual’ documentation of post-relational practices entails the linking 
together of representations within larger assemblages or chains. 
Representational chains thus produce some of the specificity of a 
topology. In addition, post-relational networks of distribution and 
circulation link audiences and spatio-temporal configurations within a 
performative matrix. The social system of art becomes, then, the 
production of the social itself as an acute form of differential network. 
This differentiation takes the form of an excess of testimony over the 
actual. The post-relational form of topology I adopt is an expansive 
assemblage of specificities of relational shape. This topological 
assemblage produces a universal subject as being in and for itself. It 
seems to me that what we are witnessing within post-relational aesthetics 
is a new ability to think the specificity of a relational as a socialized 
singularity, and moreover, the annexation of a broader rubric of 
representation modelled upon consciousness as the contestation of 
subjectivity. As such, it is not necessary to abandon micropolitical forms 
in order to facilitate new forms of representation within relational art. 
Neither do we need to lump together all forms of visual representation 
with the pejorative form of ‘the visual’. If there is to be a maxim for post-
relational representation it might be one we have already encountered: 
‘when and where does it appear and for whom’. 
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Conclusion 
 
How are the concepts of relation and representation conjoined within 
relational and post-relational political aesthetics and how are these 
concepts evolving within the rubric of a new critical realism, or the 
‘documentary real’? 
 
Within early relational arts its representational forms tended to be limited 
to gallery based installation type artworks, the documentation of 
performances and descriptions of relational art within journals and books. 
The engagement of this art with forms of representation was at first 
tentative and with good reason. Bourriaud found himself caught within 
one of the paradoxes of political art: that is the injunction to provide a 
critique of representation at the level of the ‘generalised reification’ of 
relations within a ‘totally administered’ world, countered by an ethical 
prohibition upon images and the ideological dangers of ‘speaking for the 
other’. Bourriaud recognised the need to produce new forms of 
representation adequate to the realisation of new material forms of 
relation but was bound by the micropolitical premises of his programme 
and what appears, in retrospect, to have been micropolitics’ reductive 
condemnation of all forms of representation as instances of ‘over-
encoding’. Thus the criticality of early relational art manifested itself 
weakly at the level of representation and was heavily reliant upon 
Bourriaud’s polemics as a source of legitimacy for its political 
credentials. Bourriaud’s initial solution was to draw upon Daney’s 
theorisation of ‘the visual’ in order to bracket out visual/ideological 
forms of representation from the representative capacities of relational 
art’s micropolitical forms and communities. This was, however, only a 
partial solution. The critique of Relational Aesthetics seized upon the 
weak representational manifestation of relational art and this produced 
the charge that relational art neither provided any object of contemplation 
nor demonstrated its usefulness or political efficacy: in other words, that 
it lacked any qualities upon which it might be judged. Early relational 
arts lack of a developed procedure of representation made it vulnerable to 
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a number of misreadings. Chief amongst these was the claim that 
relational art was an art of dematerialisation and that it merely re-iterated 
the failed programme of conceptual art’s critique of the commodity form 
but with a new inflection of theatricality: the fetishization of relational 
encounter. This went against Bourriaud’s insistence that relational 
aesthetics was a materialist programme and that the forms of relation it 
produced were concrete. In addition the representative forms of 
democracy and of the counter-public realms that Bourriaud appeared to 
advocate in Relational Aesthetics were underdeveloped and contributed 
to a reading of relational art as consensual and convivial. This prompted 
a critical division between convivial and antagonistic relational aesthetics 
in which particular relational practices works that evinced a strong 
photographic element were lauded as antagonistic, and in which 
antagonism became a benchmark for the judgement of relational 
artworks. 
 
Overall, the critique of early relational aesthetics helped to re-clarify the 
irreducibility of representation within any programme of aesthetics. It 
allowed Bourriaud and his interlocutors to explore a speculative 
micropolitics of representation that encompassed a potentially broader 
range of forms. Bourriaud’s response in Postproduction and The 
Radicant was to engage more explicitly with forms of exchange and to 
explain in greater detail the forms of representation that might be used to 
re-narrativise their forms, for example the screenplay and the sample. 
Thus there is a movement towards the use of form in its representative 
capacity. Along with Bourriaud’s more emphatic explanation of the 
relationship between mimesis, topology and translation this provided a 
more nuanced account of the way that the use of forms is both a 
representational act and a principle of construction: that is, the 
proposition that relational topologies produce sites of representation and 
the nature of the counter-public it proposed. At the same time the 
discourse of political aesthetics moved towards the notion of community 
as a representative form which encouraged the thinking of more 
extenuated form of artistic representation. 
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In my analysis of the re-thinking of relation, I concluded that the 
categories of relation and representation are linked within a classical 
mode of thought in which the general and the particular render ‘extinct’ 
the thinking of singular relation or the appearance of singular forms. 
Thus in very Adornian terms I re-discovered the obstacles that 
philosophy can place in the way of developing forms of art. In an 
extension of Rancière’s maxim I concluded that the future of both 
representation and relation are ‘behind us’. This was not an 
eschatological conclusion. It was merely the premise for a rethinking of 
relation and non-relation together rather than in terms of anti-
representation. This culminated in a link between Bourriaud’s relational 
matrix as a singular appearance with the notion of relational shape and 
the non-identitarian aformal intricacy of relation taken from Gashé. 
Where they meet is in the notion that encounters, meetings gestures and 
other types of interaction might form the basis of a broadening of the 
palette within which we might recognise representational forms. Broadly, 
these are forms of representation premised upon their ability to act upon 
consciousness. 
 
Within the current defence of representation there is a recognition that 
the ethical refusal of modes of representation leaves only a vacuum for 
ideological forms of representation to fill. Within this, visual 
documentation has a continuing role to fill on the basis that it can be 
viewed, not as enslaved to ‘meaning’, but increasingly as a tool. In other 
words there is developing recognition of the performativity of the 
performance document and a realism about its dialectical relationship to 
the forms of ‘liveness’, that have previously been used as a purported 
form of resistance to commodification. This resistance has been 
predicated upon a privileged ontology of performance, which in fact is 
illusory and unhelpful to the development of post-relational modes of 
representation. 
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Why has the question of relation emerged as a problem for culture 
generally? Why does the discourse of relationality dominate political 
aesthetics and philosophy? 
 
I have concluded that the question of relation arises whenever there is an 
acute need to question the intra and extra-mental properties of relation. In 
our conjuncture, this arises from a state of generally reified relation in 
which the thinking and the implementation of new relations appear to be 
disjoined. That is, they appear within a relation of non-relation. This, in 
turn, dictates that the very aporii of non-relation become a productive site 
for both art and philosophy. Given that the site of non-relation is a site of 
singularity in which, by definition, the non-object or non-being of 
relation cannot appear, this precipitates in philosophy, an analysis of the 
precepts of singularity and particularity and the very philosophical logic 
that precludes the appearance of singularities. Within art, this appears in 
the form of a re-appraisal of the precepts of representation and demands a 
re-thinking also of the nature of artistic autonomy or, the relation of non-
relation between art and what is heteronomous to it. 
 
Why have relational and post-relational practices returned to the 
ontology of the event? 
 
Within a relationally hypostatic constellation, the aporia of non-relation 
invites a form of speculative ontology or metaontology of the event. The 
event appears as the absent third term within a contradiction between the 
singular and the particular. The problem with this is that it has taken a 
providential or messianic form that elides the role of human agency. 
Hence, we encounter the event in its non-appearance, in its maximal and 
fleeting appearance as rupture. What has emerged within the theorization 
of the event, and particularly its rarity in Badiou and Rancière’s thinking 
is that the thinking of the event was in fact a symptomatic framing of 
relational hypostatsis. I have chosen to theorise the event, after Gashé, as 
inhering within the very aformal intricacy of relation and as a principle of 
movement towards non-identity. In this respect, the evental nature of 
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minimal relations allows for a thinking of the particular in its 
contingency. This is why I conclude that aleatory materialism is a 
thinking of the event that emerges from a heterological mode of thinking 
better attuned to challenge hypostatic relation than the providential 
model. When the event is conjoined to the motility of relation what 
emerges is a model in which artistic agency becomes relevant once again.  
 
What is the relationship between relational and post-relational practice 
and the historical and neo-avant-gardes? How have the cognates of 
sociability within previous forms of ‘socially engaged practice’ 
translated into the rubric of relationality? 
 
I have concluded that there is a productive relationship to be explored 
between the neo-avant-garde and post-relational practice as a ‘rich loam’ 
of experimentation but I chose not to examine this relationship in any 
detail. This was partly in recognition of Bourriaud’s insistence that the 
‘unprecedented’ programme of relationality is qualitatively different 
from the avant-garde and partly in order to examine those aspects of 
relational aesthetics that purportedly make it so. There is certainly a 
migration of cognates and procedures from the historical and neo avant-
gardes into relational aesthetics. Participation, collaboration, performance 
and encounter all feature within both. In early relational art these 
cognates do carry with them some of the immediacy and political-
interventionist verve of the avant-garde. However, what distinguishes 
post-relationality from the avant-garde is firstly the milieu and 
conjuncture in which it arises. Thus, globalization demands an aesthetics 
adequate to the shrinking spaces of artistic autonomy and in which the 
influence of popular culture is exponentially greater than it appeared 
under modernism. In addition to this, the blurring of the distinction 
between consumption and production and unique spatio-temporality of 
networks of communication and exchange require relational art to 
operate within very limited spaces of non-identity. In fact, relational art is 
tasked with producing these spaces. This is of a different magnitude to 
the site-specificity and performance spaces of the 1960s and 1970’s. 
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Relational aesthetics takes greater risks with artistic autonomy than do 
previous avant-gardes, quite simply because it has to. At the level of 
methodology, Bourriaud’s anti-teleological and anti-historical rejection 
of the avant-garde (although I think he genuinely admires it) is no 
affectation. Even in the shift of emphasis that occurs between Relational 
Aesthetics and Postproduction Bourriaud maintains a strong 
methodology and an adherence to his principles of chance or aleatory 
materialism. Thus in spite of his rhetoric of altermodernism, his thinking 
is rather post-modern and anti-philosophical in this respect. It is certainly 
not an easy fit with theories of the avant-garde, at least until Foster’s 
formulation of it in non-utopian terms. 
 
 
What are the consequences for the theory of artistic autonomy of 
relational and post-relational artistic practice? Can the theory of 
autonomy be maintained in the light of these practices? In other words, 
what gives these practices their distinctive character as art? 
 
The initial critique of Relational Aesthetics exhibited a great deal of 
anxiety about the autonomy of this new artform. This was a reflection of 
the mimetic qualities of relational art: its use of the forms of non-art. 
Allied to this was the demand that relational art demonstrate its aesthetic 
qualities, either through the demonstration of its objects or its efficacy. 
Therefore, without any ostensibly tangible demonstration of its forms 
relational art was unable to distinguish within the extant notion of 
autonomy, any substantiation of its claim to be art beyond its nominative 
capacity. This resulted from a misreading of both Bourriaud’s principle 
of productive mimesis and translation and the importance of aleatory 
materialism in relational aesthetics. These are the means by which new 
forms are created and established.  Thus, there has been confusion around 
Bourriaud’s articulation of the principle of ‘inhabitation’ or the co-
existence of relational forms with the hegemonic. This concern with 
aesthetic autonomy persists also in the archival and informational forms 
of relational art although these are less directed at relational art than as 
 259 
the whole range of critical art and networks of expanded authorship that 
have emerged within ‘internet art’. 
 
Overall, it is fair to say that anxieties about the autonomy of relational art 
have abated as debates around art’s sociable forms have fixed upon the 
more tangible category of community. There has been a general 
recognition also that Bourriaud’s project has not in fact produced any 
dire consequences. Aesthetic autonomy can be used, wrongly in my 
view, as an eschatological category that censures the heterononomous 
proclivities of emerging art. On my reading of Adorno’s dialectic, it is 
the risk that one takes with non-art that produce the most acute form of 
contradictory engagement with art. Relational aesthetics rejuvenates the 
notion of artistic autonomy and produces a maximal appearance of its 
contradictory nature. 
 
In addition, the global economic crisis and recent critical engagement 
with the ‘idea of communism’ has also produced a shift in critical focus 
and a reading of relational art as one approach among many others to the 
sociable forms of art. Thus relational art has to some extent been swept 
along in a wave of utopianism, which has had something of a re-birth as a 
preliminary form of critical engagement with capital. Relational art’s 
stockpile of forms and methodologies has informed this movement. As a 
consequence, relational art has lost its novelty and is no longer the centre 
of critical focus it once was. This has enabled some critical distance to 
open up on relational art. I have been able in my thesis to consider 
relational art and its critique together. On this basis the thesis might be 
read as an account of the operations of artistic autonomy and the very 
dialectical process that informs it and mutates it. Relational art has 
changed the notion of aesthetic autonomy because it has insisted upon its 
legitimacy as art and has devised strategies for engagement with non-art 
that entail realistic assessments of the conjuncture of globalisation and 
the forms of artistic inhabitation that are possible within it. 
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In what sense are relational and post-relational artists as ‘tenants of 
culture’ employing the use of forms mimetically?  
 
I think that Bourriaud recognises that there is no ‘outside’ of culture and 
that to this extent as ‘tenants of culture’ or ‘renters’ of cultural forms 
artists are totally implicated within its structures. The point is to learn 
how to inhabit it ‘better’, that is for artists to make their presence known 
rather than to seek some means of escape. This is where the influence of 
de Certeau upon relational aesthetics should not be underestimated. In the 
early development of relational art in particular, Bourriaud’s search for 
ways to articulate this principle and for appropriate forms of expression 
(I am thinking in particular of his use of the Marxist term ‘liminal’) have 
invited misreading. For example, liminality entails some place in which 
the commodity form of exchange is suspended. Thus his use of the term 
as denoting the production of discourse comes at a price: this is 
association of liminal relational form with a literal rejection of exchange 
value. This is not what he intended and I certainly think that this reading 
enabled Bourriaud to refine his use of ‘tenancy’ in his later work. For 
example by the time we reach The Radicant, the notion of tenancy as a 
principle of occupation is replaced with a principle of motility and 
relational flows. Also in the later work it is the motility of the movement 
between relations that becomes prevalent rather than the notion of any 
domiciliary inhabitation. 
 
Bourriaud’s thinking of mimesis is essential to a reading of 
‘inhabitation’. Mimesis entails the notion of transformation through the 
use of forms and the construction of topologies that establish new 
relational matrices allow Bourriaud to construct a form of inhabitation 
that we might describe in Stallabrass’s terms as ‘real virtuality’. This 
form of virtuality therefore enables a reading of inhabitation that is not 
based upon the simple repetition of extant relational forms. 
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What is the nature of relational art’s engagement with archival practices 
and informational networks of expanded authorship within contemporary 
art practice? 
 
As the principal locus for the construction of relations as a general social 
technique of labour, it is hardly surprising that relational art has sought to 
explore this territory as artists acting under the archival impulse have 
done since the turn of this century. The internet provides an ideal site in 
which to pit artistic labour against non-artistic labour and is a site in 
which the appropriation of forms, translation and sharing is easily 
achieved. It provides a model in which the performativity of labour can 
be explored and a site at which subjectivity is contested. 
 
However, the charge of the reductively mimetic nature of this art has 
persisted. The questions of whether ‘resistant’ networks and 
‘informational readymades’ are possible within the strictures of the 
network, has become the focus for the question of autonomy. Counter-
networks are potentially limited in their efficacy on the basis that they are 
easily recuperated, whilst the homogeneity of informational relations 
would seem to preclude any migration or metamorphosis of the 
informational readymade. These are tough questions for anybody to 
answer, and perhaps it is too soon to tell whether there is indeed any 
efficacy in this art as the means to critique capital. A provisional solution 
might be to view the question in terms of hegemonic logic and counter-
logic, and in addition, to view the matrices of relationality not simply as 
encased within electronic communication but as establishing social 
relations outside of its circuits. This would be the way that Negt and 
Kluge would examine a counter-public sphere: as an agglomeration of 
diverse sites and audiences. On this basis, the networks of post-relational 
production should be read within a broader matrix of relational 
production, that Foster anticipated in ‘the archival turn’. 
 
Relational artworks can take many forms including gallery-based works, 
online networks of expanded authorship and experimental communities. 
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Can we yet discern a new artistic form of post-relationality? What is the 
difference between relational and post-relational artistic practice? 
 
‘Post-relationality’ is a symptomatic term that arises in many different 
forms in this thesis. I have tried not to give it a fixed definition, nor have 
I tried to historicise it (for example in the move from gallery based 
artworks toward communitarian and matriced relations). Its usefulness 
has been as a name for a constellation of impressions that I have of the 
development of the programme of relational art. It is a name for the 
calling back and forth of these symptoms. Its elements include, but are 
not comprised, within the notion that relational art was post-relational 
from its inception: this means that early relational art was less a 
remediative aesthetics than a diagnostic one. It includes the post-
representational, or elements of it, in the sense that the urgent need to re-
formulate representation in relational terms becomes increasingly 
apparent as the critique of relational aesthetics confronts relational art 
with its non-appearance. It also recognizes the action of artistic praxis 
upon classical notions of relation within philosophical discourse and the 
need to replace this with a heterological thinking of relation that is both 
aformal and more nuanced than ‘the particular’ and enables its 
materiality to be built upon a principle of contingency. The list is not 
exhaustive. It merely indicates certain transformations that have taken 
place in the thinking of relationality within the last ten years. 
 
What might characterise the emergence of the ‘post-relational’ is a 
productive reading of the ‘relation of non-relation’ that arises within 
many aspects of culture, not as the impasse of anti-relationality but as the 
means by which to re-think relation and its forms of representation and 
epistemology. The epistemology of the ‘post-relational’ is dominated by 
these concerns and, in addition to the need to define new forms of 
knowledge within the precepts of post-representation and counter-
publicity. It operates also within a notion of performative materiality and 
a heterological mode of thinking that is now associated with the 
materialist undercurrent in Marx’s thinking.  
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Given that relational aesthetics is founded upon a micropolitics that is 
inimical to representation and in particular, to ‘visual representation’, 
what would be an adequate model of the forms of representation 
proposed by relational and post-relational artistic practices? What are 
the various forms of representation implicated within relational art and 
what might a relational ‘topology’ offer in terms of beginning to speak of 
new forms of representation such as ‘relational shapes’ and matrices? 
 
Relational aesthetics followed the prevalent hostility towards 
representational forms, certainly the forms of visual representation that 
have been prevalent in critical art at least since the 1960s. And the 
centrality of micropolitics dictated this. To recall, micropolitics is not 
simply a theory of anti-representation although this is an important 
element. It would have been impossible for relational art to develop 
microstructural responses to globalised capital without the benefit of this 
thinking. Nor could it have recognized that a thinking of relation upon a 
different scale (minimal relation) is pre-requisite to any form of critical 
inhabitation of reified macropolitical structures. Relational art has not 
been alone in this: the influence of Deleuze and Guattari upon critical art 
has been massive within art schools at least since the early 1980s. 
However, I think that from the outset relational art was haunted by the 
anxiety that it may not find an adequate mode for its appearance. This 
can be seen in Bourriaud’s formulation of ‘visual’ (ideological) against 
transitive-ethical forms of representation based upon the encounter. In 
the latter respect, Bourriaud falls into the tendency of critical art to 
substitute what Rancière calls ‘ethical immediacy’ through the principle 
of action as social montage. Whilst Bourriaud rejected Conceptual art’s 
notion of dematerialisation (although this is itself a reductive account of 
Conceptual art, albeit a prevalent one), he understood equally that 
Conceptual art demonstrated the irreducibility of representation within 
aesthetics. Thus, he acknowledges throughout his work the need to find 
new forms of representation. Bourriaud’s use of Daney’s notion of the 
visual is problematic in itself. It is not so much that I disagree with his 
assessment that certain forms of image making are authoritarian and 
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ideological. Rather, it is that the question of the mechanism for this is not 
fully explored. This is why I have used Rancière’s analysis of the taboo 
upon images (as over-signifying or as failing to signify) in order to re-
open the question. This enables the defence of representation as a form of 
consciousness to include the visual. 
 
One of the fortunate consequences of Bourriaud’s rejection of ‘the 
visual’ has been, that this channeled his creative energies into the 
thinking of non-visual forms of representation. His thinking of topology 
appears in Relational Aesthetics although not in an expanded form. In the 
later writing, topology, has an important role to play in the future 
development of representation. For Bourriaud, it provided a means of 
linking relations within transformative matrices, not only as articulations 
of the relations they envelop, but also as the production of relational 
space itself. Bourriaud’s thinking of ‘publicness’ develops markedly in 
this respect from his early consensual model. I believe that the 
complexity of Bourriaud’s thinking of relational space has prompted the 
re-thinking of the philosophy of relation that is a necessary step towards 
re-thinking representational form. In my development of Bourriaud’s 
conjunction and matrice, I have used Gashé’s thought to augment 
Bourriaud’s methodologies of the fragmentary construction and aleatory 
materialism. This connects the use of the topological form with a mode 
of thinking that grants it a purchase upon appearances whilst 
simultaneously rejecting the thought of origin or destination within its 
mode of representation. I have also introduced into Bourriaud’s 
‘encounter’ the notion of relational shape as a means of articulating what 
is specific and sensory within these relations.  
 
Where is the work? What is the ontology and function of the artistic 
document within the social system of relational art? .  
 
I believe that the visual documentation of some but by no means all of 
relational art practice has at times functioned in a similar way to that of 
many live art practices. That is, it has assumed a subaltern role in relation 
 265 
to the ontologically privileged and ‘unmarked’ performance: still and 
moving image documentation becomes a means to an end that does not 
sit well with relational art’s micropolitics in the same way that 
documentation has been regarded as a ‘necessary evil’ of live art. All 
forms of critical art require some means by which to appear and to 
produce their social systems. I have concluded that the proper question to 
ask is about the source of this anxiety. 
 
Visual and moving image documentation is one of the principal means by 
artworks maintain the exchange between the autopoiesis of art, that is, its 
internal logic, and its relation to the forms of the socius that are 
determined hegemonically within the logic of the commodity form. This 
Adornonian thinking holds true even now. It is the basis of a social 
system of art that does not in Rancière’s brilliant maxim become ‘a 
paradise for aesthetes’, nor does it become in Badiou’s terms ‘a 
mysterious debate with power’. Within the critique of relational 
aesthetics this manifests itself in the problem that relational art is clearly 
indebted to previous forms of performance and live art. But in relational 
art’s disavowal of its relation to those forms, at least in Bourriaud’s 
polemics, and, in fact, its annexation of this heritage within a sleight of 
hand that is the performance form, it does not thereby divest itself of the 
burden of representation that performance and live art has wrestled with 
and failed to resolve. I have been meticulously fair to Bourriaud and to 
his anti-historicism. However, in many respects Bourriaud’s ‘use’ of 
form amounts to their excoriation. His anti-historicism denies but inherits 
their problematic, particularly in relation to representation. Bourriaud’s 
aleatory materialism is at odds with his ethics of visual representation but 
he is more willing to point out the idealism of his critics than 
acknowledge this trait within the antecedents of relational art. 
 
This has had some unfortunate consequences for the reading of relational 
art. I believe that relational art is qualitatively and conjuncturally 
different from live art: but equally relational art’s shared reliance with 
live art upon the immediacy of performance as an alternative to visual 
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representation has made it prone to a reading within the teleology of 
performance. This is not a problem in itself but it has precipitated a 
reading of relational art’s essentialism based upon its ethical baggage: the 
ontology of liveness. Auslander’s ‘liveness’ argument clearly demands 
that one accept the mediation of the live by still and moving image. 
Moreover that performance is reliance upon this mediation in order to 
‘presence’ it. Auslander’s account is useful in formulating a notion of 
how visual documentation might perform a role in the broader matrixed 
forms of representation that are currently being explored. My conclusion 
is that a document is merely one element within a performative matrix. 
 
What might a model of the documentary real or more broadly critical 
realism look like? Can relational practice make a claim to critical 
realism? In particular, what can Bourriaud’s notion of operational 
realism contribute to the renewed debate around realism within 
representation? 
 
What is emerging is a picture of post-relational critical realism in which a 
matrix of operations and methodologies of representation are used in 
both the production and inscription of spaces of critical consciousness. 
Critical realism is both an incomplete aggregate of critical interventions 
and a spatio-temporal proposition. Once again, this needs to be viewed 
within the form of a constellation in order to avoid its conceptualisation. 
Critical realism is a movement against its own identity with any concept. 
In a truly Adornian sense, the legitimacy of its claim to ‘realism’ is 
precisely its fragmentary form and therefore, its ability to imitate a 
fragmented reality.  
 
I will highlight some of the operations and multiple forms of critical 
realism. Bourriaud posits operational realism in art as being suspended 
somewhere between ‘contemplation’ and ‘use’. This is not a statement of 
indeterminacy but of ‘lived experience’. It sets out a principle of 
movement between these concepts in which ‘realism’ becomes their 
negotiation. In this sense it is the process of relational art that produces 
 267 
its objectivity. Within the motility of operative realism, artworks are 
simultaneously products, tools and a medium in their own right. In this 
sense, the processual element of Adorno’s thinking is accelerated in 
Bourriaud. Bourriaud’s ‘objectile’ replaces Adorno’s partial 
identification of objects, or we might say that the principle of 
Darstellung in Adorno moves via the principle of Erfharung as ‘passage’ 
in Negt and Kluge’s thought, towards a fully performative and narrative 
inscription of the artwork. In this sense, the ‘realism’ of relational art is 
informed by and attuned to the generalised field of performance that no 
longer affords any opportunity for direct or transgressive presentations of 
criticality. However, it recognizes within this, the potential uses of the 
performance form. Thus, performative artistic labour is the means by 
which subjectivity is contested and at the level of aleatory materialism, 
the means by which novel relational forms take hold. 
 
The critical realism of early relational art operates within a mechanism of 
framing and is thus closer to the notion of the framing of ‘untruth’ that 
we find in Adorno. Bourriaud identifies realism with the point of fissure 
or encounter between two forms. However, in its later development, the 
‘relation of non-relation’ between forms of the encounter and extant 
social forms becomes an instance of productive non-relation, a singular 
presentation, rather than a presentation of irreducible singularity. When 
these forms are conjoined with the principles of topology, mimesis and 
translation they acquire a greater purchase upon the mechanisms of 
appearance. Bourriaud’s real is a conglomeration of surfaces and forms 
that are potentiality malleable. In fact it is this precarity that aligns them 
with the real and in particular with the precarity of capital’s forms of 
labour and its individuation of subjects. In this respect there is a sense 
that the realism of post-relational art acquires its aesthetic ‘indifference’ 
precisely through the mimesis of the techniques of ‘productive’ labour. 
Bourriaud’s ‘realist’ principle of ‘make-believe’ is the narrative principle 
by which its framing mechanisms and its principle of performance are 
brought together in practice.  
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My reading of Bourriaud’s realism is, therefore, as follows: his inductive 
methodology produces, in a manner similar to Adorno, not a complete 
rendering of his object (the social) but a fragmentary construction of its 
elements or facets. On this basis, we might say that it is an objective 
presentation: its appearance is not mediated by any concept. Where 
Bourriaud’s matrices differ from Adorno’s constellations is that they 
contain also a performative principle. Hence, to return to Bourriaud’s 
first point, the matrices of relation are spatio-temporal arrangements, but 
this principle of form is conflated with use. These matrices, as models of 
sociability, are to be used, surfed, negotiated and scripted. Bourriaud’s 
realism might be described as Adornian in its objectivity, that is, it is 
objective precisely because it obeys its own internal logic, but crucially it 
also contains some sense of Negt and Kluge’s Erfharung. It is the 
movement of lived experience and a precarious negotiation of its own 
matrix. When Bourriaud tells us that the way to encounter a relational 
artwork is to ask whether it proposes a world, one that offers an 
invitation to participate within it, I think that he makes an invitation to us 
to produce something real. Whereas Adorno’s realism negatively 
presents the real in its contradiction, Bourriaud’s approach is to perform 
within that (non-relational) space and to inscribe relations through acts of 
social montage and performance.  
 
Political aesthetics has been dominated in the early twenty first century 
by the relational philosophy of Jacques Rancière and the anti-relational 
philosophy of Alain Badiou. Are their philosophical positions adequate 
to the analysis of relational and post-relational art? 
 
Alain Badiou’s philosophy is a poor tool with which to analyse relational 
aesthetics. It is anti-relational all the way down. Yet he remains of central 
importance in framing the nature of relational hypostasis. The rigid 
opposition between the singular and the particular in his work, 
demonstrates the problem that a classical mode of philosophy imposes 
upon thought. Equally, if this non-relation can only be crossed through 
the ruptural emergence of a subjectivising event, this is of little use to a 
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mode of critical art in which performativity and direct action play an 
increasing role. It is only in Badiou’s political polemics that we find a 
cellular model of political organization that might provide any useful 
material forms for relational and communitarian art. This framing of 
hypostasis has informed my conclusion that relational art was already 
post-relational. That it was a diagnostic of relation as much as a 
proposition as to their construction. Rancière proves paradoxically to be 
an anti-relational thinker also on the basis that he refuses any relation 
between community of sense and the extant social institutions. This mode 
of refusal is a means by which to avoid the particularisation of singularity 
and an idealistic over-identification of the political and the aesthetic. If 
one uses either of these approaches in the analysis of relational art one is 
faced with the problem that the premises of these thinkers deny singular 
relation any sensual or material mode of appearance within the social. 
 
Can relational and post-relational art substantiate its claim to be a 
materialist aesthetics and if so, in what sense? 
 
Relational art’s materiality rests upon a set of aleatory materialist 
principles, which may in time enable one to call this, or its current 
counterparts, a materialist art. What relational art has lacked is an 
appropriate mode of appearance, or theory of representation. This is 
crucial. If transitive ethics and aleatory materialism are to work in 
conjunction, and I think they can, then they require some means of 
inscription into consciousness. In aleatory materialism, the encounter 
becomes concrete only when it has inscribed itself in fact. Thus the 
materialism of future relational art will, I think, become established 
provided that modes of both visual and non-visual representation can be 
fully articulated as an artistic language.  
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